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TO LEAD THE WORLD

American Strategy after the

Bush Doctrine

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2. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2002), 15; also see *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2006).
3. Inaugural address (January 20, 2005), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html>.
4. *National Security Strategy* (2002), 4.
5. For fighting poverty as a "moral imperative," see *ibid.*, 14; for expanding the "circle of development" and "building the infrastructure of democracy," see *National Security Strategy* (2006), 31–34.
6. See, for example, Bob Woodward, *State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006); George Packer, *The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq* (New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 2005); Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: Penguin, 2006); Ron Suskind, *The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of Its Enemies since 9/11* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006).
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8. Philip H. Gordon, "The End of the Bush Revolution," *Foreign Affairs* 85 (July/August 2006).
9. Including us. See, for example, Melvyn P. Leffler, "9/11 and American Foreign Policy," *Diplomatic History* 29 (June 2005): 395–413; Jeffrey W. Legro, *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 166–172.

ONE

A Farewell to Geopolitics

Stephen Van Evera

WHAT GRAND STRATEGY should the United States adopt in the post-9/11 era?

The balance-of-power concerns that shaped U.S. grand strategy from 1917 to 1991 have faded sharply. The nuclear revolution has made conquest among great powers impossible. As a result, other great powers now pose far less threat to U.S. national security than they did in the past.

At the same time a grave new threat to the security of all major powers has arisen: terrorism with weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). This threat stems from two phenomena: the spread of WMD materials and technology and the rise of terrorist groups that aspire to mass killing.

Threats to the global commons, especially global warming and threats to global public health, also seem increasingly serious.

These new dangers pose a common threat to all major powers. And they cannot be defeated without common action by those powers.

Three policies are called for:

- The world's major powers should organize themselves into a grand alliance, or concert—along the lines of the 1815 Concert of Europe—to take united action against WMD proliferation, WMD terrorism, and threats to the global commons. The United States should lead in creating and sustaining this new concert.
- The United States should reorient its national security policies and programs toward counterterror and countering WMD proliferation while downgrading efforts to prepare for war against other major powers.

- Programs to protect the environment and global public health should be given far higher priority in U.S. foreign policy.

American Strategy, 1917–1991: Keep Industrial Eurasia Divided

From 1917 to 1991 American national security policy focused on maintaining the political division of industrial Eurasia. American policy makers noted that industrial Eurasia (Europe plus Japan) in toto had somewhat more industrial power than the United States. They observed that modern military power was distilled from industrial power. They therefore feared that any state that controlled all of industrial Eurasia could exploit its superior economic resources to build a war machine superior to America's. Such a state, they feared, might project its power across the Atlantic and threaten or even conquer the United States. Hence officials in Washington persistently opposed the expansion of states that reached for Eurasian hegemony, fighting bitter wars to contain Germany from 1917 to 1918 and 1941 to 1945 and a long cold war to contain the Soviet Union from 1947 to 1989.

American leaders sold these struggles to the U.S. public with crusading rhetoric of a battle between dictatorship and democracy—as wars of a “free” world against tyranny, waged to save others from evil. The U.S. public largely bought these idealistic arguments. Today many Americans still believe that the United States fought the wars of 1917 through 1989 for idealist reasons. In fact, however, U.S. policy makers acted largely for power-political reasons. They worried that a Eurasian hegemon would possess the power to injure the United States, and worked to prevent any Eurasian hegemony for that reason.¹ The U.S. policy makers' logic paralleled the balance-of-power logic that guided traditional British policy toward the European continent, leading Britain to contain the expansion of France under Louis XIV, Napoleonic France, Czarist Russia, Wilhelmine Germany, and Nazi Germany.²

Terrorism was not considered a significant threat to the United States between 1917 and 1991. Very little terror was directed against the United States during these years. Nor was nuclear proliferation considered a prime threat. During the first five-plus decades of the nuclear era (1945–2001), nuclear proliferation was seen as a worry but one that was subordinate to geopolitical concerns.

Threats to the global commons seemed remote. The global climate seemed unthreatened. Threats to U.S. public health were recognized, but solutions to these threats were not believed to lie in protecting global public health.

The Fading of Geopolitical Threats after 1991

The danger that a Eurasian hegemon might appear and threaten the United States largely disappeared after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.

There is now no plausible candidate for Eurasian hegemony on the horizon. China comes closest, but not very close.³ Someday China may rival the United States in military power, but that day is decades away.⁴ And even then China will pose little geopolitical threat to the United States for four reasons.

First, geography makes China a markedly less plausible candidate for Eurasian hegemony than was Germany in 1917 and 1941 or the Soviet Union in 1947. Germany and the Soviet Union were adjacent to large industrial regions of Europe that they could invade over land. In contrast, China is not adjacent to large, vulnerable industrial regions. Europe's industrial areas are very far from China. Japan is a major industrial region near China, but it lies across a vast water barrier from the Asian mainland. A conventional Chinese invasion of Japan across this imposing water barrier would be nearly impossible. China therefore does not have important industrial targets that it might conquer within easy reach. Geography naturally precludes China from gaining a wider industrial empire.

Second, if China nevertheless does somehow conquer other industrial regions, it will gain little strength by doing so. The reason is that today's postindustrial knowledge-based economies are far harder for a conqueror to harness to aggressive purposes than were the smokestack economies of the 1940s and 1950s. Postindustrial economies depend on free access to technical and social information. This access requires some domestic press freedom and access to the Internet, foreign publications, and foreign travel. But the police measures needed to subdue a conquered society require that these channels be controlled because they also serve as carriers of subversive ideas. Thus key elements of the economic fabric now must be ripped out to maintain control over conquered polities. Conquerors must stifle the productivity of those they conquer in order to control them, leaving conquerors with little or no net economic gain. This is a marked change from the smokestack era, when societies could be conquered and policed with far less collateral harm to their economies.

Third, the rising power of nationalism guarantees that China will pay large costs to police any empire that it conquers. The age of empire on the cheap has passed with the spread of nationalist ideas, small arms, and guerrilla tactics. A Chinese reach for empire will likely collide with effective resistance of the kind that defeated the Soviet Union in Afghanistan (1979–1989) and the United States in Vietnam (1961–1975).

Fourth, and most important, the nuclear revolution makes great powers virtually unconquerable. Any state with a secure nuclear deterrent is secure from conquest, as it could annihilate any attacker. And a secure deterrent is far easier to maintain than to threaten, so nuclear powers can defend themselves even against states with many times their economic power. As a result, the United States could defend itself against China even if China grew to become the world's largest economy, conquered its neighbors, and then found a way to harness their industrial power for war. Under such exceedingly far-fetched circumstances, China still could not conquer the United States without first developing a nuclear first-strike capability against the United States. But a Chinese nuclear first-strike capability is a pipe dream and will remain so. It would require an implausibly overwhelming Chinese economic superiority over the United States. An economically fast-growing and politically unchecked China could never gain such vast economic superiority even in a best-case scenario for China. A Chinese nuclear first-strike capability against the United States is not in the cards. Therefore, a plausible Chinese threat to U.S. sovereignty can be ruled out for the foreseeable future.

For these reasons, addressing geopolitical threats should have far less priority in U.S. national security policy than in the past. Other major powers are not the danger to U.S. security that they once were. Even a vast increase in the assets possessed by China—or Russia or the major European powers—would leave them unable to threaten the sovereignty of the United States. The United States can therefore afford to put much less priority on limiting their power.

Three New Dangers: WMD Spread, WMD Terrorists, Threats to the Global Commons

As geopolitical threats have faded, three dangerous new threats have emerged.

WMD Proliferation

The global security of nuclear weapons and materials has deteriorated in recent years. The Soviet collapse made Soviet nuclear weapons, materials, and scientists more available to terrorists. Enough nuclear material to make tens of thousands of atomic bombs remains in poorly secured Russian facilities, ripe for theft or sale to terrorists.⁷

The advance and spread of technology is lowering the cost of developing WMDs. Even such poor states as North Korea can now afford it. This trend will continue in coming decades as new means of mass destruction emerge from the advances of bioscience and perhaps nanoscience. A megatrend toward the proliferation of WMD capabilities is appearing.⁶

New nuclear proliferators have appeared on the scene. The 1980s and early 1990s saw large counterproliferation successes: South Africa abandoned the bomb, Argentina and Brazil shelved their nuclear programs, and Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus dismantled their Soviet-legacy nuclear arsenals. Momentum seemed to be with the nonproliferation regime. More recently, things have ominously reversed. India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998, North Korea has developed and built nuclear weapons, and Iran has moved further toward developing them. Pakistan's nuclear technology has been spread to others by the renegade leader of Pakistan's nuclear program, A. Q. Khan.

WMD Terrorists

A new breed of terrorists who aspire to mass killing has appeared. The years 1988 to 1995 saw the emergence of terrorist groups—the Islamist al Qaeda (1988) and the Japanese group Aum Shinrikyo (1994/1995)—that pursue mass murder and would use nuclear weapons or other WMDs if they had them. Before the 1990s students of terror assumed that no terrorists aspired to commit mass murder. The watchword was that "terrorists want lots of people watching, not lots of people dead."⁷ Terrorists were assumed to operate in the realm of pragmatic politics in pursuit of defined political aims.

The appearance of al Qaeda and Aum Shinrikyo proved this assumption wrong. Some terror groups do aspire to vast destruction. In 1998 Osama bin Laden proclaimed that "to kill Americans . . . civilian and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible."⁸ A former al Qaeda press spokesman, Suleiman Abu Ghaith, claimed that al Qaeda had a right to kill four million Americans, including two million children.⁹ Clearly, al Qaeda will use WMDs to commit immense murder if it finds the opportunity.

More terrorist groups that aspire to mass killing will likely appear in future years. Millenarian ideas are on the rise in all five major world religions.¹⁰ Such thinking, which views catastrophic events as a good thing, offers a rationale for nihilistic WMD attacks. Hateful forms of nonmillenarian fundamentalist religious beliefs are also on the rise across the globe. The problem of mass murder fueled by violent religious ideas will get worse before it gets better.

Together, the spread of WMDs and the appearance of groups that aspire to mass killing face the United States with a serious threat of WMD terrorism, now and for many years to come.

Emerging Dangers to the Global Commons

If unchecked, climate change could wreak large injury to civilization. Vast damage to global agriculture and to coastal regions could ensue. Scores or hundreds of millions of people could be made homeless by rising ocean waters and desertification of farmlands. This danger is shared by all humanity, as every society will suffer, albeit to different degrees, from the calamity.

Other common threats include the H₅N₁ avian flu virus, other emerging infectious diseases, and the appearance of antibiotic resistance among known infectious diseases. These dangers seem minor—until they arrive. (The 1918 flu epidemic killed 675,000 Americans, more than both world wars combined. Wilhelm II's Imperial German Army and Hitler's Wehrmacht were bad, but flu bugs were worse.) These diseases pose a common threat because they will ignore borders and threaten everyone. The danger they pose is growing with greater interaction between the human and animal worlds and with irresponsible use of medicine, which is creating antibiotic-resistant strains. At the same time, the potential to address these dangers by common action is growing as our understanding of infectious disease expands. Diseases that once were invincible can now be mitigated or defeated by effective common action. Both the threat and the opportunity to defeat the threat are growing.

Climate change and emerging infectious diseases pose common problems that must be addressed by common action taken jointly with other states. Unilateral action by individual states will not be enough.

An American Strategy to Address the New Threats

A U.S. strategy to counter these new threats—WMD terror and threats to the global commons—should have three elements.

Create and Sustain a Concert of Cooperation among the World's Major Powers

In 1815 the victorious powers that had defeated Napoleon feared more mass revolutions like the French Revolution. They also feared conflict among themselves, partly because they worried that interstate warfare would weaken their regimes, bringing on the revolutions they hoped to avoid.¹¹ To address

these problems, they created a Concert of Europe. Under the Concert they agreed to cooperate to repress revolution across Europe while also agreeing on rules to resolve or contain their mutual conflicts.

Today the world again faces a threat from below, this time from WMD terrorists. The world also faces other common threats, especially to the climate and to global public health. A concert of cooperation among the major powers is again needed to address these shared dangers.¹²

A concert is both possible and necessary. It is possible because the world's major states now pose little threat to each other—far less than they did before the nuclear revolution. As noted earlier, nuclear weapons have made conquest among major powers almost impossible. As a result, competition for security, which fueled much conflict among great powers in the past, has greatly abated.¹³ In this way, nuclear weapons have freed the major powers to cooperate against other dangers. Because the powers are less dangerous to each other, they can more easily make common cause to solve other problems.

A concert is also possible because all major powers are threatened by WMD terror and by dangers to climate and health.¹⁴ Being jointly menaced by these threats, they have a common interest in defeating them and so share a common interest in cooperating to defeat them. None will be tempted to say, "those problems threaten you, not us, so we won't help," because they imperil everyone.¹⁵ All will be inclined to cooperate as long as they understand this.

A concert is necessary because WMD proliferation cannot be contained and WMD terror cannot be defeated without common action by the world's great powers. Nor can the climate be protected or global health be preserved by unilateral action by one country.

Counterterror policies often are only as strong as their weakest link. For example, if terrorist groups find haven anywhere, as they did in Afghanistan in the 1990s, they can flourish. One refuge is all they need. Hence every state must deny WMD terrorists access to their own and their neighbors' territory. Exceptions cannot be allowed.

Efforts to police WMD spread and WMD terrorists often are best enforced by threat of economic sanctions against miscreant states.¹⁶ But sanctions are effective only if all major industrial states participate. They are far weaker if a single major state defects. Thus the coalition against WMD spread and WMD terrorists must include every major industrial state.

Broad common action is also required to protect climate and health. No state can protect itself by its unilateral action from the harmful effects of fossil-fuel burning by other countries. No state can fully protect itself from pandemic diseases that emerge from other societies. Instead, a key defense lies in proactive collective public health measures abroad to prevent the emergence of pandemic diseases wherever they might occur.

Can the United States catalyze such a broad cooperation? The United States forged and sustained vast coalitions of states, commanding most of the world's economic power, during World War II and the cold war. If the United States could fashion broad cooperation then, it can surely do it today.

The new concert would require much global consensus building but only modest and feasible institution building. Some new institutions will be needed, but most concert functions could be implemented through existing institutions, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other alliances, the United Nations (UN), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Interpol, and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). A concert strategy is not impossibly ambitious.¹⁷

Other U.S. policies should be subordinated to the need to create and maintain the new concert.

First, and most important, the United States-China rivalry must be kept within bounds so that U.S.-Chinese cooperation against WMD proliferation and WMD terror is maintained. As noted earlier, China will likely rise in relative power for some years, perhaps becoming a peer competitor to the United States someday. A global power shift is under way. History warns that power transitions are dangerous and hard to manage. History further warns that the two strongest powers often clash, as each is the main threat to the other.

If China's ascent is mismanaged, the danger of a United States-China cold war, or even a hot war, will arise. Such conflicts would spell disruption of U.S.-Chinese cooperation against WMD terror and other common threats. This disruption of U.S.-Chinese cooperation would gravely threaten U.S. and global security. Instead, the United States must manage China's rise in a way that maintains U.S.-Chinese cooperation against the new threats.

Second, the United States should eschew strategies and tactics that harm its ability to lead a global coalition as it pursues its war on al Qaeda and its other foreign policy objectives. Instead, it should harmonize its other policies with the requisites of building and sustaining American global leadership. Specifically, the United States should conserve its global legitimacy and avoid policies that undermine it.

This means that the United States should pursue preventive war only in extremis, because preventive war casts the United States in the role of aggressor and so can undercut its legitimacy in the eyes of others. Preventive war should remain as an option but should be waged only with substantial international approval. Accordingly, the 2002 "Bush doctrine," which embedded unilateral preventive war in U.S. strategy as a regular instrument of policy, should be dropped.¹⁸

The United States should also avoid policies that require counterinsurgency, as counterinsurgent action inexorably draws the United States into brutal police work that presents an ugly face to the world. Scandals such as that of Abu Ghraib are likely whenever U.S. forces are asked to conduct counterinsurgency. The best answer is to avoid counterinsurgencies except in extremis. This means avoiding aggressive wars and the occupations they often entail. Instead, U.S. strategy should prefer more indirect and less violent instruments of influence abroad. As a first resort, it should rely on economic sanctions, military action by allies and armed proxies, forceful argument and persuasion through public diplomacy, and occasional covert action—not aggressive war. It should attract others to help with these tasks by persuading them that they will benefit from America's success. This requires adopting policies and rhetoric that persuade others that America acts to further their interests as well as its own and that American success will improve their lot.

Accordingly, the United States should speak in respectful tones to other governments. Before taking action, it should consult these governments on policies that affect their interests and make a plausible show of reflecting those interests in its policies. It should avoid cutting an imperious profile.

Since 2001 the United States' standing around the world has plummeted as publics and elites elsewhere have reacted in allergic fashion to the policies and rhetoric of the George W. Bush administration.¹⁹ What went wrong? The Bush administration regularly broke the rules I outline here. It waged preventive war against Iraq without much international blessing, and in 2002 it adopted a doctrine of waging unilateral preventive wars, prompting arguments overseas that the United States is an aggressor that acts without regard for the broader interest. It entangled itself in a counterinsurgent campaign in Iraq that presents a grim spectacle to the world, arousing others against the United States. It treated other governments brusquely, often leaving them feeling unconsulted or disrespected.²⁰ It sometimes spoke in bullying tones toward others. It presented the arrogant and imperious John Bolton as its face to the world as UN ambassador.

The Bush administration refused, reduced, or ended U.S. participation in a number of international institutions and treaties that are popular abroad. Specifically, it moved to weaken a draft UN accord to limit small arms traffic, it blocked a proposal to strengthen the 1972 treaty banning the production of biological weapons, and it refused to join or remain in a range of treaties, including the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, the International Criminal Court, and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.²¹ Some of these treaties were flawed, but the administration rarely offered to fix them. Instead, it framed its rejection of these treaties in sharp language that seemed to deny that the United States has an obligation to help solve the problems these treaties address. This sharp language fostered an impression abroad that

the United States cannot be trusted to act in the common interest of civilized societies. Some in the conservative movement have further raised eyebrows by talking of the need for an American empire.²² The United States cannot lead a global concert until these policies are changed. Instead, the United States must adopt policies and rhetoric that demonstrate that the United States will act to protect the common global welfare.

Third, the United States must build its diplomatic capacity. American statecraft skills have atrophied in recent years, as the State Department has been poorly funded. American capacity for public diplomacy (shaping ideas abroad) has also atrophied. These skills must be redeveloped if the United States is to lead a global coalition.

Redirect U.S. National Security Resources toward the New Security Threat: WMD Terror

How shall the United States apply the power of a U.S.-led concert to defeat the WMD terror threat?

U.S. declaratory policy should identify the threat of WMD terror as the prime threat to U.S. national security. And the United States should, together with its concert allies, wage the war on WMD terror on every relevant front. Six specific missions should be pursued. Together these six missions form an effective counterterror strategy.²³

Mission no. 1: The military-intelligence offensive. The U.S.-led concert must be prepared to deter regimes from giving haven to al Qaeda by credibly threatening military action against them if they aid al Qaeda. It must be prepared to oust such regimes by force if deterrence fails, as it ousted the Taliban from power in Afghanistan in 2001-2002. It must be ready to build the strength and legitimacy of states such as Pakistan that are willing to root WMD terrorists from their own territory but are too weak to do so.

The United States must also sustain a global intelligence offensive aimed at rolling up al Qaeda networks through police work. This should be done largely in cooperation with allied intelligence agencies.

This offensive should be highly selective. It should focus only on terror networks that threaten WMD attack against the United States or its concert allies. It should be conducted with heavy reliance on proxies and in cooperation with allies. Sideshowes against secondary nuisances, such as Saddam's Iraq or Assad's Syria or local terror groups that do not threaten WMD attacks, should be avoided.

Mission no. 2: Securing weapons of mass destruction and limiting WMD proliferation. All necessary steps should be taken to ensure that terrorists cannot gain access to nuclear weapons or other WMDs.²⁴ Loose nuclear weapons

and materials in Russia and elsewhere must be secured. Nuclear proliferation, especially to potential rogue states such as Iran and North Korea, must be stemmed. This is best done by forging a broad coalition of states to energetically apply both sticks and carrots, including economic sanctions and security guarantees, to persuade potential proliferators to agree in negotiations to forswear nuclear weapons. Discussion of ousting the regimes of potential proliferators should stop, as such talk only feeds the nuclear appetites of these regimes. Force should be used only as a last resort.

The nuclear nonproliferation regime should be bolstered and tightened. The 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) erred in allowing nonnuclear states to build uranium enrichment and plutonium production facilities; states can build such facilities as a move toward nuclear weapons and then withdraw from the treaty and build weapons when they are ready. This loophole should be closed. This will require a new system to provide nuclear reactor fuel to states that agree to forgo uranium enrichment or plutonium production.

The international community should establish a new principle that states have civil legal liability for any damage ensuing from terrorist use of their WMDs. This would give potential proliferators reason to fear that their national WMD programs will bring them major economic harm. The worried finance ministries and business communities of potential proliferators, fearing endless lawsuits if their armed forces lost control of a nuclear weapon or other WMD, would become powerful lobbies against proliferation. All governments would have greater reason to secure existing WMD arsenals. As a result, WMD proliferation would be prevented, and WMD security would improve.

Mission no. 3: Homeland security. The U.S. homeland should be hardened against attack. The current U.S. homeland security program is more a palliative to calm a worried public than a real security program. Instead, the United States should seriously pursue homeland security. The action agenda this requires is well known: reform of the FBI; integration of local police, fire departments, and public health laboratories into homeland security; better control of U.S. borders; greater security for U.S. nuclear reactors, chemical plants, railroads, and ports from terrorist attack; and a rewriting of U.S. insurance laws governing terrorist incidents to give businesses an incentive to harden their infrastructure against an attack.²⁵

Mission no. 4: Waging a war of ideas. The al Qaeda terror threat will persist until the terms of debate in the radical wing of the Muslim world are changed. A program to bring this change in the Islamism terms of debate must be developed. Otherwise al Qaeda will always find new recruits and places to hide.

Mission no. 5: Ending inflammatory conflicts. Al Qaeda feeds on warfare. It exploits the Israel-Palestinian conflict, the India-Pakistan conflict in Kashmir, the wars in Chechnya and Iraq, and past conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo,

East Timor, and Somalia in its propaganda, painting Muslims as victims in these conflicts whether or not they are. It also uses these conflicts as a training ground for its terrorists. Accordingly, the United States should work to dampen conflicts throughout the Mideast region. Mitigating these conflicts would take important cards out of al Qaeda's hands.²⁶ Toward this goal the United States must develop and use its peacemaking capacity.

Mission no. 6: Saving, resuscitating, or intervening in failed states. Failed states are incubators for terror. They provide potential havens in which terrorists can establish bases for training and organizing. The United States should therefore develop state capacity for preventing or ameliorating state failure; or it should develop a strategy for directly applying American power to destroy WMD terrorist elements in failed states using U.S. Special Forces, local proxies, or other elements of U.S. power.²⁷

All six missions—even homeland security—can be better performed with cooperation from other states. However, broad cooperation by other states is essential only for the first two missions, the military-intelligence offensive and the securing of WMDs and limiting of WMD spread. A concert strategy is serving its main purpose if broad cooperation on these two missions is achieved. Specifically, a concert strategy asks that all states firmly police WMD terrorists on their own territory, assist efforts to police WMD terrorists in neighboring states and client states, share global intelligence on terrorists, and cooperate fully with global efforts to secure and contain the spread of WMDs. Help on other issues will be needed from some states, but not from most. Thus a concert strategy does not make impossibly large demands of others. It asks only for feasible and reasonable cooperation.

Performing the six counterterror missions will require large innovations in U.S. national security policy. The United States should put relatively fewer resources into traditional military functions—army, navy, air force—and relatively more resources into counterterror functions. The first two missions, the military-intelligence offensive and securing and limiting proliferation of WMDs, require capable conventional forces. But both missions also require intelligence and postconflict management capabilities, including capacities for state building and conflict resolution in conquered societies; and the second mission requires robust diplomatic skills to persuade others to lock up loose nukes and bolster the NPT. The other four missions—homeland security, the war of ideas, ending inflammatory conflict, and saving, resuscitating, or policing failed states—require largely nonmilitary capabilities. To defeat the WMD terror threat, therefore, the United States must not only maintain strong conventional military forces but also build up nonmilitary instruments: intelligence, homeland security, diplomacy for locking down loose WMDs around the world, and the capacities to wage a war of ideas, to end conflicts

that breed terror, and to rescue failed states. The organizations that will do these things—U.S. intelligence agencies, local law enforcement, the Coast Guard, the Center for Disease Control, local public health agencies, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Initiative (CTR), the State Department Office of Public Diplomacy, the Agency for International Development, and others—must be strengthened.²⁸

Elevate the Protection of the Global Environment and Global Public Health to Higher Priority in U.S. Foreign Policy

These goals are viewed as minor concerns in U.S. foreign policy making. They deserve far higher priority, commensurate with their importance to the national welfare. A solution to climate change will require especially large political effort by U.S. political leaders.

To stem climate change we must replace the global coal and oil industries with new clean-energy industries. The chief barriers to this transformation are more political than technical or economic. The transformation can be achieved at feasible cost by phasing in a steep global carbon tax or a tight cap on carbon emissions in a carbon cap-and-trade system. A carbon tax or carbon cap will spark an explosion of new clean-energy technologies and businesses by giving clean-energy producers the upper hand against carbon energies in the marketplace. But a carbon tax or carbon cap will also be fiercely resisted by the coal and oil industries.²⁹ Defeating them will require an immense political effort. The clean technologies and industries we need can be created; what is needed is the political will to enact the global carbon tax that will create them.

Selective Engagement: A Supporting Element for a Concert Strategy

Before the WMD terror threat became manifest, I favored a U.S. grand strategy that Robert Art calls *selective engagement*.³⁰ Selective engagement still makes sense and should be pursued along with a concert strategy. This works because the two strategies are complementary: a selective-engagement strategy helps establish the preconditions for the broad cooperation that a concert strategy requires. Concert should now be the prime strategy, with selective engagement playing a supporting role.

A selective-engagement strategy defines America's prime interest to lie in the preservation of peace and order among the world's major states and economic regions. It assumes that war among major powers or in economically important areas can harm American economic and cultural interests and can

therefore spread to engulf the United States, and so it should be prevented. The main threat to the United States is no longer conquest but war itself. The United States prevents such war by deterring aggression among the world's major powers and among states in important regions.

Such a policy prevents conflict by raising the cost of aggression for aggressor states and making preemptive or preventive aggression less necessary for status quo powers. It mimics the policy of Bismarck's Germany toward central Europe from 1871 to 1890. In those years Bismarck bolstered peace in Germany's neighborhood by weaving a network of defensive alliances among Germany's neighbors, with Germany at the center of the network. Bismarck believed that Germany might be drawn into any new war on its periphery; that Germany therefore had an interest in peace among these states; that war is more likely when governments believe conquest is easy, as aggressors then believe they can aggress successfully, and status quo powers, being more worried, seek to secure themselves by aggression; and that peace could therefore best be preserved by giving German security guarantees to Germany's neighbors in order to raise the cost of aggression and increase the level of security among these neighbors. Bismarck's policy was a striking success: Europe was unusually peaceful during the years 1871-1890.³¹ Under selective engagement the United States would pursue a parallel policy in three major regions:

- In Europe the United States would preserve peace by maintaining the NATO alliance, thereby offering a security guarantee to all NATO states, and by offering security guarantees to non-NATO states, conditioned on their willingness to respect the rights of others.
- In East Asia the United States would continue to guarantee the security of Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and Taiwan, conditioned on their willingness to behave peacefully toward others. The United States would also reach security understandings with other Asian states, including China.
- In the Middle East the United States would guarantee the security of Israel, conditional on its willingness to agree to peace on reasonable terms with the Arabs. ("Reasonable terms" are essentially those of the four major peace plans that have been widely discussed in recent years: the Clinton parameters of December 2000, the 2003 Geneva Accord, the 2003 Ayalon-Nusseibeh or "People's Voice" initiative, and the Saudi plan of March 2007. These plans call for near-full Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel in 1967, including Arab East Jerusalem and the Muslim holy places on the Jerusalem Temple Mount, in exchange for full and final peace, with

no return of Palestinian refugees to Israel, who instead would receive financial compensation for lost land and homes.)

The Middle East cannot be stable if Israel is not secure, and the United States should look toward eventual (post-Arab-Israeli peace) Israeli membership in NATO to ensure that security. The United States should also pursue as a goal a wider security order in the Mideast region that would dissuade aggression by all against all. The Mideast will be more peaceful if all states in the region are secure, and the United States should seek to create this security.

The details of U.S. policy will differ across these three regions. But in all three places U.S. policy would include a common core principle: the United States will punish aggression by any state and aid any victim of aggression, unless that aggression is justified by accepted international norms.

A selective-engagement strategy complements a concert strategy because it works to reduce conflict among the world's major powers. Reducing such conflict is also a prime goal and a prime precondition of a concert strategy.

Impediments to Adopting a Concert Strategy

Powerful foreign and domestic forces will likely oppose the adoption of a concert strategy unless there is strong leadership for such a strategy.

Special Interests: Foreign Lobbies, the U.S. Defense Establishment

Unlike other great powers, the United States has a peculiar custom of allowing foreign lobbies free run of its national capital. As a result, foreign lobbies often play a large role in shaping U.S. foreign policies.³² Several of these lobbies will take a dim view of a U.S. concert strategy. Taiwan's influential lobby works to prevent détente between the United States and China. It will therefore oppose a concert strategy that would entail building U.S.-Chinese cooperation. Accordingly, its agents and allies in the United States will argue in the U.S. media that China poses a security threat to the United States and that the United States can best address this threat by adopting confrontational policies toward China. (The Taiwan lobby already makes this argument and has won important people in Washington to its view, wrong though it is.) Elements of the Israel lobby that align with Israel's rightist Likud party are leery of tight U.S.-European relations, as Europe is critical of Likud's expansionist policies, so these elements will not be enthused about tighter ties between the United States and Europe.³³

Some Eastern European states, including Poland and the Baltic states, have lobbies that will oppose tighter U.S.-Russian cooperation. Proponents of a concert strategy will have to overcome the disruptive action of these lobbies.

Important elements of the U.S. national security establishment will oppose a concert strategy. The *raison d'être* of most of the U.S. military establishment is defense against the military threat posed by other great powers. It has ably fulfilled this mission for the past century. It will not easily accept a new concert strategy that makes it less important, thus undercutting its claim for big budgets, while putting other nonmilitary government agencies in more important national security roles. The defense establishment is comfortable having the United States in an adversarial stance toward Russia and China, as this justifies big military budgets, so it will reflexively oppose policies of closer cooperation with those states. It will also favor policies that impede such cooperation. For example, we can expect the U.S. defense industry and its friends in Congress to continue pushing for national missile defense, which creates friction with Russia, and for unduly large U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan and for unconditional U.S. support for Taiwan, which create friction with China.³⁴

A concert strategy serves the U.S. national interest. That interest is diffuse and has no powerful lobby to represent it. Foreign lobbies and the defense establishment represent far narrower interests, but these interests are concentrated and organized.³⁵ A strong law of politics holds that concentrated and organized interests trump the general unorganized interest, even when the unorganized general interest is far larger (as in this case). An American concert strategy would need to overcome this dynamic.

American Cultural Insularity and Lack of Global Governing Expertise

America's capacity to execute a concert strategy is limited by the insularity of American culture and the atrophied diplomatic capacities of the U.S. government. Americans know little about the world. They speak few languages. They rarely go abroad. They would rather watch football and *Survivor* than learn of faraway lands and peoples. As a result, few are prepared to become effective global political managers.

The American federal government is unready for the task of global political manager. As noted earlier, the U.S. State Department is poorly funded and has few reserves of expertise on which to draw.

Directing a global concert is a very demanding task. It requires intense focus and deep knowledge of global affairs on the part of the government and the public. These are not America's strong suits.

Americans are poorly informed about current world politics and international history. As a result, the American public has little grasp of the facts that support the case for a concert strategy. This makes public support for a concert strategy unreliable.

For example, most Americans are unaware that the United States rode to victory in both world wars and in the cold war on the backs of its allies. In fact, the United States achieved success largely through others' sacrifices. Yet the American popular myth holds that those wars were won by American heroes and heroics. This urban legend leaves the U.S. public susceptible to the common argument that cooperation with other states provides few benefits and that allies are pests or freeloaders that the United States can do without.

What is the true picture? In World War I the United States suffered 126,000 military deaths, compared with 7,295,000 total military deaths among its thirteen allies. Thus U.S. military deaths constituted only 1.7 percent of the total among the Allied powers.³⁶ In World War II the United States suffered 408,000 military deaths, compared with 10,780,000 military deaths among its eighteen allies.³⁷ Thus U.S. military deaths made up only 3.6 percent of the Allied total in World War II. U.S. allies also made large sacrifices to win the cold war. In all three struggles the United States' allies were essential to its success.

A concert strategy will lack broad public support unless such facts are widely understood. The public must appreciate that the United States did well abroad in the twentieth century only because it forged and led broad alliances. Its great triumphs rested on successful diplomacy that persuaded others to stand with America and share the cost of war. Without allies the United States would have paid a terrible price for victory, if it had won at all. And it will pay a terrible price in the twenty-first century if it goes forward alone, without locking arms with others.

Another example: Americans are broadly unaware of the geopolitical national security concerns (outlined earlier) that led the United States to check German and Soviet expansion in the past century. Hence they are unaware that these geopolitical concerns are obsolete and do not apply to China today. Hence they accept erroneous arguments that China's rise requires the same confrontational response as the past rise of Germany and the Soviet Union.

The U.S. public's ignorance of world affairs makes it susceptible to false claims from special interests who oppose a concert policy for self-serving reasons. A concert policy requires a foundation of strong public support. That support requires a broad public grasp of world politics. Absent that public understanding, special interests may destroy a concert policy by deceiving a gullible public into opposing it.

Neoconservative Foreign Policy Thinking

Neoconservatives have largely shaped U.S. foreign policy in recent years. Their key policy ideas and prescriptions are contrary to the requisites of a concert strategy.³⁸ American policy must turn away from neoconservative ideas to conduct a successful concert strategy. These specific neoconservative ideas and policies should be downgraded or dropped:

- *Unilateral action.* Neoconservatives have a penchant for acting alone. They often see allies as a hindrance, and they disdain international institutions. But unilateralism is a recipe for defeat in the war on terror. The United States cannot quell the terrorists without broad international cooperation. Victory against terror requires many helping hands, just as it did in both world wars and in the cold war.
- *Preventive war.* Neoconservatives argue that preventive war should be a regular tool of statecraft, but, as noted earlier, the United States should wage preventive war only in extremis. A preventive war is an aggressive war, and as such it tends to provoke a wary or even encircling reaction from others unless it is pursued with some international blessing.
- *Bullying and big-stick diplomacy.* Neoconservatives broadly believe that compliance by others is better won by threats than by conciliation. In their view, sticks work better than carrots. Waving the mailed fist makes friends. They believe in the bandwagon theory of alliances, which holds that states align more often with the most threatening state in the neighborhood. They disbelieve its antithesis, balance-of-threat theory, which holds that states align against the most threatening state and that waving the mailed fist brings self-encirclement. Of course sometimes threats succeed, but history shows that balancing behavior prevails over bandwagoning and that bullying conduct usually wins more enemies than friends, especially when directed at major powers.³⁹ Accordingly, a concert policy requires that the United States abandon the tone of bullying and intimidation favored by neoconservatives and instead approach others in a more respectful fashion. Bullying should usually be saved for instances when it can be defended as legitimate—for example, with states that have violated important international norms.
- *Empire.* Neoconservatives believe that empire is both feasible and at times necessary. They favor the creation of a broad American sphere of influence, or empire, in the Middle East. Such a policy will arouse wide opposition around the world, as empire is broadly considered illegitimate in the postcolonial era.

- *The silent treatment.* Neoconservatives believe that talks with other states are often a form of appeasement—a demonstration of weakness that invites predation. Hence they often favor a policy of limiting or refusing talks with states with whom the United States has had friction (such as North Korea, Iran, and Syria at various times in recent years). In fact, talks are not a favor to others. Talks can be a forum for offering assurances but also for twisting arms and sowing fear. They are a setting for conveying and explaining threats and for receiving concessions or even surrender from others.

Successful coercive diplomacy requires talks. Coercive power cannot be converted into compliance by others without discussions in which the coercing state explains to the target state what compliance is desired, how it will be measured, and what punishment will ensue if the compliance is not forthcoming. And, of course, cooperation by others cannot be arranged without talks. The global political leadership that a concert strategy requires cannot be exerted without talking with all relevant players.

Neoconservatives also hold views that impede the development of an effective specific counterterror policy. They generally reject the view that WMD terror is the prime threat to U.S. security. Specifically, they underestimated the threat posed by nonstate actors both before and after 9/11, believing instead that state-sponsored terror or aggression poses the greater danger.⁴⁰ This leads them to favor allocating too few resources to the WMD terror threat. They also believe that deterring or smashing states is an adequate answer to the terror danger. Against Saddam Hussein, many neoconservatives believed that all else would fall into place once the United States defeated the Iraqi army. Hence they failed to see the need to prepare for postwar problems. Against al Qaeda, they have focused on the need to prepare to smash the armies of hostile states while neglecting the need to develop other tools of statecraft, including the capacity to wage a war of ideas, to dampen conflicts among others, to prevent or address state failure, or to lock down loose WMD materials abroad. Their counterterror strategy rests on the false premise that only terror groups with state sponsors can really harm the United States, so defeating terror requires only defeating or deterring these state sponsors. Their belief in this false premise ensures that they will not develop an effective strategy for countering terror.

Neoconservative ideas are almost exactly wrong for the new age. Neoconservatives would reduce American cooperation with other major powers, instead featuring U.S. unilateralism, exactly when U.S. national security requires more cooperation. Neoconservatives would fail to focus on the

greatest threat to the United States, the WMD terror problem. Neoconservatives would pursue an American empire in the Middle East in an age when a reach for empire is no longer feasible and is also likely to worsen the terror threat to the United States by provoking more Muslims to join the jihadis. It is ironic that neoconservatives have risen to power at the moment at which their ideas least fit the times.

Conclusion

Never in modern times have the world's major powers had less reason to compete with each other or more reason to cooperate to solve problems that jointly threaten them all. Current conditions resemble the conditions of 1815, when all the major powers felt endangered by a common threat from below—mass revolution—and cooperated against it. Today the world's major powers are jointly menaced by another threat from below—WMD terror—and by threats to their shared climate and global public health that they must address together. These challenges threaten the whole world and cannot be solved by the unilateral action of a single power. It is therefore both possible and necessary for the world's major states to cooperate to address these problems.

Accordingly, the United States should forge and sustain a broad cooperation against these common problems. It should also refocus its foreign and security policy to address them. This is the best grand strategy for achieving national security in the new era.

Notes

1. Valuable surveys of past American grand strategy are Robert J. Art, *A Grand Strategy for America* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 178–197; Art, “A Defensible Defense: America’s Grand Strategy after the Cold War,” *International Security* 15, no. 4 (Spring 1991): 5–53 (see 10–23); and Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 15–117.

On the role that balance-of-power logic played in American entry into World War II see also G. R. Sloan, *Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy, 1890–1987* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1988), 113–116 (on Franklin Roosevelt’s prewar thought). For examples of prewar balance-of-power thinking in the United States see Livingston Hartley, *Is America Afraid?* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1937), 47–50, 69–75, 138–143, 175; Walter Lippmann, “The Atlantic and America: The When and Why of Intervention,” *Life* 10, no. 14 (April 7, 1941): 84–92; and, discussing these, John A. Thompson, “The Exaggeration of

American Vulnerability: The Anatomy of a Tradition,” *Diplomatic History* 16, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 23–43 (see 36–37).

Such arguments later formed the core of the case for a policy of anti-Soviet containment advanced by its principal intellectual architects, including George Kennan and Walter Lippmann. On Kennan, see John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 25–88. On Lippmann, see Walter Lippmann, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1943), 162–164. Lippmann’s book predates the cold war, but his later writings assume the same balance-of-power logic it expresses. For other civilian and military planners who held similar views, see Melvyn P. Leffler, “The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War,” *American Historical Review* 89, no. 2 (April 1984): 346–381 (see 356–358, 370, 374, 377); and Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 10–13 passim.

2. Winston Churchill summarized this traditional British logic: “For four hundred years the foreign policy of England has been to oppose the strongest, most aggressive, most dominating Power on the Continent, and particularly to prevent the Low Countries from falling into the hands of such a Power . . . Faced by Philip II of Spain, against Louis XIV under William III and Marlborough, against Napoleon, against William II of Germany, it would have been easy and must have been very tempting to join with the stronger and share the fruits of his conquest. However, we always took the harder course, joined with the less strong Powers, made a combination among them, and thus defeated and frustrated the Continental military tyrant, whoever he was, whatever nation he led. Thus we preserved the liberties of Europe.” Winston S. Churchill, *The Gathering Storm* (New York: Bantam, 1961), 186–187.
3. Kennan echoed these arguments in 1951: “It [is] essential to us, as it was to Britain, that no single Continental land power should come to dominate the entire Eurasian land mass. Our interest has lain rather in the maintenance of some sort of stable balance among the powers of the interior, in order that none of them should effect the subjugation of the others, conquer the seafaring fringes of the land mass, become a great sea power as well as land power, shatter the position of England, and enter—as in these circumstances it certainly would—on an overseas expansion hostile to ourselves and supported by the immense resources of the interior of Europe and Asia”; George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950* (New York: New American Library, 1951), 10. For similar statements, see Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 29, 57, and 201, quoting Kennan, National Security Council Report 7 (NSC 7), and John F. Kennedy. Discussing the likely scope and implications of China’s rise are Robert J. Art, “The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul,” in *China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics*, ed. Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); Joseph S. Nye, “The Challenge of China,” in *How to Make America Safe: New Policies for National Security*, ed. Stephen

- Van Evera (Cambridge, MA: Tobin Project, 2006), 73–77; and Edward Steinfield, “Getting China Right,” in Van Evera, *How to Make America Safe*, 79–85.
4. Developing this point are Nye, “Challenge of China,” and Steinfield, “Getting China Right.”
 5. On the danger of insecure nuclear materials, see Graham Allison, *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe* (New York: Times Books, 2004), 143–150, 177; Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, *Securing the Bomb 2006* (Cambridge, MA, and Washington, DC: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2006), and resources at the Nuclear Threat Initiative Web site (<http://www.nti.org>) and the Managing the Atom Web site (<http://www.managingtheatom.org>).
 6. A worrying forecast that WMD technology will continue to develop and spread dangerously is found in Martin Rees, *Our Final Hour: A Scientist's Warning: How Terror, Error, and Environmental Disaster Threaten Humankind's Future in This Century—On Earth and Beyond* (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 1–71.
 7. Terrorist analyst Brian Jenkins in 1974, quoted in Louise Richardson, *What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat* (New York: Random House, 2006), 141.
 8. In 1998, quoted in Anonymous [Michael Scheuer], *Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2002), 59.
 9. In 2002 Abu Ghath announced on an al Qaeda-affiliated Web site, <http://www.alneda.com>: “We have a right to kill 4 million Americans—2 million of them children—and to . . . wound and cripple hundreds of thousands.” Quoted in Allison, *Nuclear Terrorism*, 12. A portrait of the jihadis' worldview and violent intentions is provided by Mary Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006).
 10. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 91–94, 419–446.
 11. On the Concert, see Robert Jervis, “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation,” *World Politics* 38, no. 1 (October 1985): 58–79; and Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994).
 12. Also arguing for a U.S. grand strategy focused on building international cooperation to take joint action is Richard N. Haass, “Is There a Doctrine in the House?” *New York Times*, November 8, 2005; and Nina Hachigian and Mona Sutphen, *The Next American Century: How the U.S. Can Thrive as Other Powers Rise* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008).
 13. I argue that security concerns were a common motive for past wars in Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 125–128, 185–190, 203–206.
 14. Thus, ironically, nuclear weapons both pose a prime security problem and allow the solution to that problem. The possibility of nuclear weapons in the hands of nondeterrable terrorists compels the major powers to cooperate against

- it. Nuclear weapons in the hands of major powers allows this cooperation by dampening security competition among them.
15. Even nontargeted states will be gravely damaged if a nuclear terrorist attack occurs, as a nuclear attack anywhere in the industrial world will likely implode the global trading system, causing a deep worldwide economic depression. There will be no haven from the economic havoc that ensues from a nuclear terror attack.
16. On the effectiveness of sanctions, see Daniel W. Drezner, “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion,” *International Organization* 57 (Summer 2003): 643–650; and Kimberly Ann Elliott, “The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty?” *International Security* 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 50–65.
17. A thoughtful discussion of the requisites for global governance in the new era is Francis Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 155–180.
18. The Bush doctrine was framed in the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2002). A friendly description is Keir A. Lieber and Robert J. Lieber, “The Bush National Security Strategy,” *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State* 7, no. 4 (December 2002), <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/ips/1202/1202/p17-4lieber.htm> (accessed January 21, 2008). For more critical discussions, see Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads*, 81–94; and the “Defense Strategy Review” page of the Project on Defense Alternatives at <http://www.comw.org/qdr/>.
19. On global views of the United States, see “America’s Image Slips, but Allies Share U.S. Concerns over Iran, Hamas,” *Pew Global Attitudes Project*, <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=252> (accessed June 13, 2006). This survey reports that favorable opinions of the United States have fallen sharply since 1999–2000 and are at new lows in some important countries.
20. In 2003 *Newsweek’s* Fareed Zakaria wrote: “Having traveled the world and met with senior government officials in dozens of countries over the past year, I can report that with the exception of Britain and Israel, every country the administration has dealt with feels humiliated by it”; Fareed Zakaria, “The Arrogant Empire,” *Newsweek*, March 24, 2003, 18–33 (see 29). Jorge Castañeda, Mexico’s reformist foreign minister until January 2003, said of Latin American officials: “We like and understand America. But we find it extremely irritating to be treated with utter contempt”; *ibid.*, 29. A retired senior Turkish diplomat, Ozdem Sanberk, remarked that U.S. abrasiveness helped prevent Turkish support for the 2003 U.S. attack on Iraq: “The way the U.S. has been conducting the negotiations has been, in general, humiliating”; *ibid.*, 33.
21. A summary of these unilateral policies is found in Stephen Schlesinger, “War against Havens for Terrorism: Examining a New Presidential Doctrine,” in *The Maze of Fear: Security and Migration after 9/11*, ed. John Tirman (New York: New Press, 2004), 155–168 (see 155–157).
22. See, for example, Frank J. Gaffney, “Worldwide Value,” *National Review Online* 5 (2004): 1–3. Gaffney proposed seven ambitious goals for the second Bush administration, including regime change in Iran and North Korea “one way

- or another." A critical discussion is found in Jim Lobe, "Neocon Wish List," *Foreign Policy in Focus* (November 11, 2004): 1-2. For more discussion of imperial ideas in the conservative movement, see G. John Ikenberry, "America's Imperial Ambition," *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 5 (September/October 2002): 44-60; Thomas E. Ricks, "Empire or Not? A Quiet Debate over U.S. Ble," *Washington Post*, August 21, 2001; and Kevin Baker, "American Imperialism, Embraced," *New York Times Magazine* (December 9, 2001): 53-54.
33. I develop this argument in Stephen Van Evera, "Bush Administration, Weak on Terror," *Middle East Policy* 13, no. 4 (Winter 2006): 28-38; and in Stephen Van Evera, "Assessing U.S. Strategy in the War on Terror," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 607, no. 1 (September 2006): 10-21
 34. An excellent agenda for action to secure nuclear weapons and materials: found in Allison, *Nuclear Terrorism*, 140-209.
 35. A valuable survey of homeland security issues is provided by Stephen E. Lynn, *America the Vulnerable: How Our Government Is Failing to Protect Us from Terrorism* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2005).
 36. My argument is from Stephanie Kaplan, who argues in a forthcoming political science Ph.D. dissertation (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) that war is a tonic for terrorist propaganda making, recruiting, network building and training and thus serves as a general breeding ground for terrorists; she concludes that war prevention and war termination should be a centerpiece of U.S. counterterror policy.
 37. A thoughtful discussion of intervention against terrorists in failed states provided by David Ignatius, "Sept. 10 in Waziristan: What Will Be Done about al Qaeda's Camps?" *Washington Post*, July 31, 2007.
 38. Today the agencies that would lead in a serious war on al Qaeda take a fit backseat to the military services in budget allocation. Specifically, in 2006 the United States spent \$454 billion for the military services and their support. In the same year, the United States spent only \$40 billion on homeland security; only \$1.31 billion on locking down loose nuclear weapons and materials through the CTR; and only \$1.36 billion on public diplomacy. Thus U.S. spending on the military was 11 times its spending on homeland security, 347 times its spending on locking down nuclear weapons and materials, and 334 times its spending on the war of ideas. The United States is like a midget with a strong right arm: powerful in one regard, but only one. For sources, see Van Evera, "ush Administration, Weak on Terror," 35 and notes 17, 31, and 32 on pp. 3739.
 39. Efforts by coal and oil producers to purvey self-serving myths about global warming are described by Ross Gelbspan, *Boiling Point: How Politicians, Big Oil and Global Journalists and Activists Are Fueling the Climate Crisis* (New York: Basic Books, 2004).
 30. On selective engagement, see Art, *Grand Strategy for America*, 121-171.
 31. I develop and offer evidence for Bismarck's argument that war is more likely when conquest is easy in Van Evera, *Causes of War*, 117-239.
 32. A revealing window on how foreign lobbies operate in Washington is provided by Ken Silverstein, "Their Men in Washington: Undercover th

- D.C.'s Lobbyists for Hire," demonstrates that even the former U.S. government of and the press.
33. On the Israel lobby, see John *Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy* A criticism is found in *Abraham and the Myth of Jewish Control*
34. The U.S. defense establishment toward the WMD terror that has its budget cut or its mission
35. More broad-based domestic strategy. For example, some under a concert with states
36. Allied military deaths in World France, 1,630,000; Britain, Serbia/Yugoslavia, 128,000 60,000; Canada, 55,000; India and Greece, 5,000. Data from *Expenditures 1985* (Washington)
37. Allied military deaths in World China, 1,350,000; France, 4; Yugoslavia, 400,000; Britain, 34,000; India, 24,000; New Zealand, 6,000; Ethiopia, 1,000. Data from Sivard, *World*
38. An example of neoconservative Frum and Richard Perle, *At* York: Random House, 2002 include Kenneth Adelman, Gaffney, Frederick Kagan, Kristol, Michael Ledeen, David Wurmser. For its community, see <http://www>
39. On bandwagoning and balance former, see Stephen M. Weber University Press, 1987), 17
40. Before 9/11, the Bush administration warnings from terror expert "Terror," 35-36.