Fool's Errands:
America's Recent Encounters with Nation Building

Gary T. Dempsey

After the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's seventy-eight-day bombing campaign against Yugoslavia came to a close in June 1999, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright toured the Stenkovic refugee camp in northern Macedonia, where twenty-five-thousand ethnic Albanians from Kosovo lived in temporary shelters. To great cheers, Albright announced to the refugees, "All the world knows about your suffering" and now "the Serbs have lost control over Kosovo." ¹ Albright then paid a visit to thousands of U.S. troops preparing to move into Kosovo as peacekeepers. "The country you will be freeing has gone through some dreadful times," she declared. "I know this is not easy on you. We are deeply honored to have you do this." ² "Your job," she added, is appropriate: "I believe this is what America is good at[:] . . . helping people." ³

Several days later, President Bill Clinton toured the same refugee camp that Albright had. He was greeted by ethnic Albanians chanting "USA, USA" and "Clinton, Clinton." ⁴ With his wife and daughter at his side, the [End Page 57] president walked through the muddy camp making family-to-family visits. Stopping to chat with one family, the president placed its two-year-old boy on his lap and said, "We hope with each passing day you will become less afraid. You have a beautiful boy."

"He is still very much afraid," the boy's mother answered. "He has suffered very much. He has seen people killed and wounded."

Surrounded by reporters, Clinton replied, "There are some things children should never see." Meeting with other refugees later that day, the president declared, "You have suffered enough. . . . I don't want any child hurt. I don't want anyone else to lose a leg or an arm or a child." Before leaving the camp, the president thanked the refugees for "sharing their lives" with him and his family. He then delivered a short speech in which he echoed Albright's belief that "helping people" is a U.S. foreign policy priority that America is "good" at doing: "We are proud of what we did. We think it's what America stands for. . . . We are committed not only to making Kosovo safe but to helping people rebuild their lives, rebuild their communities." ⁵

But were Clinton and Albright right? Is the United States government really any good at "helping people" in troubled places? America's recent encounters with nation building suggest the contrary. Indeed, Washington said it would bring order to Somalia but left chaos; it went to Haiti to restore democracy but produced tyranny; it intervened in Bosnia to reverse the effects of a civil war but now oversees an unsustainable peace; and it occupied Kosovo to build a multiethnic democracy but has instead witnessed ethnic cleansing on a widespread scale. That all these recent attempts at nation building have not actually solved the problem they set out to address seems not to have phased policy makers. Yet before Washington's troubling pattern of failures can be accounted for in more detail, it is first necessary to define the term nation building and its place within America's post-Cold War foreign policy. [End Page 58]

Nation Building

Nation building is perhaps the most intrusive form of foreign intervention there is. It is the massive foreign regulation of the policy making of another country. The process usually entails the replacement or, in the case of a country in a state of anarchy, the creation of governmental institutions and a domestic political leadership that are more to the liking of the power or powers conducting the intervention. Since such profound interference tends to elicit resistance, the nation-building process typically requires a substantial military presence to impose the nation-building plan on the target country.

The U.S. government is not new to nation building. It concluded the nineteenth century with a war to "liberate" Cuba from Spanish "tyranny." For the next quarter century, U.S. Marines tried to teach various countries in the Western Hemisphere to "elect good men," as President Woodrow Wilson put it. During the 1920 presidential campaign, candidate Warren Harding criticized the Wilson administration's nation-building policies after Wilson's vice presidential running mate, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, boasted that he had written Haiti's constitution while he was serving as the assistant secretary of the Navy. Harding replied that he "would not empower an assistant secretary of the Navy to draft a constitution for helpless neighbors in the West Indies and jam it down their throats at the point of bayonets borne by U.S. Marines." ⁶ When the U.S. government departed Haiti in 1934, according to one Haitian historian, it left "some good roads and a few schools, but little democracy." ⁷ It also left a U.S.-trained paramilitary that brutalized the Haitian people and dominated Haitian politics for several decades to come.

After World War II, the United States mobilized extraordinary resources to transform America's war-time enemies, Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, into liberal democracies. During the Cold War, the United States undertook nation-building efforts in South Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon, and El Salvador. Since the end of the Cold War, nation-building experiments have been tried in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and now in Kosovo.

The concept of nation building became a topic of analysis among political [End Page 59] scientists during the 1960s, and it was closely linked with the idea of postcolonial modernization. ⁸ Much of the analysis, however, focused on the creation of state allegiance rather than on the creation of states themselves. That had much to do with the fact that governmental institutions and territorial boundaries were often left in place by the withdrawing colonial powers, so those elements were often presumed. Still, some analysts questioned the very premise of "building" nations. In 1963, for example, Harvard University professor Carl Friedrich pointedly asked, "Are nations really built? Or, rather, do they grow?" ⁹ To be sure, explained Friedrich, the Renaissance view, epitomized by Machiavelli, holds that nations are built by "superior men of heroic stature," but the question of "reason of state" must also enter the picture: that is, what are the concrete historical "reasons which require rulers and others" to take action in the first place? ¹⁰ Or, to pose it somewhat differently: Are nations actually built, or do they develop after the populations in question come to believe that it is a collective imperative?

Gunpoint Democracy

By the time President Clinton entered office in January 1993, foreign-policy thinking in Washington had shifted away from focusing on the geopolitical containment of the Soviet Union toward redefining U.S. foreign policy for the post-Cold War world. One theme that proved popular with the foreign policy establishment and that coincidentally required maintaining Cold War-era levels of global activism and defense spending was that of "promoting democracy." An exhaustive review of the literature employing this theme is beyond the scope of this essay, but a few examples are in order. In an influential article in the summer 1993 issue of Foreign Policy, Morton H. Halperin urged the United States to "take the lead in promoting the trend toward democracy," adding that "when a people attempts to hold free elections [End Page 60] and establish a constitutional democracy, the United States and the international community should not only assist but should guarantee the result." ¹¹ Halperin was subsequently appointed head of the Clinton State Department's policy planning staff. Other voices soon joined in the promoting democracy chorus. In 1994, Tufts University professor Tony Smith asserted that the "promotion of democracy worldwide" should be put at the center of America's national security strategy. More recently, David Rieff, deputy editor of World Policy Journal, claimed that America's interest in promoting democracy should lead it to revisit the League of Nations system of setting up protectorates: that is, return to "[President Woodrow] Wilson's original idea, which was to take control over certain territories in order 'to build up in as short a time as possible . . . a political unit that can take charge of its own affairs.'" ¹²

Using "promoting democracy" as a pretext for continued global activism, however, was not an idea limited to scholars and pundits on the establishment left. In 1991, American Enterprise Institute scholar Joshua Muravchik argued that the "promotion of democracy" should be made "the centerpiece of [post-Cold War] American foreign policy." ¹³ Echoing that view in 1996, Michael A. Ledeen, also of the American Enterprise Institute, recommended that America "embrace the Democratic Revolution and make it the centerpiece of [its] international strategy." ¹⁴ By the end of the decade, Heritage Foundation fellow Ariel Cohen was advocating a "building democracy" agenda, noting, "To the extent that U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy fosters the spread of democracy, the world will become more hospitable to freedom." ¹⁵ And Robert Kagan, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was insisting that the "United States must be more assertive in advancing the enlargement of democracy around the globe." ¹⁶ [End Page 61]

For its part, the Clinton administration has used "promoting democracy," or what it calls "democratic enlargement," as its clarion call to justify eight years of interventionist foreign policy. ¹⁷ The administration's first outright use of the democratic-enlargement theme was in September 1993, when President Clinton and his foreign policy team delivered a series of coordinated foreign policy speeches. In his speech, delivered before the UN General Assembly, Clinton proclaimed, "[O]ur overriding purpose must be to expand and strengthen the world's community of market-based democracies. During the Cold War, we fought to contain a threat to the survival of free institutions. Now we seek to enlarge the circle of nations that live under those free institutions." ¹⁸

Secretary Albright, who was the U.S. representative to the UN at the time, reiterated in her speech that "our strategy looks to the enlargement of democracy and markets abroad. . . . The end of the Cold War has provided us with new and important opportunities in this regard. Under the President's leadership, we will be called upon to work together . . . to protect America and build a better world." ¹⁹ And in a speech titled "From Containment to Enlargement," then national security advisor Anthony Lake summarized the administration's foreign-policy agenda in the following way:

Throughout the Cold War, we contained a global threat to market democracies; now we should seek to enlarge their reach. . . . [W]e should strengthen the community of major market democracies. . . . [W]e should help foster and consolidate new democracies and market economies, [End Page 62] where possible, especially in states of special significance and opportunity. . . . [W]e must counter aggression and support liberalization of states hostile to democracy and markets. . . . [W]e need to pursue our humanitarian agenda not only by providing aid but also by working to help democracy and market economies take root in regions of greatest humanitarian concern. ²⁰

Using the theme of democratic enlargement to justify maintaining high levels of foreign-policy activism, however, was already implicit in Clinton's foreign policy even before he was elected president. Indeed, during the 1992 presidential campaign, he called for more vigorous efforts to restore democracy in Haiti, arguing that President George Bush's policy "must not stand." ²¹ And in an October 1992 speech on foreign policy, he charged that Bush was not aggressive enough in promoting the spread of democracy in the Balkans:

President Bush seems too often to prefer a foreign policy that embraces stability at the expense of freedom; a foreign policy built more on personal relationships with foreign leaders than on consideration of how those leaders acquired and maintained their power. . . .[He] sent his Secretary of State to Belgrade, where in the name of stability, he urged the members of the dying Yugoslav federation to resist dissolution. This would have required the peoples of Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia to knuckle under to Europe's last Communist strongman. ²²

Time and again, candidate Clinton criticized Bush for his pragmatism and his Realpolitik approach to foreign policy. And a month before the national election, Clinton derided Bush for his "ambivalence about supporting democracy," "his eagerness to befriend potentates and dictators," and his not being "at home in the mainstream pro-democracy tradition of American foreign policy." ²³ [End Page 63]

Once he defeated Bush in the 1992 presidential campaign, Clinton began selecting his chief foreign policy aides. Ensuing news reports made it even clearer that Clinton would use the theme of democratic enlargement to justify his foreign policy activism. A New York Times profile of Anthony Lake, for example, noted that the Clinton choice for national security advisor contended that with the end of the Cold War, "The new foreign-policy debate . . . is between those who, like President Bush, see the world through a classic balance-of-power prism and those who, like Mr. Clinton and himself, take a more 'neo-Wilsonian' view in which the United States uses its military and economic power to intervene in promoting democracy." ²⁴

Within a year, Clinton and his foreign-policy team began openly advocating the use of U.S. "military and economic power to intervene in promoting democracy." This was not surprising given that Clinton raised that very prospect during his January 1993 inaugural address, declaring, "Our hopes, our hearts, our hands are with those on every continent who are building democracy and freedom. Their cause is America's cause." ²⁵ Nor was it surprising given Clinton's stated convictions that America should help "create a just, peaceful and ever more democratic world," and that Americans have an obligation "to give back to a contentious world some of the lessons we learned during our own democratic voyage." ²⁶

By June 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopher had announced in a cable to all U.S. diplomatic posts that the Clinton administration's priority in Somalia would be transforming that nation into a stable democratic member of the world community. "For the first time," explained Christopher, "there will be a sturdy American role to help the United Nations rebuild a viable nation-state." ²⁷ By 10 August 1993, Albright was arguing in the op-ed pages of the New York Times that the United States must try to lift Somalia from "the category of a failed state into that of an emerging democracy," adding that the following nation-building objectives should be pursued: the "combatants [End Page 64] must be disarmed, retrained and re-employed. Development aid must be delivered and efficiently used. Democratic institutions must be established. Those who disrupt the peace must be stopped." ²⁸ David Shinn, Clinton's special coordinator for Somalia, said the mission was aimed at "re-creating a country." ²⁹ And, on 27 August 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin told a gathering at Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies that U.S. combat troops would stay in Somalia until calm was returned to its capital, Mogadishu; "real progress" is made in "taking the heavy weapons out of the hands of the warlords," and there are "credible police forces in at least the major population centers." ³⁰ But on 3 October 1993, when eighteen U.S. soldiers were killed, Clinton began to quickly distance himself from his nation-building experiment in Somalia. Four days later he announced, "It is not our job to rebuild Somalia's society or even to create a new political process that can allow Somalia's clans to live and work in peace." ³¹

Though the term nation building was exorcised from the Clinton administration's vocabulary after the Somalia disaster, Washington nevertheless continued to engage in the practice of nation building elsewhere. On 19 September 1994, for example, Clinton dispatched twenty thousand U.S. troops to Haiti as part of Operation Uphold Democracy. The mission's objectives, explained the president, would be to "provide a secure environment for the restoration of President [Jean-Bertrand] Aristide and democracy, to begin the work of retraining the police and the military in a professional manner and to facilitate a quick hand-off to the [U.S.-led] United Nations mission so that the work of restoring democracy can be continued, the developmental aid can begin to flow, Haiti can be rebuilt and, in 1995, another free and fair election for president can be held." ³² In similar fashion, Clinton announced [End Page 65] on 18 December 1997 that U.S. troops would not leave Bosnia until there are "joint institutions strong enough to be self-sustaining after the military operation . . . [the] political parties [have] really given up the so-called state-run media . . . the civilian police [are] large enough, well-trained enough, [and] well-managed enough to do the job it has to do . . . [and] we have confidence that the military is under democratic rule." ³³

The Nation Builders

Today's nation builders are brimming with advice on how to build nations, recommending everything from "forging a more equitable distribution of wealth" ³⁴ and "rehabilitating the health [care] sector in post-conflict situations" ³⁵ to encouraging "psychosocial healing" ³⁶ and "enfranchisement-based collective identity." ³⁷ The World Bank recommends reconstructing the "enabling conditions" of peacetime society and suggests seven distinct nation-building activities. ³⁸ A report by the Oversees Development Council, however, identifies no fewer than ten activities that should receive the "early attention" of the nation builder. These include providing a sufficient level of internal security to enable economic recovery; persuading the foreign business community to invest; strengthening the government's capacity to carry out key activities; assisting the return of refugees and internally displaced persons; supporting the rejuvenation of household economies; assisting the [End Page 66] recovery of communities; rehabilitating crucial economic infrastructure, such as major roads, bridges, market places, and power-generation facilities; giving priority to the basic needs of social groups and geographic areas most affected by the conflict; removing land mines from critical sites; stabilizing the national currency and rehabilitating financial institutions; and promoting national reconciliation. ³⁹

Besides the U.S. military, one of Washington's chief nation-building tools has been the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which, according to the agency's self-description, "has taken a leading role in promoting and consolidating democracy worldwide." ⁴⁰ After Clinton took office, USAID came to be dominated by a variety of "new" nation-building priorities. "One of our main goals is to have concern about gender issues be a part of all of our programs," explained one USAID official in 1994. ⁴¹ By Clinton's second term, USAID officials said they planned to "launch an effort to advance compliance with labor codes, particularly with regard to the rights of union organizing, collective bargaining, elimination of child labor, and adherence to work-place health and safety standards." ⁴² They also said they would seek to develop "human capacity," "stabilize the world population," and protect the global environment for "sustainable development." ⁴³

There has also been the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a little-known foreign-aid program intended to promote democracy abroad. NED is a nominally private organization, but all of its funds come from the federal treasury. ⁴⁴ NED says its programs are aimed at encouraging "democratic political development." ⁴⁵ In practice, however, NED under the [End Page 67] Clinton administration took advantage of its quasi-private status to influence foreign elections in ways that would be illegal if a foreign group tried to conduct the same activity in the United States. ⁴⁶ NED also supports myriad nation-building programs. In Bosnia, for example, NED has been financing an array of human-rights and civic organizations that provide "training to local citizens in the areas of conflict prevention and dispute mediation, responsible journalism, micro-enterprise development, and local public administration." ⁴⁷

Another one of Washington's nation-building organs has been the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), a federally funded institution that was created during the Reagan era to "strengthen the nation's capacity to promote the peaceful resolution of international conflict." ⁴⁸ However, with its board of directors appointed by the president of the United States, USIP under the Clinton administration became a cheerleading section for nation building. ⁴⁹ Indeed, from Somalia to Kosovo, USIP publications advocated nation-building programs ranging from enhancing "computer connectivity" in the legal information infrastructure of Bosnia to improving preschool children's "self-esteem" in postwar societies. ⁵⁰

Of course, a description of Washington's nation-building organs would be incomplete without addressing the specific kind of nations that they were repeatedly tasked with creating: namely, nations that embody American-style pluralism. From Somalia to Haiti to Bosnia to Kosovo, that was the [End Page 68] goal. Indeed, the Clinton administration's nation-building programs were all openly directed at getting large numbers of people to get along with each other, regardless if their differences were based on clan, class, religion, or ethnicity. As Clinton's deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott summarized Washington's view with respect to the Bosnian conflict:

If there is to be a post-Cold War peace in Europe . . . it must be based on the principle of multiethnic democracy. The United States is one of the first and one of the greatest examples of that principle. What's more, the civic behavior and constitutional structures associated with pluralism are conducive to regional peace and international trade. Hence, it is in our interest that multiethnic democracy ultimately prevails in Europe and elsewhere. ⁵¹

The Clinton administration's enthusiasm for the pluralistic ideal should have been evident with its early emphasis on "multilateralism" and "international community" and its willingness to abandon the long-standing tradition of American troops serving only under the American flag. The administration's pluralistic pretensions, however, became most evident with NATO's bombing campaign against Yugoslavia. On the eve of the first night of air strikes, for example, President Clinton implored, "I want us to live in a world where we get along with each other, with all of our differences." ⁵² Several days later, Clinton explicitly linked his Kosovo policy with his support for domestic hate crimes legislation:

We grew up in a culture that was dominated for too long by people who thought they only counted if they had somebody to look down on, that they could only lift themselves up if they were pushing someone else down. . . . And if you . . . look at the whole history of this violence we see in Kosovo, what we went through in Bosnia . . . you see all these things. When you strip it all away, down deep inside there is this idea that you [End Page 69] cannot organize personal life or social life unless some group feels better about itself only when they are oppressing someone else. Or people at least believe that they ought to have the right to do violence against someone else solely because of who they are, not because of what they do. Now, at the bottom, that's what this is all about. And I have said repeatedly since I have been president that one of the things I have sought to do in our country is to bridge all these divides. . . . If you think about the brave men and women who are working with our NATO allies today in Kosovo, and you remember that this basically all started twelve years ago, when Mr. Milosevic decided to rally the support of his ethnic Serbian group by turning their hatred against the Kosovar Albanians, and later the Bosnian Muslims and the Croatian Catholics and the others, it is very important that we deal with these challenges here at home, even as we continue to support the work of our people in uniform in the Balkans. Milosevic could end it now by withdrawing his military police and paramilitary forces, by accepting the deployment of an international security force to protect not only the Kosovar Albanians, most but not all of whom are Muslims, but also the Serbian minority in Kosovo. Everybody. We're not for anybody's hate crimes. ⁵³

Clinton reiterated his view three weeks later: "We first have to set an example, as best we can, standing against hate crimes against racial minorities or gays; standing for respect, for diversity," he told a Washington gathering. "Second, we have to act responsibly, recognizing this . . . fleeting position the United States now enjoys of remarkable military, political and economic influence. We have to do what we can to protect the circle of humanity against those who would divide it by dehumanizing the other." ⁵⁴

With the end of NATO's bombing campaign, Clinton continued to place the pluralistic ideal at the center of his rhetoric, telling U.S. troops entering Kosovo, "If we can do this here . . . we can then say to the people of [End Page 70] the world, 'Whether you live in Africa or Central Europe or any other place, if somebody comes after innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse because of their race, their ethnic background or their religion and it is within our power to stop it, we will stop it.'" ⁵⁵ "No one," added Clinton, "should ever, ever be punished or discriminated against, killed or uprooted because of their religion or ethnic background." ⁵⁶ And speaking to a unit of the Illinois Air National Guard in Chicago, Clinton stated, "You have people of Serbian and Albanian descent flying together, proving that we do find strength in our diversity and we come together for the common good. . . . We want people who live in the Balkans to be able to work together the way the people in this unit who come from the Balkans work together." ⁵⁷

Given such priorities, it's not surprising that Walter McDougall, professor of history and international relations at the University of Pennsylvania, once characterized the Clinton administration's foreign policy as an unabashed attempt at "global meliorism," which he defined as foreign policy that is centered not on security issues that could endanger Americans but on trying "to make the world a better place." ⁵⁸ The Clinton administration's virtuous power doctrine and its multiple nation-building missions certainly fit that description. Yet the administration's attempts "to make the world a better place" did not end with those policies. In fact, in the final months of his presidency, Clinton met with other G-8 leaders in Okinawa, Japan to discuss establishing what can be described only as global welfare programs. ⁵⁹ By the end of the meeting, the assembled heads of state agreed to spend $1.3 billion to fund basic education in poor countries and to start an international school lunch program. "One of the best things we can do to get children in school is to provide them at least one nutritious meal there every day," said [End Page 71] Clinton. ⁶⁰ The agreement came the day after the G-8 announced its Okinawa Charter on the Global Information Society, an assistance program aimed at promoting worldwide computer access.

But the Clinton administration's "meliorist" tendencies date back even earlier. In 1995, for example, Clinton's first national security advisor, Anthony Lake, suggested that "helping the helpless" should be made a dominant principle of American foreign policy. ⁶¹ A year earlier, Vice President Al Gore asked the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to analyze the correlates of state collapse. The CIA found that "new democracies tend to fall most often when they have a high infant-mortality rate." ⁶² Gore then proposed developing foreign-aid programs to promote healthy babies and quality parental care around the globe, on the theory that the result would be enhanced world peace. ⁶³ "America," Gore would later declare during his presidential run, "has a responsibility to lead the world." ⁶⁴ He then proceeded to define not only ethnic and religious squabbles as American national security concerns but also the "disruption of the world's ecological systems," "international drug trade and corruption," "new pandemics and new mutations of disease," and the lack of education, health care, Internet access, and other social welfare entitlements in the developing world. ⁶⁵ Clinton sounded a similar theme at the UN's Millennium Summit in September 2000, proclaiming, "We must work . . . to prevent conflict; to get more [of the world's] children in school; to relieve more debt in developing countries; to do more to fight malaria, tuberculosis and AIDS; . . . to do more to provoke prevention and to stimulate the development and affordable access to drugs and vaccines; to do more to curb the trade in items which generate money that make conflict more profitable than peace, whether diamonds in Africa or drugs in Colombia." ⁶⁶ [End Page 72]

Making Excuses

Realist critics have largely dismissed such thinking for what it is, global do-goodism masquerading as foreign policy. Johns Hopkins professor Michael Mandelbaum, for example, attacked what he called Clinton's "Mother Teresa" foreign policy, which he said aimed to turn America's national security pursuit "into social work." ⁶⁷ Similarly, Robert Manning of the Council on Foreign Relations and Patrick Clawson of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy suggested that Clinton's nation-building operations all were "instances of social engineering passing as foreign policy." ⁶⁸ Despite these criticisms, a deeper empirical question is left unanswered: Does nation building even work?

Today's advocates of nation building will usually concede that Washington's recent attempts have either failed or are in the process of failing. Yet that has not dampened their enthusiasm for the practice. That is because they tend to dismiss the failures by arguing that nation building hasn't really failed, it just hasn't been tried hard enough. Typical of that kind of excuse is a 28 October 1999 report by the Brussels-based International Crisis Group. That report admits that the Dayton Accord, Washington's blueprint for nation building in Bosnia, is failing. After years of NATO occupation, it explains, Bosnia

has three de facto mono-ethnic entities, three separate armies, three separate police forces, and a national government that exists mostly on paper and operates at the mercy of the entities. . . . In addition, two out of the three ethnic groups actively oppose Dayton, and are prepared to wait until such a time as the international community withdraws and the agreement can be laid to rest. ⁶⁹

But the report then goes on to assert that Dayton's nation building "can succeed if implemented properly," if only the "NATO-led international [End Page 73] force" in Bosnia were to work "more robustly" to "act as an implementing agent." ⁷⁰

In a similar vein, David Rieff admits in a USA Today op-ed that "what rules in Bosnia is not peace, but an absence of war," and "almost nobody, either in Bosnia or abroad," believes the peace there "would last for a week if . . . [NATO's] soldiers were withdrawn." But he then adds:

The reason for this is simple. Neither the major powers nor the forces they deployed in Bosnia after the peace accord paid enough attention to the return of the refugees. . . . Had NATO chosen to turn Bosnia into a protectorate, as even some Bosnians demanded at the time of the Dayton agreement, things might very well have turned out differently. ⁷¹

Jakob Finci, head of the George Soros-financed Open Society Fund in Bosnia, agrees. In his view, nation building would have succeeded in Bosnia if the West had created a "full protectorate without even a small part of local self-rule lasting as long as the situation is not normal." ⁷² "We made a mistake," likewise claims an American official in Bosnia. "This is only a half dictatorship. We should have made it a full dictatorship." ⁷³

In the case of Somalia, the excuse is much the same, that nation building would not have failed if only it had been pursued more vigorously. As the UN prepared to pull out of Somalia, for example, the commander in charge of the operation told a news conference, "We didn't have enough forces or resources to disarm the country. That's why Operation Hope can't fulfill all its goals. . . . The international body and contributing nations must be committed enough to accept the violence and loss of life associated with war, and then stay the course." ⁷⁴ In a similar fashion, Richard Haass of the [End Page 74] Brookings Institution acknowledges that the Somalia operation had a "tragic and failed ending," but he then adds that it is

at least plausible and perhaps likely that alternatives would have met with greater success. . . . The principal alternative . . . was to embark from the outset on a policy of concerted peace making and nation building. This would have required disarming the local factions and arresting those who resisted, setting up a transnational political authority, and creating a professional police force and military. It would have meant a greater willingness to accept [human and financial] costs at the beginning of the intervention. . . . The advantage of this approach is that after an initial period of peace-making by U. S. forces, the conditions might have existed for UN forces to carry out peace-keeping and nation-building activities. ⁷⁵

A nearly identical excuse is given in the case of Haiti. Hugh Byrne and Rachel Neild of the Washington Office on Latin America, for example, concede in a 1997 Christian Science Monitor op-ed, "The truth is that three years after the intervention, U.S. and international policy in Haiti has been no great success." The aim of America's Haitian policy, they point out, has failed to restore democracy and jump-start the economy:

Some $2.8 billion in aid sent or pledged held out the promise of building infrastructure, modernizing the state, restoring economic growth, and alleviating poverty. There are precious few signs of any of this. Instead, there are rutted roads, a weak and ineffective state, stagnant growth, and poverty. Politically, the picture is no better. A dynamic grass-roots movement that helped topple the [Jean Claude "Baby Doc"] Duvalier dictatorship and elect Mr. Aristide has been sidelined and largely demobilized. Political ambition and opportunism are the order of the day.

But then Byrne and Neild go on to argue that a more vigorous nation-building effort is the answer: "Now is the time to begin crafting a new, long-term international approach. International donors should commit for the long [End Page 75] haul. . . . But greater emphasis should be placed on development in the rural sector, where some two-thirds of Haitians live, and on long-term strategies to create jobs and alleviate the country's crippling burden of poverty." ⁷⁶

And in the case of Kosovo, some analysts are already explaining away the unfolding nation-building failure there by arguing that it would be working if only the United States and NATO would be more assertive in imposing their will in the pursuit of the nation-building agenda. Typical of this view is columnist Georgie Anne Geyer, who blames many of the problems in Kosovo on U.S.-NATO peacekeepers not doing enough: "NATO is bogged down by contortions of excessive protocol, hapless collective decision-making in the European defense establishments and the refusal of Washington to lead and make judgments." ⁷⁷ Her solution: "A no-nonsense military occupation in the style of Gen. Douglas MacArthur . . . with the military and the civil power combined." ⁷⁸

Such argumentation is dubious, however. Since all nation-building missions could conceivably be started earlier or pursued more vigorously, there is no way to directly refute someone who makes such excuses. Moreover, such excuses are self-reinforcing: that is, they employ success, failure, and everything in between as evidence in favor of the nation-building agenda. Yet research indicates that there is more to building democratic nations than bold dominion over a geographical area and the people who live there. Indeed, the authors of two different multivolume studies argue that the successful democratization of a country is by and large the product of domestic factors. ⁷⁹ Furthermore, a recent analytical survey suggests that there is no significant relationship between more intrusive or proactive forms of foreign intervention and success in preventing the recurrence of conflict in strife-torn areas. ⁸⁰ Several [End Page 76] historical retrospectives on America's Vietnam experience also clearly demonstrate that nation building can fail, even when it is vigorously pursued. ⁸¹

False Comparisons

Other advocates of nation building prefer to argue that it succeeded in post-World War II Germany and Japan, so the practice must work if done right. Senator Paul Simon, for example, endorsed nation building in Somalia in 1993 claiming, "We didn't do too badly in Germany and Japan." ⁸² Writing in Commentary, the American Enterprise Institute's Muravchik similarly claimed,

Nor should it be doubted that America is capable of using force effectively on behalf of democracy. When the U.S. invaded Grenada in 1983, Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan exclaimed: "I don't know that you restore democracy at the point of a bayonet." But that in fact is what we did . . . in Japan [and] Germany . . . after World War II. ⁸³

The New Republic has defended nation building, asserting, "Somalia has given nation building a bum rap. The United States helped build pretty good nations in Japan [and] West Germany." ⁸⁴ Karin von Hippel of the United Kingdom's Centre for Defence Studies says, "Today's strong democracies in Germany and Japan reflect the value of . . . a commitment [to nation building]." ⁸⁵ And Krishna Kumar of USAID contends

the cessation of civil wars presents an unprecedented opportunity for . . . countries to rebuild their societies, polities and economies and to [End Page 77] embrace reforms that have been elusive in the past. There are many successful examples of this: The war-shattered countries of Europe rebuilt themselves into powerful democracies. Japan emerged from the ashes of war as a leading economic power. ⁸⁶

But postwar Germany and Japan cannot justifiably be compared with places like Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, or Kosovo. First of all, it is an abuse of history to imply that Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, or Kosovo come anywhere close to warranting the same military concern (and commitment of resources) as postwar Germany or Japan. Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, even combined, could not build a military-industrial capacity that could threaten the United States and its allies as Germany and Japan both once did. Moreover, the security payoff of rebuilding Germany and Japan in terms of shoring up Europe and Asia against communist expansion and the economic payoff in terms of foreign trade were critical to the United States. The same cannot be said for Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. ⁸⁷

Second, the postwar political situations in Germany and Japan were historically unique. Unlike Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, Germany and Japan were totally defeated in war and their leaders thoroughly discredited. University of Illinois political scientist Richard Merritt explains that the "failure of Nazism and the confusion of potential leaders" in the wake of unconditional surrender "made the German people receptive to discourse on [End Page 78] governance. . . . [and] imposed social change." ⁸⁸ The same cannot be said of the people in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Moreover, says Merritt, even before the war's end, Germans had become amenable to the policy prescriptions the Allies wanted to impose.

We must consider first the extent to which Germans were predisposed, even before the war's end, to accept the programs that AMG [the American Military Government] and other Tripartite Allies might propose. The data show that substantial numbers of German respondents were disgusted by what the Nazis had done and increasingly realized that Nazi actions were not accidental but were consistent with and even prefigured by Nazi ideology. . . . To some measure, then, AMG enjoyed a ready market for its product. ⁸⁹

By the end of the war in the Pacific, the Japanese, too, had become receptive to profound political change in ways not replicated in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Indeed, according to Massachusetts Institute of Technology historian John Dower, the U.S. occupying force "encountered a populace sick of war, contemptuous of the militarists who had led them to disaster, and all but overwhelmed by the difficulties of their present circumstances in a ruined land." ⁹⁰ The Japanese, moreover, embraced their defeat not as an end but as a beginning to make a better future. As a result, explains Dower, "the ideals of peace and democracy took root in Japan not as a borrowed ideology of imposed vision, but as a lived experience and a seized opportunity. . . . It was an extraordinary, and extraordinarily fluid, moment never seen before in history and, as it turned out, never to be repeated." ⁹¹

Third, with regard to Bosnia and Kosovo specifically, the inhabitants [End Page 79] there fought a war with each other; the inhabitants of Germany and Japan did not participate in such communal bloodletting. Perhaps if a third party had forced the French to live with the Germans, or the Koreans to live with the Japanese under a single government after the war, then a comparison could be made with modern Bosnia or Kosovo. Otherwise, the postwar political situations are dissimilar.

Fourth, the high level of education and industrial know-how in postwar Germany and Japan facilitated an economic recovery inconceivable in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, or Kosovo. Germany also had strong traditions of the rule of law, property rights, and free trade before the Nazi era, ⁹² and Japan's elite exhibited an honorific culture that respected and obeyed the wishes of the victor in battle. ⁹³ Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, on the other hand, have little in the way of liberal traditions or cultural attitudes that are agreeable with massive foreign interference.

Despite these sharp historical differences, and all the excuse making, the Clinton administration spent tens of billions of dollars and huge amounts of diplomatic capital trying to nation-build in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. After eight years of experimentation it is time to conclude that an ambitious nation-building program is not a sufficient condition to transform a country into a self-sustaining, democratic member of the family of nations. Numerous other favorable but rarely replicated factors must be in place for it to succeed. Or to put it more bluntly, nation building is a fool's errand if a country is not ripe for the effort.

Gary T. Dempsey is a foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute and coauthor with Roger W. Fontaine of a forthcoming book on the United States' recent efforts at nation building.

Notes

1. Quoted in Jane Perlez, "In Triumph, Albright Visits Kosovar Refugees," Chicago Tribune, 12 June 1999, 14; "War in the Balkans: Albright Tells Cheering Refugees They Can Return," Houston Chronicle, 12 June 1999, 24.

2. Quoted in Perlez.

3. Quoted in Michael Mandelbaum, "A Perfect Failure: NATO's War against Yugoslavia," Foreign Affairs 78, no. 5 (1999): 8; Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Remarks to U.S. Troops in Operation Sabre, Camp Able Sentry Near Skopje, Macedonia, 11 June 1999, at http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1999/990611a.html, accessed 21 August 1999.

4. Kim Sengupta, "Liberation of Kosovo: Clinton Visit, Kosovars Hail the Conquering Hero," Independent [London], 23 June 1999, 3.

5. Quoted in ibid; Jane Perlez, "Clinton Promises Refugees Safe Home," Portland Oregonian, 23 June 1999, A1.

6. Quoted in Mark Peceny, Democracy at the Point of Bayonets (University Park, Penna.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 1.

7. Quoted in Otto Kreisher, "The Haiti Crisis," Copley News Service, 20 September 1994.

8. See Michael E. Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Jefferson P. Marquis, "The Other Warriors: American Social Science and Nation Building in Vietnam," Diplomatic History 24, no. 1 (2000); Patrick Lloyd Hatcher, The Suicide of an Elite: American Internationalists and Vietnam (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990).

9. Carl J. Friedrich, "Nation-Building?" in Nation Building, ed. Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz (New York: Atherton, 1963), 27-8.

10. Ibid., 28.

11. Morton H. Halperin, "Guaranteeing Democracies," Foreign Policy, no. 91 (1993): 105-22.

12. David Rieff, "A New Age of Liberal Imperialism?" World Policy Journal 14, no. 2 (1999): 9.

13. Joshua Muravchik, Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1991), 221.

14. Michael A. Ledeen, Freedom Betrayed: How America Led a Global Democratic Revolution, Won the Cold War and Walked Away (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1996), 7.

15. Ariel Cohen, "Spreading Freedom: Building Democracy and Public Diplomacy," in Issues 2000: The Candidate's Briefing Book (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 2000), 1.

16. Quoted in Norman Levine, "Inheriting the World: American Foreign Policy after the Cold War," Arizona Republic, 13 February 2000, J1.

17. Evidently, Clinton has even enlisted the first lady into his struggle to spread democracy. In 1998-99, millions of taxpayer dollars were spent shuttling Hillary Clinton to England (for a conference on "Hearing Children's Voices"), Bulgaria, Chile, the Czech Republic, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Ireland, Macedonia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Tunisia, Switzerland (twice), and Uruguay. The first lady's spokeswoman, Marsha Berry, contends that the trips were vital to the president's mission of "enlarging democracy" around the globe: "She travels at the request of the president and the secretary of state," says Berry. "These trips have been very advantageous for the country. Many of the places she visits are emerging democracies or struggling democracies or ones that have been successful, and she is rewarding their efforts." Quoted in Seth Gitell, "Jet-Setter," New Republic, 9 August 1999, 15.

18. Bill Clinton, "Confronting the Challenges of a Broader World," address to the UN General Assembly, New York, 27 September 1993, at www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1993/9/27/4.text.1.

19. Madeleine K. Albright,"Use of Force in a Post-Cold War World," address at the National War College, National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., 23 September 1993, at http//dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1993/html/Dispatchv4no39.html.

20. Anthony Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement," address at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., 21 September 1993, in U.S. Department of State Dispatch 4, no. 39 (1993): 660.

21. Quoted in Peceny, 158.

22. Quoted in ibid., 157-8.

23. Quoted in Thomas H. Henriksen, "Clinton's Foreign Policy in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and North Korea," in his Essays in Public Policy (Palo Alto, Calif.: Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 1996), 5.

24. Steven A. Holmes, "Choice for National Security Advisor Has Long-Awaited Chance to Lead," New York Times, 3 January 1993, A16.

25. Quoted in Henriksen, 7.

26. Quoted in Benjamin Schwarz, "The World Isn't Ours to Americanize," Los Angeles Times, 28 August 1994, 5.

27. Michael R. Gordon, "Christopher, in Unusual Cable, Defends State Department," New York Times, 16 June 1993, A13.

28. Madeleine K. Albright, "Yes, There Is a Reason to Be in Somalia," New York Times, 10 August 1993, A19.

29. Quoted in Charles Krauthammer, "Playing God in Somalia: The United States Is Not in the Business of Re-Creating Nations," Washington Post, 13 August 1993, A25.

30. Quoted in John Lancaster, "Aspin Lists U.S. Goals In Somalia," Washington Post, 28 August 1993, A1.

31. Bill Clinton, "Address to the Nation on Somalia," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 29, no. 40 (11 October 1993): 2,022-5.

32. Bill Clinton, "Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate," 21 March 1995, at www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1995/3/22/4.text.1.

33. Bill Clinton, "Statement by the President on Bosnia," 18 December 1997, at www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1997/12/18/8.text.1.

34. James K. Boyce and Manuel Pastor Jr., "Macroeconomic Policy and Peace Building in El Salvador," in Rebuilding Societies after Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance, ed. Krishna Kumar (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1997), 310.

35. Joanna Macrae, "Dilemmas of Legitimacy, Sustainability and Coherence: Rehabilitating the Health Sector," in ibid.,183.

36. Kimberly A. Maynard, "Rebuilding Community: Psychological Healing, Reintegration and Reconciliation at the Grassroots Level," in ibid., 225.

37. Roderick K. von Lipsey, "The Intervention Cycle," in Breaking the Cycle: A Framework for Conflict Intervention, ed. Roderick K. von Lipsey (New York: St. Martin's, 1997), 32. See also, David Callahan, Unwinnable Wars: American Power and Ethnic Conflict (New York: Hill & Wang, 1997); Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention (Boulder Colo.: Westview, 1997); John W. DePauw and George A. Luz, Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action (New York: Praeger, 1992).

38. World Bank, "Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Role of the World Bank," (Washington, D.C., World Bank, 1998), 4-5.

39. See Nicole Ball and Tammy Halevy, "Making Peace Work: The Role of the International Development Community," policy essay no. 18, Oversees Development Council, Washington, D.C., March 1996. See also John M. Goshko and R. Jeffrey Smith, "Details of Clinton's 'Democracy' Program Slowly Begin to Emerge," Washington Post, 5 May 1993, A28.

40. United States Agency for International Development, "Democracy and Governance," at www.usaid.gov/democracy/index.html, accessed 9 August 2000.

41. Quoted in Judy Mann, "A Stand against Domestic Violence," Washington Post, 20 April 1994, D27.

42. U.S. Agency for International Development, "Annual Performance Plan for Fiscal Year 2001," February 2000, at www.dec.org/partners/2001_app, accessed 9 August 2000.

43. Ibid.

44. "White House Fact Sheet on U.S. Efforts to Promote Human Rights, Democracy," U.S. Newswire, 10 December 1998.

45. National Endowment for Democracy, "About Us," at www.ned.org/about/about.html, accessed 29 August 2000.

46. See John M. Broder, "Dollars and Foreign Policy: Practice vs. Preaching," International Herald Tribune, 1 April 1997, 1; Barbara Conry, "Loose Cannon: The National Endowment for Democracy," Cato Foreign Policy Briefing, no. 27, 8 November 1993.

47. National Endowment for Democracy, "Central and Eastern Europe Grants," 1997 Annual Report, at www.ned.org/pubs/97annual/cee97.html, accessed 29 August 2000.

48. See Christopher Black, "The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Impartial?" Mediterranean Quarterly 11, no. 2 (2000): 35.

49. See, for example, Steven M. Riskin, ed., "Three Dimensions of Peacebuilding in Bosnia: Findings from USIP-Sponsored Research and Field Projects," Peaceworks, no. 32 (United States Institute of Peace) (1999); Howard Olsen and John Davis, "Training U.S. Army Officers for Peace Operations: Lessons from Bosnia," United States Institute of Peace Special Report, October 1999; "Bosnia Report Card: Pass, Fail, or Incomplete?" United States Institute of Peace Special Report, January 1999; John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997); "Restoring Hope: Real Lessons of Somalia for the Future of Intervention," United States Institute of Peace Special Report, July 1994.

50. See Ruzica Rosandic, "Grappling with Peace Education in Serbia," Peaceworks, no. 33 (2000); Riskin.

51. Strobe Talbott, "U.S. Leadership and the Balkan Challenge: Remarks at the National Press Club," Washington, D.C., 9 November 1995, at www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bostal2.html.

52. Bill Clinton, "Remarks by the President to the AFSCAME Biannual Convention," Washington D.C., 23 March 1999, at www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1999/3/23/2.text.1, accessed 15 August 2000.

53. Bill Clinton, "Remarks by the President at Hate Crimes Announcement," Washington, D.C., 6 April 1999, at www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1999/4/6/4.text.1, accessed 15 August 2000.

54. Bill Clinton, "Remarks at Millennium Evening--The Perils of Indifference: Lessons Learned from a Violent Century," Washington, D.C., 12 April 1999, at www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1999/4/13/4.text.1, accessed 15 August 2000.

55. Quoted in Jim Hoagland, "Kosovos to Come," Washington Post, 27 June 1999, B7.

56. Quoted in Sengupta.

57. Bill Clinton, "Remarks by the President to Illinois Air National Guard Personnel," Chicago, 12 June 1999, at www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1999/6/15/6.text.1, accessed 15 August 2000.

58. Walter A. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: America's Encounters with the World since 1776 (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), 172, 173, and 198.

59. See Kim R. Holmes, "Humanitarian Warriors: The Moral Follies of the Clinton Doctrine," Heritage Lectures no. 671, Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C.,11 July 2000.

60. Quoted in Patrice Hill, "G-8 to Spend $1.3 Billion to Educate Poor Nations," Washington Times, 23 July 2000, A1.

61. Quoted in Jason DeParle, "The Man inside Bill Clinton's Foreign Policy," New York Times Magazine, 20 August 1995, 35.

62. Karen Tumulty, "The Secret Passion of Al Gore," Time, 24 May 1999, 44.

63. Ibid.

64. "Al Gore, Remarks as Prepared for the International Press Institute," U.S. Newswire, 30 April 2000.

65. Ibid.

66. Bill Clinton, "Remarks by the President in Address to the Millennium Summit of the United Nations," New York, 6 September 2000, at www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/IZR?urnipdi://oma.eop.gov.us/2000/9/6/11.text.1, accessed 7 September 2000.

67. Quoted in George Melloan , "From 'Mother Teresa' Diplomacy to Where?" Wall Street Journal, 12 February 1996, A15.

68. Robert Manning and Patrick Clawson, "The Clinton Doctrine," Asian Wall Street Journal, 31 December 1997, 6.

69. International Crisis Group, "Is Dayton Failing? Bosnia Four Years after the Peace Agreement," 28 October 1999, at www.crisisweb.org.

70. Ibid. The International Crisis Group also recommends turning Bosnia into an outright protectorate, claiming "a protectorate could implement rapid refugee returns, remove obstructionist officials, institute the rule of law, restructure communist-era economic and political structures." Quoted in "Bosnia Remains Far from Unified: Dayton Pact Largely a Fiction, Report Says," Chicago Tribune, 3 November 1999, 22.

71. David Rieff, "Bosnia's Refugees Hold Lesson for NATO," USA Today, 26 May 1999, 25A.

72. Quoted in Ron Nordland and Zoran Cirjakovic, "Dictatorial Democrats," Newsweek, 5 October 1998, 28.

73. Ibid.

74. Quoted in Thomas Wagner, "Somali Peace Unlikely, UN Military Chief Says--Advice Next Time: More Troops, No Pullout," Times-Picayune (New Orleans), 19 January 1994, A10.

75. Richard N. Haass, Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999), 112-3.

76. Hugh Byrne and Rachel Neild, "Success in Haiti Is Possible, but Not 'Overnight,'" Christian Science Monitor, 28 November 1997, 18.

77. Georgie Anne Geyer, "Kosovo Checkmate," Washington Times, 26 March 2000, B3.

78. Georgie Anne Geyer, "Two Men Strive for Order in Chaotic Kosovo; German General, Kouchner Call It 'Impossible Task,'" Washington Times, 19 March 2000, C11.

79. Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Lipset, Democracy in Developing Countries, 3 vols. (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1989); Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy, 4 vols. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

80. Paul F. Diehl, Jennifer Reifschneider, and Paul R. Hensel, "United Nations Intervention and Recurring Conflict," International Organization 50, no. 4 (1996).

81. Between 1955 and 1961, the United States pumped more than $1 billion in economic and military aid into Vietnam. The U.S. government built roads, bridges, railroads, and schools. American development experts worked on agricultural projects, and Vietnamese teachers, civil servants, and police were trained in the "American way." See George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 2d ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), 56-61. See also John Prados, The Hidden History of the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995), 21.

82. "A Quagmire," MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour, 16 September 1993.

83. Joshua Muravchik, "Beyond Self-Defense: Dangers of American Military Involvement in Somalia--When, Where and How to Use Force, Commentary 96, no. 6 (1993).

84. "No Exit," New Republic, 22 April 1996, 6.

85. Karin von Hippel, Democracy by Force: U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 206.

86. Krishna Kumar, "The Nature and Focus of International Assistance for Rebuilding War-Torn Societies," in Kumar, 1.

87. According to the U.S. State Department, the U.S. goal in postwar Germany was to prevent "Germany from ever again becoming a threat to the peace of the world." See "Documents on Germany 1944-1985," U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1985, as cited in Richard L. Merritt, Democracy Imposed: U.S. Occupation Policy and the German Public, 1945-1949 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995), 370. With respect to the U.S. economic and security interest in postwar Europe generally, it has been written that it "rested squarely on an American conviction that European economic recovery was essential to the long-term interests of the United States. . . . Policy makers in the Truman administration were convinced that a 'dynamic economy' at home required American trade and investment abroad, which in turn required the reconstruction of major trading partners in Europe and their reintegration into a multilateral system of world trade. . . . The defeat of Germany and the exhaustion of Britain and France had left a power vacuum in Central and Western Europe into which the Soviet Union might expand unless the United States assembled the components of a viable balance of power. This meant filling the vacuum by rebuilding economic and political systems strong enough to forestall aggression and defeat communist parties, whose rise to power seemed the most likely way for the Soviets to extend their influence." See Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 26-7. See also Melvyn P. Leffler, "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-1948," American Historical Review, no. 89 (1984): 346-81.

88. Merritt, 392.

89. Ibid., 394.

90. John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 24.

91. Ibid., 23, 84.

92. See Ludwig Erhard, Germany's Comeback in the World Market (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1976); Gustav Stolper, Karl Hauser, and Kurt Borchardt, The German Economy: 1870 to the Present (New York: Brace and World, 1967); Egon Sohman "Competition and Growth: The Lesson of West Germany," American Economic Review 49 (1959); Henry Wallich, Mainsprings of the German Revival (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1955).

93. See Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1989).