Brinkmanship and Nuclear Threat in the Ukraine War

Carl Conetta, 31 May 2023. Full text ⇒ HTMLPDF

Western leaders and Kyiv pledge to “stay the course” despite Russian nuclear threats. But does western brinkmanship in the Ukraine war depend on denying there is a brink? This short article examines “nuclear threat denialism” and its function in war policy. It explores Moscow’s most likely but occluded nuclear option and the unique danger it represents. And the post examines the relevance of the Cuban Missile Crisis to the current conflict.

Catastrophe: The Global Cost of the Ukraine War

Carl Conetta, 02 May 2023. see article ⇒ HTML or PDF

The war has been a disaster for Ukraine, but also a calamity for the world. This brief article provides a concise overview of the war’s profound global effects, beginning with the combatants’ cost in lives and treasure. Beyond this it assesses the war’s impact on global trade and economy; energy and food price inflation and their effects on poverty, hunger, and mortality; the redirection of humanitarian and official development assistance; the total sum of aid to the Ukrainian war effort, and the estimated cost of postwar reconstruction and recovery. Also examined is the war’s effect on global defense spending. The article also provides copious citations to support further inquiry.

Tempting Armageddon: The Likelihood of Russian Nuclear Use is Misconstrued in Western Policy

The probability of Russian nuclear use related to the Ukraine war is rising – but why?  Neither Washington nor Brussels fully apprehend the risk.

by Carl Conetta, 02 Feb 2023 – Full report: HTML or PDF  Summary: HTML or PDF

This article tracks and assesses the evolution of Russian nuclear threats in the Ukraine crisis, the related interplay between Moscow and Washington, the factors driving Russian thinking on nuclear use, the nuclear options available to Russia, and why US-NATO leaders and hawkish observers dismiss these options as impracticable. We conclude that the probability of Russian nuclear use, although conditionally modest, is rising as Ukraine’s armed forces push forward toward Crimea and the Russian border while also increasing their retaliatory attacks on recognized Russian territory. On its present trajectory, the crisis will soon run a risk of nuclear conflict greater than that experienced during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

The “Stable Nuclear Deterrent” collapses in the Ukraine War

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by Charles Knight, 17 October 2022

The Ukraine War presents a more dangerous nuclear risk than the Cuban Missile Crisis and demands more careful rationality and restraint by Russia and the US. Can we Iskender nuclear capable missiledepend on that rationality and restraint? Probably not.

However, there are some things that the US and NATO can do to reduce the probability that Moscow will opt to use nuclear weaponry. This article lists those steps.

The article also explains why any remaining “stable mutual deterrence” between the US and Russia is presently extremely fragile. It concludes:

The US/NATO war effort in Ukraine must remain deliberately limited. Beyond that, we must resist the usual war fevers (beset with visions of victory over evil) that take nations toward total war.

Did NATO expansion prompt the Russian attack on Ukraine?

The short answer is “no” – but there is more to the issue than that. A closer look at the road to war illuminates paths to a negotiated end

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by Carl Conetta, 10 June 2022

 

With no end in sight, the Russia-Ukraine conflict is an unfolding catastrophe for Ukraine, the region, and the world. Besides increasing battlefield death and destruction, the war and how it is being fought promise global economic recession, severe food crisis, a surging flow of refugees, pandemic revival, and a transnational flood of illicit military weapons and munitions.

This essay looks at the policies that shaped the contention leading to war, and that increased the likelihood of conflict. It looks at the effects of NATO expansion and military activism, the “color revolutions” in Ukraine, the disposition of Crimea, the rebellions in Ukraine’s east, the Minsk process, Putin’s revisionism, Russia’s security concerns, and how the USA and Europe responded to the intensifying friction between Moscow and Kyiv. Through closely examining the policies conditioning the conflict, this analysis aims to identify potential “exit ramps” for all involved.

Russia-Ukraine War: Estimating Casualties & Military Equipment Losses

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by Carl Conetta, updated 02 April 2022

How do the two sides in the Russia-Ukraine conflict compare in terms of personnel and equipment losses?  These seemingly objective measures are subject to an intensive propaganda war. This brief analysis examines multiple sources of data to find that the combatants are actually not far apart in the percentage of equipment attrition they have suffered. And Russian personnel fatalities are likely in the range of 3,500 (April 2). Contrary to the messaging of the two sides, both would seem able to sustain combat for a considerable time longer. Unfortunately, as Russian forces have transitioned to a heavier, more firepower-dominant mode of warfare, Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure are suffering more death and destruction. While this might argue for increased emphasis on war containment and diplomatic efforts, the most evocative messaging on the western side emphasizes Russian miscalculation and fumbling, Ukraine’s adept resistance, and the promise of war termination via increased investment in the war.

And so now… It’s war?

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by Carl Conetta, 21 Feb 2022

The battle within Ukraine and the USA-Russia contest over it has returned Europe to the darkest, most ominous period of the 1947-1989 Cold War. That this should happen with both the United States and Russia barreling grimly forward reflects a singular failure of diplomacy and common sense. There were two recent points in time when positive leadership might have turned us away from the path of disaster. Fortunately, one of these is not yet foreclosed. The short essay examines them both, asking how did we get here? It concludes with the question: Is it harder to live with autonomy for the Ukrainian rebel areas than it is to face regional war?

To End America’s Longest War the US-Korea Alliance Must Change

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by Charles Knight, initially published by the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, 22 December 2021.

This article reports on South Korean President Moon’s latest peace initiative, which has achieved an agreement “in principle” by the U.S., North Korea, China, and South Korea to negotiate an “end-of-war declaration.”  Recently, the U.S. appeared to have modified its nuclear disarmament approach, accepting that “step by step” is the realistic way to proceed.  A few article excerpts:

A step-by-step approach requires give and take, [implying] that the U.S. might ultimately have to settle for some tempering of the North’s nuclear arsenal rather than the complete, verifiable, and irreversible disarmament (CVID.)

…a strategy of waiting patiently for sanctions to force Pyongyang’s capitulation…overlooks how existentially critical nuclear weaponry has become in North Korea’s strategic calculus. Without an adequate national security alternative, Pyongyang will most likely choose to suffer indefinitely under the economic pain of sanctions, however severe.

Alliances cannot and do not last forever. To endure from one era to another, they must adapt and change. If Washington returns to old habits of leveraging its hegemonic will to control affairs on the Korean Peninsula, it may reap the unintended consequence of hastening the end of the alliance.

Afghanistan: What Just Happened? What Comes Next?

Can the United States escape the vortex of its 20-year war?

 

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by Carl Conetta, 09 Sept 2021.

This article assesses the calamitous end of America’s 20-year war and the effort of US interventionists to use public distress about the airport chaos to blunt and distract from an adequate appraisal of the war that produced it.

The war was defined from the start by an impossible mission shrouded in misinformation. Intelligence agencies failed to give useful intelligence over a span of not just 4 months, but 20 years. And the article asks, Can we escape the political and strategic dynamics that produce and sustain such wars?

It concludes by examining how some Western powers are now looking to continue the conflict via other means. Against this, the author proposes a stability-oriented approach that would energetically explore areas of possible US-Taliban cooperation, a new positive context in which areas of difference might be productively addressed.

They made a desolation and called it “A Good War”

 

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By Carl Conetta, Reset Defense Blog, 04 February 2021.

This article (with extensive bibliography) surveys, at the 20-year mark, the consequences of the US regime change, occupation, and nation-building exercise in Afghanistan. Drawing on US DOD and congressional research agency reports, media investigations, and NGO analyses it anchors the broad public impression of full-spectrum failure. It reviews the human and financial costs of the war, the failures of reconstruction, and the ongoing dysfunction of Afghan governance.

America’s debacle in Afghanistan, which echoes the Soviet failure during the 1980s, indicates that nations are not the type of thing that can be built according to a foreign blueprint, and especially not at the point of a gun. Outsiders lack the knowledge, indigenous roots, legitimacy, and degree of interest to prevail. Indeed, their very presence is provocative, especially given differences in language, religion, and culture.

Why is withdrawal so difficult? The article concludes that domestic political and institutional considerations are more important than any strategic rationale or cost-benefit analysis. Once committed, no political or military leader, nor the Pentagon cares to own responsibility for failure. And hubris generates an endless succession of imagined “new paths” to success. But as success proves forever elusive, so does withdrawal. In a perverse sense, it is persistent failure that keeps America mired for decades in this and other desultory wars.

Principles for Building Confidence and Stability into National Defenses and International Security – toward sufficient, affordable, robust, and reliable defense postures

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by Charles Knight and Carl Conetta, 01 February 2021 (revised 15 March 2022.)  

Adapted from Carl Conetta, Charles Knight, and Lutz Unterseher, “Building Confidence into the Security of Southern Africa,” PDA Briefing Report #7. Commonwealth Institute, 1996.

balanced & stable

By bringing military structures into line with defensive political goals, the non-provocation standard facilitates the emergence of trusting, cooperative, peaceful political relations among nations. In contrast, any doctrine and force posture oriented to project power into other countries is provocative — unless reliably restrained by political and organizational structures.

Korea versus Korea: Conventional Military Balance and the Path to Disarmament

by Charles Knight and Lutz Unterseher, Lit Verlag, Munster, Germany, April 2020.

➪ full book PDF  or  ➪ order Paperback

Chapter: “A Path to Reductions of Conventional Forces on the Korean Peninsula” by Charles Knight.

➪ read full English text:  PDF    or   ➪ Korean auto-translation (DeepL)

korea vs korea cover

Varied incremental steps that embody and signal the accumulating commitment to a minimally acceptable common political future for Korea are key to this process. Progressive reduction of cross-border invasion threats through mutual confidence building force restructuring will constitute a virtuous circle of reinforcement for a changed relationship. [Through the] accumulation of the sunk costs of iterative reciprocity North and South Korea will arrive at a point where the demonstrated commitment to smaller restructured military postures is sufficient to allow rapid progress toward a stable level and disposition of arms compatible with a new peaceful political relationship.   ~ Knight

Die Konfrontation auf der Halbinsel, mit offensivir Oreintierung und Bereitschaft zur Praemption, impliziert Stabilitatsrisiken. Diese werden noch erhoht durch Entwicklung und Einfuhrung prazier ballistischer Raketen, welche die Illusion nahren, den Gegner im Konfilktfall ‘enthaupten’ zu konnen.   ~ Unterseher

Sustainable Defense: More Security, Less Spending

Final Report of the Sustainable Defense Task Force of The Center for International Policy, June 2019. ➪ full report  PDF

Carl Conetta contributed analysis of the economic and climate change challenges, details of the threat assessment, the strategy, and the calculation of savings from recommended changes to force structure.

The United States must partner with other nations in addressing challenges like climate change, epidemics of disease, nuclear proliferation, and human rights and humanitarian crises. None of these challenges are best dealt with by military force. Rather, they will depend on building non-military capacities for diplomacy, economic assistance, and scientific and cultural cooperation and exchange which have been allowed to languish in an era in which the military has been treated as the primary tool of U.S. security policy.

Transactional diplomacy isn’t working with North Korea – relational diplomacy might

by Charles Knight, a version of this article appeared in The National Interest on 19 February 2019. We have published a modestly revised version on this website in February 2022.

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DPRK soldiers

The United States will strengthen its Korean alliance while opening many paths to an acceptable political future for Korea by fully supporting its ally in building out the aspirations for Korean peace found in the Panmunjeom Declaration.

8 Key findings regarding the Korea nuclear arms crisis from recent discussions with experts in China, Russia and Korea

by Charles Knight, Center for International Policy, 02 February 2018.read full post  PDF

Most interlocutors thought that there is almost no chance that the presently stringent sanctions can force the DPRK to agree to disarm. The Chinese and the Russians generally believe that the maximal concession that sanctions can win from the DPRK is an agreement to freeze their warhead and missile development — particularly inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) development — in return for some combination of confidence-building measures, security guarantees, and progress toward political normalization. The North Koreans will not give up the nuclear weapons they already have… at least not until there is permanent peace on the peninsula and the US is no longer understood to be an enemy.

Afghan Army Now Ready … to lose to the Taliban

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by Charles Knight, Lobe Log, 19 September 2015.

A review of the well-informed and insightful study by M. Chris Mason, The Strategic Lessons Unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan: Why the Afghan National Security Forces will not hold, and the implications for the U.S. Army in Afghanistan, Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, June 2015.

The most serious deficit of the Afghan National Security Forces…is its lack of motivation in comparison to the Taliban. One of the primary lessons unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan is that soldiers in the armies we create, train, and equip are simply not willing to fight and die for weak, corrupt, illegitimate governments.
~ M. Chris Mason

Not a common global home, but a fine mess

Presentation by Carl Conetta on the “World Security Situation – Russia, Iraq, Syria, and Beyond” panel of the Economists for Peace and Security (EPS) symposium in Washington, DC, 17 November 2014. The panel included Richard Kaufman, Bill Hartung, and Heather Hurlburt.

 
HTML transcript
 
Audio immediately below

 
panel one EPS 1114

Something in the Air: ‘Isolationism,’ Defense Spending, and the US Public Mood

by Carl Conetta, Project on Defense Alternatives, Center for International Policy, 14 October 2014.

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Something in the Air Is “neo-isolationism” captivating the American public? Or is interventionism back? Will the public continue to support reductions in defense spending?
 
The report offers a comprehensive and critical analysis of current and historical US public opinion polls on global engagement, military intervention, and defense spending. Significant fluctuation in public sentiments is evident. So is an enduring divide between elite opinion and the general public. The report assesses these in light of changes in US policy, strategic conditions, and the economy. It also examines the effect of partisan political dynamics on public debate and opinion. Seven tables and graphs.

The US “Asia Pivot” and “Air-Sea Battle” Concept: Toward Conflict with China?

by Carl Conetta. Originally published as “Will the QDR Pivot for Air-Sea Battle with China?” in Reset Defense Bulletin, 03 March 2014.

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Asia Pivot

Will China come to pose a peer military threat to the United States?  The Obama administration’s 2012 Strategic Defense Review and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) turn on this eventuality. Both the so-called “Asia pivot” and the evolving Air-Sea Battle (ASB) operational concept are meant to preclude it. But they may serve to precipitate it, instead.

Reasonable Defense: A Sustainable Approach to Securing the Nation

by Carl Conetta, PDA Briefing Report #21, 14 November 2012. 9 tables. The appendix provides an additional 18 tables and charts addressing personnel, force structure, and budgets.
PDF  ➪ summary PDF  ➪ appendix of tables and charts PDF.

sustainable defense Argues for a new balance among the various instruments of national power reflecting today’s strategic conditions.  Taking a realistic view of security needs, the report advocates a military 20% smaller than today’s. It advances a “discriminate defense” strategy that would focus the military on cost-effective missions and save $550 billion more than official plans over the next decade.

Debt, Deficits, and Defense: A Way Forward

Report of the Sustainable Defense Task Force, 11 June 2010.   ➪ PDF summary PDF

Debt, Deficits, and Defense    

      

The report presents options identified by the task force for reducing DoD’s budget — in sum saving nearly $1 trillion over the decade. The task force was convened by Rep. Barney Frank, Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee. PDA played a major role in researching, composing, and producing this report.

    

Disappearing the Dead: Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Idea of a “New Warfare”

by Carl Conetta, PDA Research Monograph #9, 18 February 2004.  PDF summary PDF  ➪ HTML  ➪ summary HTML

 

Collateral in Iraq
Examines the Pentagon’s treatment of the civilian casualty issue in the Iraq and Afghan wars, reviews the “spin” and “news frames” used by defense officials to shape the public debate over casualties, and critiques the concept of a “precision warfare” as misleading.  Case studies include the Baghdad bombing campaign. An appendix provides a comprehensive Guide to Surveys and Reporting on Casualties in the Afghan and Iraq Wars.

Dueling with Uncertainty: the New Logic of American Military Planning

by Carl Conetta and Charles Knight, February 1998. ➪ HTML PDF

 

wild cards

Examines how the new planning concepts and methods adopted by the Pentagon since 1992 have led to military requirements disproportionate to real threats and have supported overweening ambitions for the application of military power. A version appeared in the March/April 1998 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists as “Inventing Threats.”

Confidence-Building Defense: a comprehensive approach to security and stability in the new era

by Carl Conetta and Lutz Unterseher. May 1994.
Newly published in ➪ PDF.

Originally, this primer was written and then published in spiral-bound book format for a series of seminars sponsored by the Study Group on Alternative Security Policy (SAS) and the Project on Defense Alternatives (PDA).  These seminars were held in 1994 in several of the newly sovereign states of Europe: the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Belarus.

In 1994 no suitable seminar host was found in Ukraine.  Although confidence-building defenses can not solve all of Ukraine’s strategic dilemmas during the present war with Russia, initial evidence strongly suggests that its military has made successful use of some of the principal aspects of a confidence-building defense.

The primer remains one of the most comprehensive presentations of the concepts of Confidence-Building Defense (C-BD), including details of their application to the structuring and operations of national armed forces.  It totals 116 pages with 94 charts and tables.

Although some details of arms and tactics change over time, the fundamentals remain relevant to present-day international security, military planning, and the furthering of peaceful relations.

 

Defensive Military Structures in Action: Historical Examples

➪ PDF ➪ HTML by Carl Conetta, Charles Knight, and Lutz Unterseher, May 1994.

 

Winter War FinlandExamines three significant cases in the last 90 years where defensive preparations, structures, and tactics were of decisive importance in major military operations. Published initially in Confidence-Building Defense: A Comprehensive Approach to Security & Stability in the New Era, Study Group on Alternative Security Policy and Project on Defense Alternatives, 1994.

Toward Defensive Restructuring in the Middle East

by Carl Conetta, Charles Knight, and Lutz Unterseher, PDA Research Monograph #1, February 1991.
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Examines the character of force structure and military conflict in the Middle East and outlines a nonoffensive defense posture for nations in the region. It also draws the implications of such a posture for arms transfers and arms control policy. An appendix reviews the pertinent lessons of the 1990-91 Gulf War.

An edited version of this article appeared in the 01 April 1991 issue of The Bulletin of Peace Proposals (now Security Dialogue).