Concepts for Army Transformation: A Briefing for the Transformation Task Force

- What You Should Take Away from the Briefing
- Transformation is a Process, not a Destination
- Implications for the Army
- The Path to Army Transformation
- What the Blueprint for an Information Age Army Might Look Like:
  - Operational Level
  - Tactical Level
- Summary + Back-Up Slides
What You Should Take Away From this Discussion

Reorganize the Army:

• to provide more ready, deployable combat power through rotational readiness and unit cohesion.

• to continuously absorb new technologies and develop new capabilities.

• to integrate Army capabilities with the Navy, Marines, and Air Force.

• to mount combined operations and incorporate allies into US-led formations.
Transformation is a **Process**, not a Destination!

- Information processes are sources of power and should drive organization for combat.

- Warfighting systems should co-evolve with concepts and organization.

- Introduction/adaptation of new technology to the force should be continuous.

- Transformation begins when the force exploits new technology and develops the concepts and organizations that are indicated by the new capabilities.
Army’s **Single Service Structure:**
**Designed to Deploy Mass, not Capabilities!**

Too Many Echelons - Too Slow to Decide - Too Expensive to Modernize - Too Vulnerable to WMD!
**Implications for the Army in the Age of Air, Space and Missile Power**

- Army ground forces must integrate seamlessly into the emerging global strike complex.
- New technology compels and enables change in the way Army ground forces organize to fight.
- Army capabilities must be organized for integration with other services at increasingly lower levels.
- Integration of ground maneuver forces with powerful strike assets is the foundation for a true revolution in military affairs!
The Key to Army Transformation:

• Historically, armies confuse transformation with re-capitalization.

• Armies transform when they successfully exploit new technology, new operational concepts, new organizations, as well as new approaches to training and leadership to attain qualitatively superior fighting power.

• Army transformation should create powerful synergies with the new technologies and concepts fielded by air and naval forces.

Question: “What capabilities can the Army field that the Joint Commander is likely to need?”
The Path To Transformation

🌟Step 1. A New Joint Operational Concept

🌟Step 2. A New Organization for Combat that Can Execute the Concept

🌟Step 3. A New Joint Operational Architecture

🌟Step 4. A New Approach to Modernization, Training, Readiness, Personnel Management, Recruiting, etc, … leveraging technology, as well as concepts across service lines.
Redefining Warfare with a new Operational Concept

• The objective of Dominating Maneuver (DM) is to gain a positional advantage in time and space that places the opposing force at such a disadvantage that he is compelled to surrender or be destroyed.

• Dominating Maneuver is not single service.

• Its success depends on the ability to project military power rapidly using air, land and sea power from all points on the globe to converge near simultaneously as joint forces that act in concert to paralyze and defeat the enemy.
Operational Command and Control for the Combat Groups

• Position warfighting C2 in the unified commands.

• Reduce timelines for deployment and enhance responsiveness to crisis.

• Set the stage for an integrated standing Joint Task Force.

• Flatten the Army’s hierarchical structure to permit rapid decision making and planning.
• Army C2 exists within larger “plug and play” joint operational architecture.

• The deep C2 structure plugs the Army into the JFACC.

• The close/deep/rear framework facilitates integration with emerging global strike complex.
### Change in the Operational Architecture Enhances Jointness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>World War II C2</strong> (Remagen, 1945)</th>
<th><strong>Gulf War C2</strong> (Desert Storm, 1991)</th>
<th><strong>21st Century C2</strong> (Information Age)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Theater Commander</strong></td>
<td><strong>CINC, USCENTCOM</strong></td>
<td><strong>CINC, Unified Command</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army Group</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>JFLCC or JTF</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td><strong>Combat Group</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Corps</strong></td>
<td><strong>Corps</strong></td>
<td><strong>Battalion</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Division</strong></td>
<td><strong>Division</strong></td>
<td><strong>Company</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Regiment</strong></td>
<td><strong>Brigade</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Battalion</strong></td>
<td><strong>Battalion</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Company</strong></td>
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</table>
Adaptive organization leverages specialized modules of Army combat power.

Within a training and readiness system that ensures the Army is strategically relevant to Joint Operations across the spectrum of conflict.

Aviation in every Close Combat Group!
Fewer Echelons - Faster Decision Cycle - Cheaper to Modernize

JTF CDR

JTF

(Conduct Operational Maneuver)

(Conduct Offensive OPNS in Joint Operational Area)

(Conduct Tactical Maneuver)

(The Fighters!)

Co/TmOA

MNVR TF

Combat Group

Jointness Begins Here!

Platform
Tactical Reorganization for Joint Warfighting and Rapid Response to Crisis and Conflict

How does the Army construct new specialized modules of combat power from existing assets and incorporate new technologies with new capabilities in the process?

Employ the Close/Deep/Rear framework to simplify Army organization for combat in a network-centric “plug and play” joint operational architecture.
# Notional Army Ground Forces in the 21st Century

## Close Battle Echelon
- 8 Airborne-Air Assault Groups
- 3 Recon-Strike Groups
- 15 Combat Maneuver Groups
- 7 Aviation Strike Groups

## Deep Battle Echelon
- 3 Rocket Artillery Groups
- 7 Air Defense Groups
- TBM/GLCM/ADA
- 7 C4I Groups

## Rear Battle Echelon
- 3 Early Deploying Support Groups
- 3 Late Deploying Support Groups
- 3+ Specialized Support Groups MP, MED ...
- 3 Engineer Groups
- 6 Aviation Support Groups
US Air and Naval Forces can strike targets quickly and accurately nearly anywhere on the earth’s surface.

This creates the conditions for an “Inchon-style” operation wherever the strikes are concentrated.

Reorganization creates a larger combat base of ready, rapidly deployable ground forces that can exploit paralyzing strikes.
## Notional Rotational Readiness Scheme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deployment Scheme</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Deployment</th>
<th>Reconstitution</th>
<th>Forward Presence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>8 Airborne-Air Assault Groups</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3 Light Recon Strike Groups</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>15 Combat Maneuver Groups</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>8 Aviation Strike Groups</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5 C4I Groups</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5 Theater Air-Missile Defense Groups</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3 Early Deploying Support Groups</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notional Light Reconnaissance Strike Group (LRSG)

LRSG
5,000 Troops

Brigadier General
Commands LRSG

ARMED RECON
Twice the Maneuver Strength of a Conventional Maneuver brigade task force!

CMD (C4I) & CONTROL
Robust command structure, IWSR, Cruise Missile & NBC defense within a new Joint Framework

STRIKE
Striking Power of an Artillery Brigade

COMBAT MOBILITY
Ability to breech obstacles, mines and sustain momentum in the attack!

SPT
Power to sustain independent operations for more than a few days!

• 3 Groups CONUS-based designed to move by USAF and commercial aircraft!
Setting: Crisis in the Mediterranean. Competing factions position cruise missiles and air defense technology in a port on North African coast to deny access to US forces.

NCA Direct a Carrier Battlegroup (CVBG) and Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) to position off the coast of the N. African State.

Phase I: MEU Seizes Airstrip 50 kilometers from the port city.

Phase II: LRSG Deploys to Secure Airstrip. (Assumes C17/C5A availability).

Phase III: LRSG and MEU secure Port for use by follow-on Marine/Army Forces (Maritime Prepositioning Force) [Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)].
Joint Maritime Task Force
for Forcible Entry on Day (N+10)

An LRSG
Integrates into a
Marine-Based JTF!
CVBG + MEU Deploy
MEU Secures Airport
LRSG Deploys
LRSG + MEU Secure Port
MEB Lands

Day 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Linking the LRSG to the AEF integrates maneuver and strike assets across service lines!

- Under JFACC command, the LRSG can contribute to AEF success in the halt phase of future crises and conflicts!
- LRSG can conduct operational maneuver to key objectives, compelling enemy to concentrate.
- LRSG Strike assets complement, not duplicate AEF/Naval strike efforts.

AEFs are cross sections of capabilities made available for deployment during specified periods and sized by current force.
Kosovo: The arrival of an LRSG in January 1999 might have made a difference to Belgrade’s calculus.

In a coercive campaign LRSG:

- Provides lighter, but credible land component.
- Makes air and naval components more effective.
- Signals escalation dominance.
- Can shift rapidly between combat and peace enforcement.

Bosnia - Herzegovina

- Sarajevo
- Montenegro
- KOSOVO
- Skopje
- Thessaloniki
- VJ Corps

49,000 troops
355 Tanks
500 BMPs/BTRs
900 Artillery Systems

Light Recon Strike Group
**Example: Group-based Response Force to a Major Theater War (ROK/SWA)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Description</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JFLCC (integrated into unified C2 Structure)</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>In Theater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 COMBAT MANEUVER GROUP (CMG)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>In Theater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 CMG Army Prepositioned Equipment</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>CONUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 CMG Army Prepositioning Afloat Set</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>CONUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 JTF SPT GP Army Prepositioning Afloat Set</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>CONUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 AIR DEFENSE GROUP (strategic air/sea lift)</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>CONUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 AVIATION STRIKE GROUP (in theater)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>CONUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 ROCKET ARTILLERY GROUP (strategic lift)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>CONUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 LIGHT RECON-STRIKE GROUP (strategic air lift)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>CONUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 C4I GROUP in theater</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>CONUS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Bottom line:** This Group-based Force could be ready to attack in two weeks and close in less than 30 days. Another equivalent force is immediately behind the deployed force in the training phase. Mix could include more!
Joint Task Force (JTF) CDR

Jointness Begins Here!

(VII Corps)

Moved to Desert Storm from Germany/US:

43,600 Troops in 30 days.

Combat capability equal to or greater than VII corps in Desert Storm.

100,000 Troops in 120+ days.

VII corps moved to Desert Storm from Germany/US:
America’s NATO allies are moving to force designs that are consistent with the Group approach.

The British and French armies orient contingency planning along the lines of large brigade battlegroups (5,000 troops).

Contemporary German army doctrine organizes warfighting around large mobile brigade battlegroups (5,000 troops).

The Group-based structure can become a model for a commonality of doctrine, organization, and communications in US-led alliance structures.
Transformation should result in significant change to enhance joint warfighting capabilities. It should not “tinker on the margins!”

The uncertain promise of future technology must not thwart change now through the continuous interaction of technology and new organizations for combat.

The combat group concept is a critical bridge to the future. It facilitates continuous adaptation through the incorporation of new technology.