Bill Clinton was the New Age—in more ways than one. He inherited, fully blown, what his predecessors only dimly foresaw: the peaceful demise of a rival empire and the birth of a new system.

Unlike the United States’ Cold War presidents, who lived by enduring rules, President Clinton and his helpers were forced to write new scripts. This has made for a surfeit of theorizing that is unusual for policymakers. Even a cursory glance at the rhetorical record reveals a plethora of general statements: this is how the world is … these are the sources of power that count … this is the order we ought to shape.

Though the United States has never been shy about churning out general statements about its role in the world, the Clinton administration was particularly prolific in invoking principles. Pontification was the name of a game that frequently evoked the atmosphere of an international relations seminar, and the message was remarkably homogenous. Much of it sounded as if the enunciators had all passed through the same school of public and international affairs.

Their professors must have been liberal institutionalists who taught them respect for interdependence, institutions, transnationalism, global issues, and the benign impact of democracy. A smaller group of teachers apparently favored neomercantilist ideas, with a penchant for managed trade and aggressive export promotion. There was likely at least one who did denigrate the soft stuff, reminding the students that states still rule, that conflict is endemic, and that power, even at the end of the totalitarian twentieth century, remains the ultimate arbiter.
How did this New Age administration perceive the United States in the world? How did Clinton and his colleagues view these four issues:

• the structure of global power today,
• the principal threats to the United States and the world,
• the uses of force, and
• the desirable post-bipolar international order?

The Structure of Global Power

Beginning in the early 1970s, U.S. academics and actors like Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski were inordinately fond of the idea of a multipolar world. Although bipolarity was about to tighten in the real world, these observers envisioned either a pentagon-shaped system of the United States, USSR, Europe, Japan, and China, or a world of two triangles—one economic, the other strategic—with the United States occupying the apex of both. In the 1990s, when the world was no longer bipolar, U.S. policymakers stopped speaking the language of geometry or magnetism. That is something of a paradox; although “the last remaining superpower” has become a household term, administration spokesmen avoided such shibboleths as if they were coined by Beelzebub. Indeed, Clinton explicitly rejected the magnetic metaphor. Decisions, he asserted, must be made “without the benefit of some overarching framework, the kind of framework the bipolar ... world provided for so many years.”

After the demise of Soviet communism, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott said there are no longer any global dragons to slay. Instead, according to Policy Planning Director James Steinberg, there is a kind of loose structure made up of traditional allies in Western Europe and in Japan and former adversaries Russia and China. “We live in a world where these four powers, each in its own way, have the ability to significantly affect our security and prosperity,” Steinberg said.

How did the United States relate to these four? Was it back to the quintipolar world of the nineteenth century? Not quite. Then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili believed that the United States was a category of its own:

Today ... the difference, or the “delta,” between the capabilities of our military forces and the military forces of those who would wish us ill is

The Clintonites were careful not to target history’s usual suspects as troublemakers.
greater than at any time in my 39 years of service. And our challenge for tomorrow will be to maintain that “delta” so that a future chairman ... can come before you and say, with the same conviction, that ours are the best armed forces in the world, bar none. 1

Words like “primacy,” let alone “hegemony” or “unipolarity,” would not roll over anybody’s lips, but the agenda was clearly informed by the conviction of being number one. It was vast and ambitious, and the United States was always at the center. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “We must be more than audience, more even than actors, we must be the authors of the history of our age.” 4

What does this “made in the U.S.A.” framework entail? Boundless ambition. First, Albright said that the country must remain a European power and a Pacific power. In addition, a democratic Russia and Ukraine must become strong partners. The United States must also shepherd along North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enlargement and supervise the implementation of the Dayton accords, much of whose success is due to leadership from Washington. In Asia, the United States had to continue to manage its multifaceted relationship with China. In the Middle East, diplomatic engagement would build on the dialogue between Israel and Palestine. In addition, there were proprietary interests in a whole slew of secondary bailiwicks: Cyprus, Northern Ireland, India and Pakistan, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Central Africa. In each of these areas, U.S. leadership was seen as salutary and necessary.

Albright laid out more details to the ambitious agenda. The points included creating a global economy that places the United States at the hub. In addition, the country must promote arms control and nonproliferation, freedom and the rule of law, and pursue a hard line against international terror, crime, and drug dealing. Clinton put it all in one simple sentence: “We must continue to bear the responsibility for the world’s leadership.” He continued,

These are the kinds of things that America must continue to do. From Belfast to Jerusalem, U.S. leadership has helped Catholics and Protestants, Jews and Arabs to walk the streets of their cities with less fear of bombs and violence. From Prague to Port-au-Prince, we are working to consolidate the benefits of democracy and market economics. From Kuwait to Sarajevo, the brave men and women of our armed forces are working to stand down aggression and stand up for freedom. 5
If there was a “Clinton doctrine,” it is this, as stated by the president, “The United States cannot and should not try to solve every problem, but where our interests are clear, our values are at stake [and] where we can make a difference, we must act and we must lead.”

“We must act and we must lead”—that is the theme that betrayed at least a psychic sense of primacy. The self-perception of primacy or unipolarity led the United States to believe it was the indispensable and inescapable nation. Sure, there were those four other power centers in the world, but they were not co-equal. They relate to the United States as spokes do to a hub, as players to a conductor. It is a triple-tiered structure. The United States is on top; on the next level down, there are four potential equals that the United States accords special status; at the bottom of the pyramid is the rest of the world. Though the four near-greats have one or several types of chips at their disposal, the United States has more than everybody else, and only Washington can play at every gaming table simultaneously.

Slaying Dragons

Left after the Soviet Union’s collapse were many smaller and more abstract and remote dragons. As serious fire-breathers, they lurked not in the now but in the future: the breakdown of cooperation, the defiance of the rules by protectionists or terrorists. It was the “rogue states” and subnational actors such as crime and drug lords who threatened the fabric of peace, not to mention the global issues such as warming and pollution that menaced the world’s welfare.

The Clintonites were careful not to target history’s usual suspects as troublemakers—rising states such as China, economic powerhouses such as Europe and Japan, or resurgent ex-giants such as Russia. These potential rivals were all portrayed as either reliable old friends (Western Europe and Japan), or candidate-members of the U.S. orbit that were already grasping Washington’s hand (Russia), or acolytes that would soon be integrated into the community of responsible great powers (China). As to the emerging giant in the Far East, Clinton’s embrace was conditional:

America has a profound interest in seeing that China is stable, open, at peace with its neighbors. We want it to embrace political pluralism and the international rules of civilized conduct. We want a China that works with us to build a secure and prosperous future. ... If we engage China, instead [of] isolating ourselves from her, we can help to influence the path it takes.”
So if former enemies were not the threat, what was? Isolated dictatorships were becoming democratized and technological forces of the information age made borders more permeable. But a key peril, curiously, was seen to grow from the best things of international life: integration and globalization. These forces were changing people’s attitudes. “The forces of global integration are a great tide, inexorably wearing away the established order of things ... People fear change when they feel its burdens but not its benefits. They are susceptible to misguided protectionism; to the poisoned appeals of extreme nationalism; and [to] ethnic, racial, and religious hatred.”

In addition, global environmental challenges; reckless acts of “rogue states”; and alliances of terrorists, drug traffickers, and international criminals presented new challenges that cannot be conquered by a single nation.

The clash of civilizations, especially in the Balkans, also continued to worry Clinton.

History and geography have conspired to make that area the most explosive powder keg on the continent of Europe. The Drina River ... traces one of the world’s most treacherous fault lines. The three communities that live there—Serbs, Croats, and Muslims—bear the legacies of two empires, three religions, and many cultures. That means if the fight among them continues unabated, it might eventually draw in other nations to the south and east, including ... Macedonia and Albania ... Greece and Turkey, two of our NATO allies that are also regional rivals.

There were, finally, the moral threats: violations of human rights, hunger, disease, care for refugees, the survival of infants and children, domestic violence, and the conscription of young girls into prostitution. In short, the United States should lead the way to protect the rights of more than half the people on Earth.

Thus, the tightly focused threat agenda of yore had given way to an almost open-ended one. For the Clintonites, there was virtually nothing on the planet that did not spell one hazard or another—and an U.S. obligation to act. It is hard to recall another period of U.S. diplomacy when so rich a tableau of threats was painted to legitimize so vast an agenda of action. Or, in Albright’s words, “Today, the greatest danger to America is not some foreign enemy; it is the possibility that ... we will forget ... that problems abroad, if left unattended, will all too often come home to America.”

With that, Clinton’s secretary of state could put to shame Woodrow Wilson, Jimmy Carter, and all the global meliorists who have peopled the U.S. stage since 1776.
Hegemony on the Cheap

What resources was the Clinton administration willing to commit to so vast an agenda? How did virtually unlimited ends relate to inherently limited means? With no existential enemy in sight, this traditional question had evidently changed from “How much do we have?” to “How much are we willing to commit?” In total wars, even when they remained cold as against the Soviet Union, the nation was willing to issue large, if not blank, checks; there was no burden too heavy, no price too high, as John Kennedy famously put it. Great threats generated great means almost automatically.

In a world without towering dragons, the Clintonite United States came to look for hegemony on the cheap. The critical limiting factor quickly became lives lost and casualties sustained. Beyond core values—the nation’s physical existence and its way of life—the price the United States (or any democracy) is willing to pay may have dwindled to two-digit numbers. Dead servicemen numbering 241 in Lebanon and 18 in Mogadishu were enough to terminate the U.S. intervention in either case. The air war over Kosovo in 2000 was deemed successful with zero casualties.

Given this low tolerance, the Clintonite agenda was indeed breathtaking. Anthony Lake, Clinton’s nation security adviser until 1997, outlined seven tasks which may call for the use of force: 11

- to defend against direct attacks on the United States, its citizens and its allies;
- to counter aggression;
- to defend our key economic interests;
- to preserve, promote, and defend democracy;
- to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, international crime and drug trafficking;
- to maintain our reliability (in order to sustain the credibility of U.S. leadership); and
- to combat famines, natural disasters, and gross abuses of human rights.

No European, Russian, or Chinese government would ever enunciate an agenda so open-ended. In truth, no U.S. government, certainly not Clinton’s, would ever want to be held to it, so the qualifications came thick and fast. First of all, there was to be no automatic use of force, except for an attack on the nation or allies. (Make “allies” conditional, one should add, because not even NATO, the United States’ most entangling alliance, provides for an automatic commitment of force.) Clintonites also believed that threatening the use of force could achieve the same results as actually using...
it. In addition, selective force was more appropriate than massive use, and exit strategies became paramount. Since Vietnam, the specter of an indefinite, and perhaps losing, engagement has been the trauma of U.S. strategy, and so knowing when to get out had dethroned Douglas MacArthur’s “there is no substitute for victory.” Lake called for the United States to “give our armed forces a clear mission with achievable military goals.” This was code-speak (and has been since the days of Caspar Weinberger) for a posture that will have no truck with grand ambitions unless the risk of failure and/or of unbearable costs can be reduced to near zero. In earlier days, say from the Civil War to the Cold War, great objectives warranted great efforts and risks. In the 1990s, the risk shaped and constricted the objective. Means were not tailored to the end; the end was tailored to the means.

The reluctance to accept casualties came to rule military planning most dramatically during the Kosovo war of 2000. Thus, the bombing had to be carried out from altitudes that proved self-stultifying and ultimately immoral. Unable to find, let alone hit, military targets, U.S. and NATO bombers went after Serbia’s civilian infrastructure. Unwilling to commit ground forces, the alliance allowed Serb forces to disperse, hide, and finally emerge from the war almost unscathed.

The reason for letting Serbia’s Slobodan Milosevic snatch quasi-victory from the jaws of defeat was obvious—and perhaps intrinsic to mature democracies. Macbeth said it well: “If it were done when ’tis done, then ’twere well / It were done quickly.” Protracted engagements spell mounting casualties and declining domestic support. This led to the paradox of the Persian Gulf war when the greatest force since World War II (600,000 troops) was assembled not to achieve great ends, but to protect the force itself. In early 1998, when the United States was contemplating another intervention against Saddam Hussein, Secretary of Defense William Cohen told the troops, “We intend to take care of you ... we intend to minimize the risk to your lives. ... We will do our level best to minimize the risk of harm.” He added, “That is why ... the mission itself ... has been very carefully circumscribed.”12

So, Albright asked rhetorically, “Why don’t we use military force to remove Saddam from power?” Her answer, “[T]oppling Saddam requires a far vaster commitment of military force and a far greater risk to U.S. lives than we need to contain the threat of [his] weapons of mass destruction.” In other words, the means define the end; the risk of lives—and domestic support—limited what the United States must and can do.
The critical limit to the use of force was domestic support. When Cohen was asked whether the United States might go to war against Iraq without strong public support, he replied warily, “[A]ny president must go before the American people to persuade you that it’s in our national interest to put our sons and daughters in harm’s way, and that we have a national security interest in seeing this military action through.”

Yet in an age when the United States enjoys a surfeit of core security, the “national interest” rings neither clear nor strong. Threats are diffuse, abstract, and remote, and so are the perceived gains force might extract. Justifying force even stumps presidents. When Saddam grabbed oil-rich Kuwait, raising the specter of Iraqi dominance over a strategic region and strategic resource, President George Bush was reduced to invoking “jobs, jobs, jobs” as reason for intervention. Absent compelling national interests, force must be used economically, synergistically, and on the margin. That was also the lesson of Bosnia. The United States opted for a punishing strike against the Bosnian Serbs only in August 1995, three years into the war. It was not just the horrors of Srebrenica that galvanized, if ever so briefly, U.S. and Western opinion. For earlier, the arming of Croat and Muslim forces had begun to bear fruit, as demonstrated by several routs of the Serbs. Once the balance on the ground was favorable, U.S. air power could tilt it economically, swiftly, and with little risk—and then reap the political profits at Dayton a few months later.

The Clinton administration used force two-and-a-half times during its tenure: in Bosnia, Iraq, and Kosovo. What do these cases tell us about the new U.S. way of war? The 1995 U.S. intervention in Bosnia suggests that the national interest, even if its objective is remote and abstract, might still warrant the deployment of force, but its size will be small, and it will be used only if

- the ends are very modest (bludgeoning the culprit to the bargaining table);
- the human costs are virtually nil (because of technological superiority and a severely weakened enemy); and
- international support is very high (all of NATO joined in while Russia refrained from mischief).
In 1998, when Saddam threw out the United Nations (UN) inspectors, the United States almost intervened in Iraq again. That it did not makes the point. If the national interest can be defined only in abstract terms (upholding the credibility of the UN, keeping nonexistent weapons out of a weakened dictator’s hands), a small force will be deployed, but only halfheartedly so. It will not be used when

- the ends are either vague (destroying what cannot be accurately targeted) or excessive (changing the adversary’s political system);
- the gains are uncertain (there was little expectation of finally toppling Saddam); or
- international support is low and dwindling, requiring an enormous expenditure of political capital, which adds to costs (America’s former Gulf War allies, the Arabs and the Europeans, were highly critical of U.S. intentions).

In the end, the United States and Great Britain opted for an intermittent low-intensity air war that could be carried out because it attracted virtually no attention at home or abroad. In the Kosovo conflict, conditions were far more favorable. Breaking Milosevic’s will seemed easy and inexpensive; there was a high degree of allied participation (hence legitimization), and the risk of Russian and Chinese mischief was low. In sum, the administration’s unspoken maxim on the use of force was brief and concise: make it cheap and/or make it fast—or don’t use it at all.

This is hardly the worst grand strategy for a power that enjoys primacy, but not hegemony. For the United States as for Britain in the past, the economy of force is the better part of valor because its superiority is neither overwhelming nor guaranteed forever. Nor can the United States count on the automatic succor of allies abroad and the electorate at home. Power must not be expended wantonly or provocatively so as not to tempt the lesser players to coalesce in countervailing combinations. So, power must be invested wisely if primacy is not to wither soon.

The Teleology of Technology

Official visions could be summed up nicely under the heading “Condorcet in Computerland.” It was teleology rather than deontology. Clinton, Albright, et al., did not paint an international order that should be, but is about to be, fed by inexorable forces that will bring about good as if decreed by an unseen god. That god was democracy, and his archangels were three: information, integration, and innovation (or technology).
Condorcet, the French philosopher of the eighteenth century, is apropos because he was most explicit in relating theory to teleology. The theory is the one usually identified with Kant: democracy equals peace. Yet Condorcet adds the elements of historical optimism—indeed, necessity—to the inherent pacificity of democracy/republicanism/liberalism. According to Condorcet, modernity (i.e., the eighteenth century) was the tenth and final stage of history. It transcended the nine previous chapters that recorded nothing but bloodshed, injustice, and oppression. Democracy/republicanism was the “end of history,” to coin a phrase. Its triumph being ordained, peace would reign forever more.

Though presumably unaware of Condorcet, and at best only vaguely familiar with his ideological offsprings, Hegel and Marx, the Clintonites used to talk pure Enlightenment, but with a heavy admixture of Intel and Internet. Theirs was the teleology of technology. Their argument about the ordained new international order contained the following elements.

First, straight Kantianism: “Democracy is not only the best guarantee of human rights,” argued Albright, “it is the most fundamental source of peace and prosperity as well.” Talbott made the case more fully, saying that democracy is good not only for the country where it is practiced but also for that country’s neighbors and the community of states. This experience has established a body of evidence that shows that democracies are much less likely to go to war with each other, persecute its citizens, create refugees or environmental disasters, or engage in terrorism. In short, Kant was no longer buried in Königsberg, but safely ensconced on the seventh floor of the U.S. State Department.

How would democracies inevitably triumph? The Clintonites mapped out two paths: a philosophical and a practical one. Philosophically, there was hardly a problem because the expansion of human rights and democracy was essentially preordained. Eighteenth-century liberals would have added “by natural law.” Bill Clinton did not use the term, but natural law is what he invoked when expounding in almost Lockean language, “These rights are universal—not U.S. rights, not Western rights, not rights for the developed world only, but rights inherent in the humanity of people everywhere.”

But why will these ideas prevail? Fortunately, the late twentieth century had spawned an irresistible agent of historical necessity: technology. Listen to Clinton as he describes the global forces that will soon blanket the world with Kantian republics:
In a world that links rich and poor, North and South, city and countryside, in an electronic network of shared images in real time, the more these universal rights [enshrined in the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights] take hold, the more people who do not enjoy them will demand them.

Armed with photocopiers and fax machines, e-mail, and the Internet, supported by an increasingly important community of nongovernmental organizations, they will make their demands known, spreading the spirit of freedom which, as the history of the last 10 years has shown us, ultimately will prevail.

What about the practical side? All teleologists from Condorcet to Lenin have always faced the gap between what history has ordained but is not yet. What then is to be done until the revolution comes?

In a vivid testimony to their optimism and self-esteem, the Clintonites bestowed on themselves the role of midwife. Because of U.S. leadership, Talbott asserted, and because the story is still unfolding and will be for a long time, the United States must remain in a position of international primacy.

In other words, history needed a little help from its friends (a.k.a., Washington). The United States was the chosen agent of necessity because the “political and economic principles that we have nurtured here ... for [more than] 200 years are now ascendant around the globe.” Practically parroting James Madison, Clinton proclaimed that “our values and our interests are one and the same.”

As in the late eighteenth century, there was no clash between what order demands and interests permit. “We must support democracy and human rights if we want a policy that not only reflects our ideals, but also reinforces our interests. Promoting democratic values amplifies our authority and credibility. Our interests are most secure in a world where the rule of law protects both political rights and the free market.”

How to promote this miraculous convergence of ideals and interests? One might think that U.S. interference was hardly required if sheer historical necessity drove the process, for such a chariot hurtles forward on its own, pulled only by integration, globalization, technology, and knowledge. Nonetheless, the Clintonites did not want to put all their money on necessity which, logically, would put the “last remaining superpower” out of a job. So, the Clintonites believed, the United States must shape globalization.

“Our purpose is to see that, in the hurly-burly of globalization, the forces of integration prevail over those of disintegration; that we move from the
bipolar world of the Cold War to a world with many different centers of wealth, culture, and power, but where the inevitable tensions among them do not lead to destructive conflict.”20 Hence, “promoting democracies that participate in this new global marketplace is the right thing to do [for the United States].” Furthermore, the enemies of democracy and integration must not prevail. The enemies of goodness were everywhere and so, “in order to keep our streets safe [at home], we must attack sources of crime at the far ends of the Earth.”

In policy terms, this required vigorous multilateralism above all. Clintonites asserted that the bilateral structure of government-to-government talks that had been the past staple of U.S. diplomacy could not address threats such as terrorism, drug trafficking, and environmental disasters. A second prescription was institutionalism. The United States had to strengthen institutions that worked for global peace and prosperity such as NATO, the UN, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank to help share the burden.

Just in case neither multilateralism nor institutionalism took care of international order, the United States must engage in “uni-multilateralism,” so to speak. It must lead, or orchestrate, all the other powers of weight. In the end, the politics of goodness has to be flanked by good old realpolitik, with the United States acting as hub to the spokes that converge on Washington. It is “structured multipolarity”—ever-shifting combinations, but an enduring constellation centered on the Beltway. The unspoken premise was “he who orchestrates, will not be encircled; he who pulls the strings, will not be felled by the slings of rivals.”

One spoke of the wheel was U.S. leadership in Europe and, as the U.S. alliance system expanded, it would also export order eastward. A second spoke was to be put in place by forging a partnership with democratic Russia. A third spoke was an alliance with Japan. A fourth spoke was China, and thus led to the encouragement of China’s participation in the international community.

Subsidiary spokes were the regional organizations: members of the North American Free Trade Agreement; the Organization of American States; the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum; the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; and the Organization of African Unity. Why so? “In my view,” mused U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations Bill Richardson, regionalism was good because it is “representative of a larger worldwide movement toward the acceptance of democracy, open borders.” It was all part of the larger teleology and more: these institutions promote the U.S. interest in world order. Where the UN was overburdened by peacemaking or hamstrung by its veto-members, regional organizations were seen as incubators for creating strategies toward effective peacekeeping and peace building.

U.S. History

History was going the United States’ way during the eight Clinton years. Where it moved too slowly, the United States would provide a dynamic push. Where “anti-historical” forces pushed to the fore, U.S. leadership would contain and reverse them. The United States could do so economically and synergistically because only it was capable of coordinating the other power centers. As National Security Adviser Samuel Berger put it,

No other nation has the muscle, the diplomatic skill, or the trust to mediate disputes, nudge opposing sides to the negotiation table, or when appropriate, help enforce the terms of an agreement. Israelis and Palestinians finalize their agreement on the White House lawn. Bosnians huddle at Dayton. Haiti’s dictators yield to our military threat. The parties in Northern Ireland look to America for help in their courageous quest.21

The moral of it all can be compacted into one sentence. At the end of the millennium, the “American Century” was not over, it had just begun. That was the heady message of the administration’s rhetorical record on the cusp of the twenty-first century. It was a rampant historical optimism that was last heard so loudly and clearly in the days of Jefferson and Madison—when the Republic was very young, when it knew nothing about the toil and tragedy that would attend its rise to global preeminence in the twentieth century. But the Clinton administration was lucky. During eight years in power, its rhetoric was tested only meekly and fitfully. Unlike all his predecessors—from Roosevelt and Truman to Reagan and Bush—Clinton faced only one existential crisis. It was self-inflicted, unfolding at home, not abroad.

Notes


4. The idea of America-as-Model was echoed by National Security Adviser Samuel Berger: “The ideas increasingly if not universally being embraced today are the central ideas that define America: democracy, liberty, free enterprise.” “A Foreign Policy Agenda for the Second Term,” address before the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., March 27, 1997, typescript.


6. Ibid.


