

# CHINA'S EXPANDING ROLE IN AFRICA

## Implications for the United States

A Report of the CSIS Delegation  
to China on China-Africa-U.S. Relations  
November 28–December 1, 2006

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Our CSIS delegation comprised an unusually diverse high-level collection of nine independent experts, all but one U.S. based, and including two nationals from Africa. Each gave generously of his and her time, and each revealed the depth and passion of their respective engagement with both Africa and China. John Hamre, CSIS president and CEO, has steadfastly encouraged us to pursue the opportunities for collaboration first tabled in early 2006 by CIIS president Ma Zhengang. Jennifer Cooke, codirector of the CSIS Africa Program, has offered much intellectual guidance throughout the development of the project, while Savina Rupani and Elizabeth Sullivan provided tireless and expert project support.

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# Executive Summary

China, in its quest for a closer strategic partnership with Africa, has increasingly dynamic economic, political, and diplomatic activities on the continent. As demonstrated in the third Forum on China and Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in November 2006, the high-profile summit marked a historic moment in China-Africa relations. China's highest leadership actively espoused the summit's ambitious vision, which was enthusiastically embraced by a broad range of African leaders. Forty-eight African countries were present, including 43 heads of state. The Chinese push forward in Africa raises the promise of achieving future gains that benefit Africa in significant, constructive ways, raising hopes that China will seriously turn its attention to long-neglected areas such as infrastructure development and that its strategic approach will raise Africa's status globally, intensify political and market competition, create promising new choices in external partnerships, strengthen African capacities to combat malaria and HIV/AIDS, and propel the continent's economic growth, enabling African countries to better integrate with the global economy.

This report identifies six key factors that significantly undergird the Chinese approach:

1. China's quest to build a strategic partnership with Africa fits squarely within Beijing's global foreign policy strategy and its vision of the evolving international system.
2. Chinese leaders and strategists believe China's historical experience and development model resonate powerfully with African counterparts, thereby creating a comparative advantage vis-à-vis the West.
3. China's history of friendly, respectful, and helpful political linkages with Africa is thought to provide a durable foundation for a future strategic partnership.
4. China believes Africa is on the verge of a developmental takeoff.
5. China's policymakers are confident that a state-centric approach to Africa will build strategically on Beijing's core strengths and align with the stated preferences of African countries.
6. Policymakers believe it is in China's interest to engage third parties on Africa, but cautiously, slowly, and with serious reservations.

Drawing momentum and confidence from the six key factors above, China's expansive presence in Africa has been erected on an array of political, economic, and cultural exchanges that have proliferated in recent years. These activities visibly confirm China's growing interest in Africa; they also visibly signal the continent's emergent importance to China's burgeoning economy and rising political stature.

While China's more ambitious and complex Africa policy of today may in due course bring financial and political payoffs, alter the playing field in Africa, and create pressures for changes in U.S. policy approaches, multiple risks also attend China's strategy. In particular, Beijing faces nine core challenges in translating its vision of a strategic partnership with Africa into a sustainable reality:

1. China will need to work assiduously to overcome obstacles tied to language, culture, religion, and racial bias.
2. Although the FOCAC Beijing Action Plan calls for increased exchanges between African and Chinese media, and for the two sides to facilitate the placement of resident correspondents in China and in African countries, Chinese media and popular culture have only very limited entry into African markets thus far. Knowledge and expertise about Africa in China's policy advisory and think tank communities is thin and lacking in up-to-date, on-the-ground experience.
3. Evolving African popular opinion—the “African street”—is not currently factored systematically into Beijing's thinking.
4. The Chinese approach is neither familiar nor well equipped to engage with the emergent and increasingly vocal and influential nongovernmental groups in Africa.
5. Adhering to a formal policy of noninterference and putting it into consistent practice will be difficult and likely clash over time with deepening Chinese interests.
6. In the future, China will be under increasing pressure to define how it will direct and coordinate internally the complex bundle of ambitious policy and programmatic initiatives it is advancing.
7. The Chinese diaspora business community poses special “reputational risks” related to bribery and counterfeiting, among other controversial practices.
8. Pressures will mount for China to do more to harmonize its donor activity in Africa with ongoing international assistance, especially with respect to debt.
9. Pressures will mount on Beijing to manage its relations better with its most important bilateral partner, the United States, vis-à-vis Africa.

China's expansive engagement in Africa inherently carries significant implications for U.S. interests in Africa and around the world, as well as for U.S.-China relations. Like China, the United States is in the midst of an expansive

phase of ever-greater engagement in Africa. U.S. foreign assistance levels to Africa have more than tripled during the Bush administration. Signature White House initiatives have been launched that have had a predominant focus on Africa: the five-year, \$15-billion President's Emergency AIDS Relief Plan (PEPFAR); the U.S. Malaria Initiative; and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, which seeks to reward states that are well governed and performing well economically with substantial new aid compacts that will accelerated economic growth. Private-sector engagement is steadily rising, concentrated in the energy field, and annual two-way trade reached \$60.6 billion in 2005, up 36.7 percent from 2004. It is now widely acknowledged that U.S. national interests in Africa have burgeoned to include substantial global energy stakes, counterterrorism concerns, public health, and intensifying competition with China, India, South Korea, and other Asian countries that have significantly enlarged their engagement in Africa.

Up to now, the United States and China have been largely absorbed in their separate, respective spheres, enlarging their presence and investment in Africa, with little systematic or substantive reference to the other. Some initial think tank research, as well as multiple media reports in the United States, has raised concerns about China-Africa relations, often framed in apprehensive or censorious terms. The United States and China did endorse in principle in 2005 a U.S.-China subregional Africa dialogue, as part of the larger U.S.-China strategic dialogue, but since that point there has been very little progress in building real content into that commitment.

China's expansive engagement in Africa is a complex new reality that we only partially grasp—fast moving, multidimensional, and long-range in its various impacts—and it calls for greater attention and action in Washington. As such, critical work needs to be done to generate new, longer-range thinking and greater intellectual content to help create effective U.S. policies to engage China productively in Africa, if a costly U.S.-China clash in Africa is to be avoided. A strategic approach can build on the reality that, broadly speaking, the United States and China share a range of common interests in seeking a more collaborative and constructive bilateral relationship. The relationship between the two countries is in a period of relative stability and constructive dialogue, presenting a window of opportunity to make further gains in expanding their common ground. Most obviously, the two sides have become deeply intertwined economically and share a joint interest in managing their political and security relationship in a way that assures continued bilateral economic benefits.

Integral to any such approach, however, will be the expectation that—owing to the weak state institutions, high incidence of conflict, and relative economic fragility in most African countries—developments in Africa, independent of U.S.-China relations, will repeatedly test U.S. and Chinese approaches and their resolve to work collaboratively. It will be no less important to anticipate that enduring philosophical, ideological, and programmatic differences, mutual suspicions and misunderstandings, and competitive tensions will sustain the risk of a clash of U.S.-China interests in Africa. Hence the special need to anticipate



flash points in approaches to Africa and manage them preemptively: most important, at this point, are crisis cases such as Darfur, sensitive assistance issues such as debt and harmonization of donor approaches, and access to energy resources.

With urgent foreign and security policy concerns elsewhere around the world, and with several major and growing U.S. diplomatic, humanitarian, developmental, and security initiatives in process in Africa already, there is a risk that U.S. policymakers will be unwilling or unable to give China's expansive presence in Africa the priority time and policy energy it requires. This would be a mistake. The opportunities and interests present themselves now to assess China's approach to Africa more accurately, engage China more effectively, and work to shape outcomes in Africa that are beneficial to Africans, as well as Chinese and Americans.

More specifically, this report finds several promising options for U.S.-China-Africa collaboration at the multilateral, government-to-government, business, and civil society levels.

### **Multilateral Level**

- Give high priority to multilateral organizations—such as the UN Security Council, UN operational agencies, the African Union, and African subregional bodies—as principal mechanisms for gaining Chinese support for U.S.-China-Africa collaborations in political and security spheres.
- Encourage deeper engagement among China, the United States, and other international donors on the issues of development assistance, poverty alleviation programs, multilateral development banks lending, and African debt sustainability.
- Encourage engagement of China at the G-8 summit in Germany in 2007, especially as it relates to the G-8's priority focus in 2007 on African development.
- Engage China to take part in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).
- China and its African partners, under the FOCAC umbrella, should establish a permanent secretariat or other high-level coordinating body to guide and implement their deepening partnership.

### **Bilateral Government-to-Government Relations**

- Accelerate the development of a more substantive agenda for U.S.-China cooperation in Africa, recognizing inherent limitations.
- Increase ongoing bilateral consultations addressing immediate and emergent challenges, especially regarding developments in the Niger Delta and in the arc stretching from the coastal Horn of Africa and inland: Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Chad.

- Ramp up military-to-military consultations regarding Africa between China and other key players, including the African Union, European countries, and the United States.
- Intensify collaboration on health- and education-related issues in Africa.

### **Business, Economic, and Trade Activities**

- Expect increased Chinese interest in business partnerships.
- Encourage Chinese public-private partnerships in Africa.
- Seek trilateral ways to work with African authorities to assure that the massive increases in U.S. and Chinese development and trade assistance complement one another.

### **Civil Society and Nongovernmental Organizations**

- Facilitate interaction among Chinese, African, and international civil society organizations to meet on issues of common research interest, including observation of grass-roots elections, cooperative activities to support environmental protection or worker safety, and other civil society activity related to good governance, religious practice, community health, and rights of women and girls.
- Facilitate interaction between U.S. and Chinese Africanists to deepen the level of Chinese scholarly understanding of contemporary Africa.



# Introduction

## Background

From November 28 to December 1, 2006, the CSIS Africa Program and CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies led a senior-level delegation to China. Fortuitously, the visit took place in the immediate aftermath of the momentous Forum on China and Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit held in Beijing, November 3–5, 2006. This mission grew out of a broad, multiyear initiative at CSIS, dating back to mid-2002, which recognized the fact that China is in the midst of an historical expansive engagement in Africa, at the very same time that the U.S. administration has tripled its aid commitments to Africa and launched several major White House initiatives focused on Africa. For Chinese and U.S. national interests alike, Africa increasingly matters in new and significant ways that intrinsically call for each to pursue a long-term, strategic approach. As the Chinese and U.S. approaches are refined, there is a strong case at this historical juncture for deepening our understanding of the evolving U.S. and Chinese perspectives on critical policy issues pertaining to Africa, identifying the means to manage points of tension better, and formulating concrete avenues for fruitful future U.S.-Chinese collaboration in Africa.

Specifically, the CSIS China-Africa Project has three main goals:

1. Illuminate the motivations and decisionmaking processes driving Chinese foreign policy toward Africa, in the context of evolving U.S. policy approaches;
2. Conduct in-depth, on-the-ground field work assessing the extent and impact of Chinese interests and activities in Africa in key issues areas, with a special focus on energy and other raw material access, financial markets, commodity prices, human rights, good governance, public health, regional stability and peacekeeping operations, and the environment;
3. Carry out activities, conferences, and seminars that provide substantive content to advance a U.S.-China dialogue on Africa.

To help meet these goals, and in partnership with the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), a Beijing-based think tank associated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the CSIS delegation to China engaged key Chinese specialists on Africa during a two-day seminar, November 29–30, with the aim of gaining a more in-depth perspective on the motivations and bureaucratic mechanisms driving Chinese policy in Africa, explaining the factors that shape U.S. approaches to Africa, and exploring promising areas for U.S.-Chinese

collaboration on Africa. The delegation also traveled to Shanghai for a day of discussions on December 1, hosted by BHP Billiton China, which drew together representatives from Shanghai's business, diplomatic, and academic communities to examine the economic and geopolitical implications of China's expansive engagement in Africa.

While in Beijing and Shanghai, the delegation was able to engage a broad array of interlocutors from Chinese government, diplomatic, business, and academic circles. These persons included Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Yesui, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhai Jun, current and former Chinese diplomats to Africa, the head of the Chinese African Studies Association, senior vice president of the China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) Gao Zhikai (Victor Gao), policy experts drawn from 10 different think tanks and other governmental institutions, and more than a dozen leading government and nongovernment specialists living in China who closely follow China-Africa relations. The delegation membership and itinerary in China are included as appendixes to this report.

The CSIS delegation was an unusual assembly of independent senior-level experts, with depth of experience in both Africa and China and expertise across multiple sectors: in energy markets and scarce high-value commodities; public health; fair business practices; human rights and good governance; and security and peacekeeping operations. In combination, the delegation provided a striking picture of the multiple, diverse sectors of American society that shape U.S. policy approaches toward Africa. The delegation included Ambassador Mark Bellamy, vice president of the National Defense University; Peter Lamptey, a Ghanaian doctor who heads Family Health International's HIV/AIDS Institute; Ray Offenheiser, president of Oxfam America; Pearl Robinson, professor at Tufts University and president of the African Studies Association; Lorne Craner, former senior official in the Bush administration and current president of the International Republican Institute; Akwe Amosu, a Nigerian-British senior officer at the Open Society Institute; Ken Isaacs, vice president of the Christian humanitarian relief organization Samaritan's Purse; Stuart Brooks, a British senior public policy analyst at Chevron; and Anthony Carroll, a trade and investment specialist with Manchester Trade Limited.

## **Core Conclusions**

China's new strategic partnership with Africa, unveiled at the November 2006 FOCAC, marks a new and historic moment in China-Africa relations. China's highest leadership actively espoused FOCAC's ambitious vision, which was enthusiastically embraced by a broad range of African leaders. Forty-eight African countries were present, including 43 heads of state. The Chinese push forward in Africa raises the promise of achieving future gains that benefit Africa in significant, constructive ways. It has raised hopes across Africa that China will turn its attention seriously to long-neglected areas such as infrastructure and that its strategic approach will raise Africa's status globally, intensify political and market competition, create promising new choices in external partnerships,

strengthen African capacities to combat malaria and HIV/AIDS, and promote economic growth. It also raises multiple nettlesome policy issues and complex implementing challenges that China will increasingly confront in the future and that require careful consideration earlier rather than later.

China's expansive engagement in Africa inherently carries significant implications for U.S. interests in Africa and around the world, as well as for U.S.-China relations. It comes in a period of major parallel expansion of U.S. commitments in Africa, propelled by growing U.S. national interests in Africa in terms of global infectious diseases, energy security, counterterrorism and global security, and promotion of good governance. The tripling of U.S. foreign aid that has occurred during the Bush administration has included the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), a five-year, \$15-billion program, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, a major initiative aimed at strengthening the economic performance of well-governed states, many in Africa. U.S. military engagement in Africa has expanded significantly, especially in the Horn of Africa, the Sahara/Sahelian zone, and the Gulf of Guinea maritime zone. In 2007, for the first time ever, the United States has announced its intention to create a separate U.S. Africa combatant command. Following the Ethiopian military's ouster from power of the Islamist movement ruling in Mogadishu, U.S. forces in early 2007 significantly stepped up counterterrorism activities in southern Somalia, targeting suspected al Qaeda members. U.S. investment in Africa's energy sector, and its dependence on Africa to meet its rising energy needs, have both steadily expanded, in parallel with a similarly robust pattern of rising Chinese oil dependency on Africa. Within the next decade, the United States will rely upon Africa for 20 to 25 percent of its oil imports.

China's ambitious, new high-profile role in Africa challenges the United States to think far more comprehensively and strategically about how it will engage China on Africa matters in the future. A part of that challenge, for both the United States and China, will be trying to avoid the trap of a damaging and unnecessary strategic competition in Africa. To do so, both the United States and China will need to give far higher priority to working together, innovatively, assiduously, and carefully, and to enlarging open, senior-level communications between the United States and China on Africa matters. It will require better management of areas of tension and finding the means to circumnavigate special sensitivities on each side without sacrificing principle. It will require giving far greater prominence to African input in devising a common way forward in strengthening Africa's global integration. It will require working far more systematically within existing multilateral channels, especially those based in Africa, to harmonize donor approaches on debt relief, investments in public health, and related issues. And it will require seriously pursuing options that hold considerable promise for concrete U.S.-China-Africa collaborations, especially in the areas of conflict resolution, HIV/AIDS, malaria and other infectious diseases, African peacekeeping capacity, and good governance.

Deepening U.S.-China interdependence and strong shared interests argue, at least on the surface, in favor of a closer alignment of approaches. Other powerful

factors, however, pull in an opposite direction and sustain the risk of a U.S.-China clash in Africa. Intensifying economic and political competition inherently raise tensions. There is persistent mutual suspicion of each other's motives and a tendency to mirror-image (i.e., to emphasize the other's hypocrisy and callousness). And there are significant, enduring ideological, philosophical, and institutional differences. If a clash is indeed to be averted, it will likely happen only if there is the conscious political choice and exercise of political will by each government's leaders.

The remainder of this report details the findings and recommendations derived from the CSIS delegation visit and ongoing CSIS research. It contains an examination of China's evolving approach to Africa and major emerging challenges, followed by brief commentary on the implications of China's approach to Africa for U.S. foreign policy interests. The report concludes with concise, promising options for U.S.-China-Africa collaboration in the official, business, and civil society spheres.

# China's Evolving Approach to Africa

## Key Factors Shaping China's Current Approach to Africa

While China has maintained good bilateral diplomatic relationships with African nations since the 1950s, and provided substantial development aid and infrastructural assistance to partners on the continent, it was not until 2000 that Beijing launched a more comprehensive and ambitious effort to court Africa as a whole. This new, more activist approach is best seen in the activities and aims of the multilateral Forum on China and Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) process (see below). The CSIS delegation came away convinced that the following six key factors significantly undergird the Chinese approach.

*1. China's quest to build a strategic partnership with Africa fits squarely within Beijing's global foreign policy strategy and its vision of the evolving international system.*

Africa is seen as integral to Beijing's strategic ambition to advance a "new security concept" that can ensure China's peaceful rise as a global power and strengthen relations with key neighbors and regions. Through its overarching global approach, China's leadership seeks to sustain China's internal development and political stability at home, legitimize within the international community the historic benefits of China's rise, and achieve its longer-term goal of a more multipolar, equitable, and "democratic" international system.

China's hard national interests and strategic needs bind it increasingly to Africa. In earlier decades, expressions of political solidarity and altruism dominated Chinese discussions of Africa. These are still relevant today but take a back seat to hard national interests. In the words of a senior Chinese Foreign Ministry official, today "China needs Africa." It needs Africa for resources to fuel China's development goals, for markets to sustain its growing economy, and for political alliances to support its aspirations to global influence.

*2. Chinese leaders and strategists believe China's historical experience and development model resonate powerfully with African counterparts, thereby creating a comparative advantage vis-à-vis the West.*

Chinese leaders and diplomats consciously promote their country's past, present, and future to appeal to African counterparts. China emerged from colonial encroachment, internal chaos, and economic destitution to achieve spectacular economic growth and infrastructure development. In the past two decades, its achievements have lifted over 200 million Chinese citizens out of



poverty. In the meantime, China can claim that it has achieved solid political stability and increasing international clout. Such a national narrative, it is asserted, has a powerful resonance in Africa.

Moreover, the Chinese development approach that underpins this narrative is cast as a superior, far more dynamic alternative to Western approaches. In Beijing's view, Africans and Chinese find common ground in the view that the West's historical experiences in achieving development are too remote from the African experience, offer fewer transferable lessons, and that the Western economic model has generated few dramatic success stories in Africa. As Beijing sees it, Western development approaches are overly moralizing, bureaucratic, conditional, and grounded in a corrosive and short-sighted skepticism. In contrast, Beijing unabashedly claims to provide development aid with "no political strings attached" and with an emphasis on political stability and economic development first and foremost.

*3. China's history of friendly, respectful, and helpful political linkages with Africa is thought to provide a durable foundation for a future strategic partnership.*

China is especially proud that over the past 50 years it established a legacy of political solidarity and development assistance in partnership with Africa, at a time when China was itself internationally isolated, impoverished, and beset by major internal challenges. Reflecting principles dating to the Bandung conference of developing nations in 1955, Beijing staunchly supports the inviolability of African state sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs, and the need for postcolonial nations to stand up to outside "bullying" and "hegemonism." Moreover, Beijing believes this history compares very favorably with the poor political and security legacy left to Africa by the U.S.-Soviet superpower rivalry of the Cold War era that stoked wars in places like Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia and created alliances with corrupt strongmen like Zaire's President Mobutu and Somalia's President Barre.

Chinese leaders also recognize that its relationship with Africa has earned China momentous diplomatic dividends. Beijing has not forgotten that Africa's support in the early-1970s was vital to Beijing gaining its seat in the United Nations. Today, Beijing assiduously courts those remaining African countries that continue formally to recognize Taiwan in an effort to further isolate Taiwan on the international stage.<sup>1</sup>

*4. China believes Africa is on the verge of a developmental takeoff.*

Chinese analysts assert with considerable confidence that Africa has crossed a historical threshold and is trending overall toward a far brighter future—a future in which China can play a positive and active role. According to this view, Africa has realized a period of relative stability and calm as compared to the dark days of the 1990s when protracted conflicts raged in more than a dozen countries.

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<sup>1</sup> As of the end of 2006, five African countries maintained formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan: Burkina Faso, Gambia, Malawi, Sao Tome and Principe, and Swaziland. In addition, the Taiwan government operates four quasi-official liaison missions in Africa: one in Nigeria (in Abuja) and three in South Africa (in Pretoria, Cape Town, and Johannesburg).

Chinese interlocutors recognize that several select conflicts persist and require close international engagement: in Sudan/Darfur, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Ivory Coast. But the broader Chinese view of Africa is of increasing peace and stability, a continent poised to make major developmental gains. As such, the time is ripe for a more engaged and expansive Chinese role.

*5. China's policymakers are confident that a state-centric approach to Africa will build strategically on Beijing's core strengths and align with the stated preferences of African countries.*

Beijing's principal and highly preferred means of engagement with Africa is through official government-to-government relations. For Beijing's leading officials, the next three-year phase in China-Africa relations will be guided almost exclusively by the integrated Action Plan, organized around eight core policy initiatives outlined in the Summit Declaration. The Action Plan results from several years of official dialogue, government planning missions, and diplomatic reporting between China and African counterparts. Likewise, China's engagement with third parties about its Africa policy—as with the U.S.-China Senior Leaders Dialogue and its sub-dialogue on Africa—is tightly confined within official channels and will remain there.

For Beijing, such an approach plays to its strengths. Its Africa policy is not complicated by private domestic constituencies and interest groups, allowing for quicker and more decisive action. China's largest economic and business activities in Africa are dominated by state-owned and/or state-influenced companies, giving official Beijing another leg up in political and economic competition in Africa. China lacks well-developed, independent business and civil society sectors, which for now leaves the full lead responsibility for carrying forward its vision clearly in the hands of state leaders and official diplomats.

*6. Policymakers believe it is in China's interest to engage third parties on Africa, but cautiously, slowly, and with serious reservations.*

China remains open in principle to collaboration with the United States and other developed world countries in Africa. In his opening remarks to the CSIS delegation, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Yesui affirmed openness to collaboration with the United States, consistent with commitments to sustain the U.S.-China strategic dialogue on Africa. Our Chinese interlocutors acknowledged the value of drawing on U.S. and other Western expertise and knowledge of Africa, including engagement with African civil society, business partners, and regional organizations.

China, however, remains wary of and highly sensitive to U.S. discussion of its approach in Africa, including proposed collaboration. That reflects Beijing's continuing concern with perceived U.S. hegemony and the related fear that Washington's long-term intention is to thwart or contain China's ambitions to become a fully global power. It is rooted in a proud Chinese nationalism that bristles at overreaching American power, influence, and sermonizing in Africa (and elsewhere around the world). A very recent experience of direct relevance is

the defeat in 2005 of the China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) bid for the U.S.-owned energy firm UNOCAL. Chinese analysts asserted repeatedly that this was proof of the U.S. determination to prevent the rise of a Chinese global energy firm and that the outcome directly prompted Chinese authorities to intensify its push for a strategic partnership in Africa.

## **China's Expansive Presence in Africa and the November 2006 FOCAC Summit**

Drawing momentum and confidence from the six key factors above, China's expansive presence in Africa has been erected on an array of political, economic, and cultural exchanges that have proliferated in recent years. These activities visibly confirm China's growing interest in Africa; they also visibly signal the continent's emerging importance to China's burgeoning economy and rising political stature.

Senior Chinese officials, in an attempt to step up the frequency of high-level visits, have now established the diplomatic precedent of beginning each new year with a major official visit to Africa. In 2007, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing took a seven-nation tour of Africa beginning on January 1, with stops in Benin, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Chad, the Central African Republic, Eritrea, and Botswana. President Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao, and Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing visited more than a dozen African countries within the first half of 2006, shortly after the issuance of the first official white paper on China-Africa relations in January 2006, on the 50th anniversary of China's diplomatic relations with Africa. In each of these high-profile visits, Chinese officials have consistently emphasized common ground with Africa and China's desire for a closer dialogue in areas such as peacekeeping operations, legislative exchanges, human resources development, medicine and health, judicial cooperation, and agribusiness.

In the last few years, China has also pledged to grant duty-free treatment for African goods, facilitating the diversification of Africa's export market to China. Beijing has sought ways to increase Chinese investments in Africa. According to a book released by the World Bank in 2007, *Africa's Silk Road: China and India's New Economic Frontier*, as of 2005, the Chinese Export-Import Bank had provided an accumulated commitment of \$800 million in concessional loans for 55 projects in nearly two dozen African countries. In addition, China agreed to grant debt relief to 31 African countries, worth \$1.2 billion, in 2000. At the second FOCAC summit in 2003, Beijing pledged to write off another \$750 million worth of debt for African countries. The World Bank study further estimates that as of mid-2006, the total amount of Export-Import Bank loans to Africa is valued at over \$12.5 billion in infrastructural development alone. These projects are mainly concentrated in Angola, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.

In the energy sector, China's oil imports from Africa (primarily Angola, Sudan, Nigeria, and Equatorial Guinea) continue to rise and account today for 30 percent

of total external oil dependence and between 4 and 5 percent of China's total energy needs. China's first-ever white paper on Africa, issued in January 2006, directs Chinese companies to collaborate with African countries to "develop and exploit rationally their natural resources." Africa has about 8 percent of the world's proven oil reserves, with nearly three-quarters located in West Africa. New off-shore discoveries concentrated in West Africa's Gulf of Guinea will, in the next decade, account for one in four new barrels of oil that enter the world marketplace. Chinese oil companies, like their Western counterparts, are particularly interested in the low-sulfur sweet crude in the Gulf of Guinea and are making significant headway in constructing pipelines, oil refineries, and securing exploration rights. Angola has since 2003 been the leading supplier of oil to China from Africa. In 2006, Angola accounted for 50 percent of China's oil imports from the continent and surpassed Saudi Arabia to become China's leading external supplier of oil.

Beijing has significantly expanded cultural and educational exchanges in the last few years. With a projection of 100 million Chinese travelers by 2020, China is poised to become one of the world's largest outbound tourist markets. Since 2003, China has promoted Africa as a tourist destination and has approved more than two dozen African countries as officially sanctioned destinations for Chinese tourists. In 2005, 110,000 Chinese tourists visited Africa, double the number for 2004. In addition, to foster educational exchanges, three Confucius Institutes have recently been established in Kenya, Rwanda, and South Africa. These institutes, with the support of the Chinese government and in partnership with African universities, provide Chinese language and cultural courses for African students. The Chinese Ministry of Education estimates that there are over 8,000 African students studying Chinese. With the number of interested students on the rise, five more Confucius Institutes are expected to be launched in the near future.

China has built its more expansive engagement in Africa within the FOCAC framework. The third FOCAC summit in Beijing in November 2006 stands out from the previous two—in 2000 (in Beijing) and 2003 (in Addis Ababa)—for its exuberance, scale, and ambition.

The Chinese leadership expended exceptional effort and prestige to guarantee the success of the November summit. By all accounts, African leaders enthusiastically embraced the vision and the opportunities put forward by Beijing. The major document to come out of the event, the FOCAC Beijing Action Plan (2007–2009), sets out plans for cooperation in several major areas (political cooperation, economic cooperation, cooperation in international affairs, and cooperation on social development) and ambitious targets for China to scale up its engagement in Africa.<sup>2</sup>

Among other pledges, the Action Plan commits China to:

- Send 100 senior Chinese experts on agriculture to Africa and set up 10 agricultural demonstration sites in Africa;

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<sup>2</sup> The full FOCAC Beijing Action Plan (2007–2009) is provided as an appendix to this report.

- Set up a China-Africa Development Fund gradually amounting to \$5 billion to support “well-established and reputable” Chinese firms investing in Africa;
- Increase from 190 to over 440 the number of export items to China eligible for zero-tariff treatment from the least developed countries in Africa having diplomatic relations with China;
- Double development assistance to Africa by 2009;
- Provide \$3 billion of preferential loans and \$2 billion preferential export buyers’ credit to African countries in the next three years;
- Cancel government interest-free loans that had become due by the end of 2005 contracted by heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) and least developed countries (LDCs) in Africa that have diplomatic ties with China;
- Train 15,000 professionals from African countries in the next three years;
- Set up 100 rural schools and double the number of scholarships for African students to 4,000;
- Build 10 hospitals and 30 anti-malaria clinics, while providing RMB 300 billion (approximately \$37.5 million) for the purchase of anti-malarial drugs; and
- Send 300 Chinese young people to Africa over the next three years, under the Chinese Young Volunteers Serving Africa Program, to support education, agriculture, sports, and health-related programs.

## Emergent Challenges for China in Africa

Beijing faces several formidable challenges in translating its vision of a strategic partnership with Africa into a sustainable reality. The CSIS delegation identified nine core challenges.

*1. China will need to work assiduously to overcome obstacles tied to language, culture, religion, and racial bias.*

Chinese is not widely spoken in Africa, and Chinese diplomats, businessmen, technicians, doctors, peacekeepers, and other “cultural ambassadors” must learn languages widely spoken in Africa—such as English and French—in order to be most effective. Similarly, future Chinese engagement in Africa will need to take into greater account the exceptional religiosity of African societies and develop an official approach, now largely absent, for engaging religious leaderships. Religious organizations, Muslim and Christian alike, provide a broad and widening range of social services, especially in education and health, have extensive linkages with their counterparts outside Africa, and have a strong public voice on matters of public debate. Within the global Christian world, the Protestant and Catholic communities in Africa are the fastest growing in terms of membership and participation. Africa’s 300 million Muslims comprise highly complex, dynamic, and variegated communities.

*2. While the FOCAC Beijing Action Plan calls for increased exchanges between African and Chinese media, and for the two sides to facilitate the placement of resident correspondents in China and in African countries, Chinese media and popular culture have only very limited entry into African markets thus far. Knowledge and expertise about Africa in China's policy advisory and think tank communities is thin and lacking in up-to-date, on-the-ground experience.*

As its relationship with Africa deepens and becomes more complex, China will require a far more nuanced understanding of evolving developments in key African partner states than exists today. Chinese university-based scholars and think tank specialists do not have regular or extended opportunities to travel to and carry out research in African countries.

*3. Evolving African popular opinion—the “African street”—is currently not factored systematically into Beijing's thinking.*

Instead, what is seen are isolated instances of ad hoc, tactical reactions to local challenges (e.g., the voluntary textile export quotas China put in place in South Africa in 2006, following intense pressure from the South African government, trade unions, and the media).

*4. The Chinese approach is neither familiar nor well equipped to engage with the emergent and increasingly vocal and influential nongovernmental groups in Africa.*

Following the end of the Cold War, as the political environment in Africa liberalized, incipient grass roots groups, suddenly less constrained, began to proliferate. As the 1990s advanced, their expertise and presence began to be seen across multiple sectors: electoral preparations and monitoring; independent media; and advocacy for economic reform, human rights, protection of vulnerable populations, and empowerment of women, among others. By the end of the 1990s, the nongovernmental sector was firmly established in many countries as an essential partner in any national policymaking deliberations. Indeed, the nongovernmental sector began to seed smart, reformist talent to serve government reform efforts and became central to the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) peer review process in places like Ghana and Kenya.

*5. Adhering to a formal policy of noninterference and putting it into consistent practice will be difficult and likely clash over time with deepening Chinese interests.*

As state and business interests deepen in Africa, Beijing will increasingly face mounting pressures favoring pragmatic adjustments and focused actions that go against an unwavering policy of “no political strings attached” and absolute respect of sovereignty. Already, there is some evidence of policy ferment within Chinese government circles over the aims and implementation of Africa policy, as well as questions of how the Chinese government can better manage its increasingly complex relations with Africa.

China will increasingly confront, in settings like Nigeria, deep structural corruption, absence of law and order, violence, hostage taking, and targeted

attacks on private energy and other sectoral interests. At the same time, it will confront mounting pressures from African and external critics for more accountability and transparency in Chinese aid and business practices in places like Angola, Zimbabwe, and Ethiopia. In dire humanitarian crises such as Sudan's Darfur region, it will face persistent pressures to support humanitarian interventions.

*6. In the future, China will be under increasing pressure to define how it will direct and internally coordinate the complex bundle of ambitious policy and programmatic initiatives it is advancing.*

At present, it is not clear who is in charge in mediating the interests of the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, semi-autonomous energy and extractive enterprises, large-scale infrastructure construction firms, and other important domestic actors. Different government actors bring different interests and leverage points to the debate about Africa policy, as well as varying capacities to see those interests served within China and with regard to Africa. For example, increasingly marketized Chinese enterprises—and their state-related shareholders back in China—are primarily interested in profit making in their international operations. While understandable, it is unclear how these enterprises will proceed if profit seeking complicates or contradicts broader Chinese government policy in Africa.

Related to this, China will be under pressure to reconcile competing demands from African states and to manage African government expectations better. At this stage, it is not yet clear how increasing demands and expectations from Africans are to be prioritized. Powerful African figures are pressing for the establishment of a genuine joint China-Africa implementation committee for FOCAC, but no agreement had been reached as of late 2006.

*7. The Chinese diaspora business community poses special “reputational risks” related to bribery and counterfeiting, among other controversial practices.*

At present, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not well equipped to manage this problem. The National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Commerce are able to exert influence on large state-owned enterprises and oversee and guide their approaches in Africa, up to a point. Their influence is minimal over hundreds of thousands of Chinese entrepreneurs active today in Africa.

*8. Pressures will mount for China to do more to harmonize its donor activity in Africa with ongoing international assistance, especially with respect to debt.*

There is at present no systematic sharing of data by Chinese ministries with international and bilateral donors deeply invested in Africa, or with African participants in the emerging strategic partnership launched in Beijing. No effective bilateral or multilateral mechanisms have yet to be established at a broad international level or country level for integrating assistance and avoiding duplication. China's approach makes little reference to how its efforts will relate to those of the IMF, World Bank, and the Extractive Industries Transparency

Initiative (EITI). There is mounting concern that Chinese lending practices undermine the debt relief strategies devised over the past decade in cooperation with African states and regional bodies that have dramatically reduced the debt burden in Africa. The fear is that Chinese lending practices may encourage the rapid reestablishment of an unsustainable debt burden in Africa.

Chinese officials have repeatedly insisted that its loans to African countries will not include detailed preconditions. It has committed \$8.1 billion in 2006 to Nigeria, Angola, and Mozambique. The state-owned Export-Import Bank of China, one of the world's largest export credit agencies with annual disbursements of \$15 billion, argues that its loans and credit extensions have helped Africa countries "build a series of key projects with favorable social and economic returns."

In October 2006, World Bank president Paul Wolfowitz expressed apprehension that many of Africa's poorest countries may be incurring excessive new debt as a result of the unconditional loans made by Chinese banks. Washington is particularly concerned with Africa's borrowing patterns and the impact this may have on the long-term effectiveness of the HIPC debt relief initiative and the related \$31-billion debt relief package for Nigeria, concluded at the time of the 2005 G-8 Summit in Gleneagles, Scotland. Most dramatic was the September 2006 statement by the U.S. Treasury Department labeling China a "rogue creditor" practicing "opportunistic lending."

*9. Pressures will mount on Beijing to manage its relations better with its most important bilateral partner, the United States, vis-à-vis Africa.*

The U.S.-China regional sub-dialogue on Africa, initiated in late 2005, reached an initial agreement to devise concrete projects for collaboration. Since that point, however, progress has stalled. In the meantime, pressures have risen in the United States to confront China on some of its activities in Africa: most notably, with respect to Darfur, debt, energy competition, business practices, and relations with disreputable governments like Zimbabwe. With the recent change in the control of the U.S. Congress, interest in critically reviewing the nature of the U.S.-China relationship has increased significantly. National advocacy campaigns like the Save Darfur coalition continue to press for the imposition of new sanctions on China as the means to leverage greater cooperation in pressing for a United Nations–African Union hybrid peace operation in Darfur.



# Implications for the United States

Like China, the United States is in the midst of an expansive phase of ever greater engagement in Africa. U.S. foreign assistance levels to Africa have more than tripled during the Bush administration. Signature White House initiatives have been launched that have had a predominant focus on Africa: the five-year, \$15-billion President's Emergency AIDS Relief Plan (PEPFAR); the U.S. Malaria Initiative; and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, which seeks to reward states that are well governed and performing well economically with substantial new aid compacts that will accelerate economic growth. Private-sector engagement is steadily rising, concentrated in the energy field, and annual two-way trade reached \$60.6 billion in 2005, up 36.7 percent from 2004.

Since 9/11, U.S. military engagement has been enlarged substantially: through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative; a Gulf of Guinea maritime initiative now in development; and an ambitious Horn of Africa counterterror program. The Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), based in Djibouti, is projected to be in place over the next 15 years. Following the Ethiopian military's intervention in Somalia in late December 2006, which routed the Islamist courts' government, the United States engaged directly in early January 2007 by attacking fleeing convoys suspected of transporting "hard target" terrorists tied to the August 1998 al Qaeda attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the subsequent attacks on Israeli tourists in Mombasa, Kenya, in November 2002.

Up to now, the United States and China have each been largely absorbed in their separate, respective spheres, enlarging their presence and investment in Africa, with little systematic or substantive reference to the other. Some initial think tank research, as well as multiple media reports in the United States, have raised concerns about China-Africa relations, often framed in apprehensive or censorious terms. The United States and China did endorse in principle in 2005 a U.S.-China subregional Africa dialogue, as part of the larger U.S.-China strategic dialogue, but since that point there has been very little progress in building real content into that commitment.

What then, can be said further about the nature of the evolving U.S.-China relationship and the implications for the United States of the dramatic parallel expansion of U.S. and Chinese engagement in Africa?

First, and most importantly, there is a need for a more strategic approach by the United States, if a costly U.S.-China clash in Africa is to be avoided and if opportunities for fruitful collaborations are to be pursued effectively. A strategic approach can build on the reality that, broadly speaking, the United States and China share a range of common interests in seeking a more collaborative and constructive bilateral relationship. The relationship between the two countries is in a period of relative stability and constructive dialogue, presenting a window of opportunity to make further gains in expanding their common ground. Most obviously, the two sides have become deeply intertwined economically and share a joint interest in managing their political and security relationship in a way that assures continued bilateral economic benefits. In addition, recent experience has affirmed that the two countries stand a far better chance of dealing with the many security challenges they face—from stemming the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea to securing energy supplies to tackling the problem of global climate change—through cooperation and healthy competition rather than confrontation.

This deepening interdependence also underscores the need for a strategic vision in the United States' approach to China-African relations that recognizes that U.S. action taken in one sphere can have unintended and potentially negative repercussions in another. That was demonstrated dramatically in CNOOC's defeated bid to purchase UNOCAL, which was widely seen within Chinese policymaking circles as proof of U.S. determination to prevent the rise of a Chinese global energy firm and became an impetus to accelerate the formation of strategic relationships in Africa. China is increasingly in a position to move resources and take decisions in its Africa approaches in response to U.S. actions elsewhere that touch on China's perceived global interests. The United States should assume there will be additional unforeseen surprises of this kind in the future, but work to avoid them as much as possible.

"Our policy and the Chinese policy [on Darfur/Sudan] are closer than I realized they were, and I think the Chinese are going to play an increasingly important role in helping us to resolve this. I think the visit was a very successful one because we found many more areas of common agreement, both about our objectives and our strategies for achieving those objectives."—*Andrew Natsios, U.S. president's special envoy to Sudan, speaking at a press briefing before departing Beijing on Friday, January 12, 2007.*

Natsios's four-day visit included closed-door meetings with State Councillor Tang Jiaxuan, one of China's top diplomats, and Vice Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi (Source: Agence France-Press, Beijing).

Integral to any such approach, however, will be the expectation that—owing to the weak state institutions, high incidence of conflict, and relative economic fragility of most African countries—developments in Africa, independent of U.S.-China relations, will repeatedly test U.S. and Chinese approaches and their resolve to work collaboratively. It will be no less important to anticipate that enduring philosophical, ideological, and programmatic differences, mutual suspicions and misunderstandings, and competitive tensions will sustain the risk

of a clash of U.S.-China interests in Africa. Hence the special need to anticipate flash points in approaches to Africa and manage them preemptively: most important, at this point, are crisis cases such as Darfur, sensitive assistance issues such as debt and harmonization of donor approaches, and access to energy resources.

For the United States, such a strategic and anticipatory approach to China-Africa relations will demand a greater openness to engage China through multilateral channels, such as within the United Nations, within major international economic and financial institutions, and within Africa-based multilateral bodies such as the African Union. The slower pace and tough diplomatic work of consensus building will prove frustrating, but can pay longer-term dividends in providing greater awareness of Chinese policies and preferences and fostering more constructive and cooperative responses from China.

More specifically, a strategic approach can also be strengthened through a deliberate focus on strong, mutual shared interests in Africa. In the sphere of public health and infectious diseases in Africa, the United States and China have each taken global leadership positions—on HIV/AIDS, malaria, and avian influenza—and each aims as a matter of policy to address the weakness of infrastructural capacities and health workforce shortages better.

"China's involvement had a very big role on Somalia in the Security Council on the sanctions issues and the arms embargo issues, and we will continue to work with China. We have actually found a lot of constructive interaction with China on the Council."—*Jendayi Frazer, U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs, speaking at a CSIS conference, "Securing Somalia's Future: Options for Diplomacy, Assistance, and Security Engagement," Washington, D.C., January 17, 2007.*

Frazer lauded China's crucial support for UN Security Council 1725 and the IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia (Source: CSIS Africa Program [transcript provided by Federal News Service]).

On matters of conflict resolution, peacekeeping capacity, and counterterrorism in Africa, there is a substantial convergence of perspectives and approaches. Differences persist with respect to Darfur, yet in the UN Security Council there has been recent progress in quietly aligning diplomatic approaches on Sudan. In their shared role as permanent members of the Security Council, China and the United States have shared decision power in shaping African peacekeeping operations, which account for fully 65 percent of operations worldwide. Each has professed a rising interest in investing in African peacekeeping capacity. On matters pertaining to al Qaeda's threat to Africa, there are no significant divergences of opinion or approaches. Indeed, improved future maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, for instance, will benefit China's energy security as much as that of the United States. At the same time, U.S. encouragement of a greater

role for China will need to be tempered by Beijing's continued adherence to its traditional support for state sovereignty and nonintervention.

The same inherent shared economic and political interest exists with respect to ensuring predictable, stable governance in Africa over the long term, better integrating Africa into the global economy, building trade capacity, and lowering poverty. The measure of success in the coming years will be whether the United States and China build a record of concrete collaborations in Africa that create new facts on the ground, reveal the scope of shared interests, promote African well-being, and guard against impulsive action that aggravates tensions and results in a damaging confrontation.

Finally, with urgent foreign and security policy concerns elsewhere around the world, and with several major and growing U.S. diplomatic, humanitarian, developmental, and security initiatives in process in Africa already, there is a risk that U.S. policymakers will be unwilling or unable to give China's expansive presence in Africa the priority time and policy energy it requires. This would be a mistake. The opportunities and interests present themselves now to assess China's approach to Africa more accurately, engage China more effectively, and work to shape outcomes in Africa that are beneficial to Africans, as well as Chinese and Americans.

# Looking Ahead

## Future Policy Options

The following pages offer several concise, promising options for U.S.-China-Africa collaboration in the official, business, and civil society spheres. These recommendations are organized into four parts, covering approaches at the multilateral, government-to-government, business, and civil society levels.

### Multilateral Level

- *Give high priority to multilateral organizations—such as the UN Security Council, UN operational agencies, the African Union, and African subregional bodies—as principal mechanisms for gaining Chinese support for U.S.-China-Africa collaborations in political and security spheres.*

Given Beijing’s staunch support for “noninterference” and the inviolability of sovereignty, it will remain reluctant to act outside the mandate of a regional or international consensus to deal with humanitarian or political crises within states. However, if an international consensus emerges, legitimated by the United Nations or the African Union, for example, Beijing will be more supportive of potential interventions, while still keeping a relatively low profile.

One promising approach to the issue of good governance and human rights would be Chinese and U.S. endorsement of principles already adopted by the African Union. These would include the African Union Charter on Human and People’s Rights, which entered into force in October 1986, and the African Union’s founding statutes.

Washington should further encourage Chinese participation in multilateral donor discussions regarding Africa, both at the international level and at in-country recipient levels, in order to better harmonize ongoing donor activity with China’s expanding presence. This call for Chinese involvement should not come from the United States alone, but should be voiced from UN donor agencies, from donor countries, and through African multilateral and bilateral channels into Beijing.

- *Encourage deeper engagement among China, the United States, and other international donors.*

The issue of debt sustainability, for example, may be an area where these partners can move forward toward closer collaboration in Africa.

Though differences remain, the need to integrate Chinese aid with international donors' lending practices has surfaced. Beijing seems to realize the long-term consequences of its lending practices. In the latest FOCAC Action Plan, it agreed to "actively participate in bilateral and multilateral assistance plans for African countries in post-war reconstruction, humanitarian rescue and relief, and poverty reduction." The World Bank held direct talks with Chinese officials in late 2006. Debt sustainability was also on the agenda for discussions when Henry Paulson, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, led a delegation of U.S. cabinet-level secretaries and other senior U.S. policymakers to Beijing for the inaugural session of the Strategic Economic Dialogue in December 2006. One of the main objectives of the dialogue is increased bilateral cooperation, under existing mechanisms, on development assistance and multilateral development bank lending.

Washington's attempts to engage Beijing—bilaterally and through multilateral institutions such as the OECD and the World Bank—is an important first step to promote responsible lending and to help ensure that African countries reap the benefits of coordinated aid and debt relief while avoiding a new buildup of unsustainable debt.

Coordination between Chinese and other international donors on poverty alleviation programs also makes sense to avoid duplication of effort and assure a more effective distribution of resources.

- *Encourage engagement of China at the G-8 summit in Germany in 2007, especially as it relates to the G-8's priority focus in 2007 on African development.*

Senior Chinese officials are regularly invited to the G-8 summits, and in 2007, they will be in a position to amplify ongoing initiatives that seek to build health capacity to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and TB, reform global trade regimes, promote greater transparency, and build African peacekeeping capacity.

- *Engage China to take part in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).*

EITI is a nongovernmental organization, formed in 2003, with a permanent international secretariat to be based in Oslo, Norway, which according to its website, "aims to ensure that the revenues from extractive industries contribute to sustainable development and poverty reduction." Over 20 resource-rich countries across the world—including 14 in Africa<sup>1</sup>—support or actively implement EITI principles and guidelines, and EITI has the support of dozens of other national governments, multinational companies in the extractive sector, industry associations, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and major institutional investors. To date, neither the Chinese government nor Chinese companies have been involved with EITI. As China's energy and other natural resource extraction companies increasingly expand their presence in

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<sup>1</sup> Those African countries are Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, and Sierra Leone.

Africa, it will become all the more vital to gain their participation in the EITI. If China were to join as a supporting country, it would align itself with the United States, Europe, Mexico, and other investing countries in an effort to ensure that energy producing countries enhance the transparency of the revenues produced by energy investment. China's participation would provide a platform for discussing the utility of revenue transparency, expose China to the desire of many African energy producing countries to fight corruption in the energy sector, and gain China's support for an international effort that will strengthen global energy security and China's own national interests.

- *China and its African partners, under the FOCAC umbrella, should establish a permanent secretariat or other high-level coordinating body to guide and implement their deepening partnership.*

A number of powerful African political leaders are keen to have a greater say in the direction FOCAC is taking and in shaping the level and nature of China's growing assistance in order to meet African needs. Beijing would benefit from such an arrangement, especially as it helps prioritize and target its ambitious assistance goals in Africa and helps legitimate Chinese policies through more regularized consultations with African counterparts. Formally establishing a secretariat or similar body will also provide third parties—such as international lenders or bilateral donors—an appropriate interlocutor to initiate or coordinate collaborative activities in Africa.

## **Bilateral Government-to-Government Relations**

- *Accelerate the development of a more substantive agenda for U.S.-China cooperation in Africa, recognizing inherent limitations.*

Within the framework of the U.S.-China Senior Leaders Dialogue, a sub-dialogue on Africa implies agreement in principle to establish more regularized consultations on and collaborative activities in Africa. Discussion and clarification of the FOCAC three-year action plan released in November 2006 can be a central point of departure for sub-dialogue deliberations. Africa-related issues and discussions can also be integrated into the newly launched Strategic Economic Dialogue led on the U.S. side by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson.

However, even if a more substantive agenda can be put forward, both Beijing and Washington will find it difficult to execute strictly bilateral programs in Africa. The benefits of undertaking concrete, on-the-ground cooperative initiatives in Africa will need to be weighed against the benefits of doing so within multilateral frameworks, especially those already operational.

- *Increase ongoing bilateral consultations addressing immediate and emergent challenges.*

Immediate attention will be needed on the destabilizing situation in the Horn of Africa, especially regarding developments in the arc stretching from the coastal Horn inland: Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Chad. Consultations and joint solutions should also be fostered to address security and political challenges

emerging in the Niger Delta, Angola, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, and regarding the maritime security of energy and raw material shipments along the east coast of Africa.

- *Ramp up military-to-military consultations regarding Africa between China and other key players, including the African Union, European countries, and the United States.*

China and other key players are looking to expand the role of their militaries to assist in addressing security challenges in many parts of Africa. China has dramatically increased its peacekeeping forces since 2000 and is now one of the largest contributors of peacekeepers to the United Nations, with more than 1,600 troops, police, and military observers in the field in 11 missions. China has peacekeepers operating in six of the seven current UN missions in Africa.<sup>2</sup> As the international community contemplates increasing its presence in such locations as the Darfur region of Sudan, and with the possibility that additional UN peacekeepers will be needed elsewhere, the United States, China, the African Union, and other interested parties will need to intensify their consultations in response. The reasoning behind the forthcoming establishment of a new U.S. Africa command, reflective of increasing U.S. concerns about stability, failed states, and terrorism in Africa, would be one point of departure for U.S. and Chinese discussions about security on the continent.

- *Intensify collaboration on health- and education-related issues in Africa.*

The United States and China already cooperate bilaterally in addressing a range of global health priorities. This bilateral cooperation can be expanded, perhaps under the rubric of the U.S.-China Senior Leaders dialogue or the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue, to consult more broadly and coordinate activities related to global health, especially with regard to Africa. Issues of common health concern in Africa would include combating HIV/AIDS, stepping up contributions to fight malaria, and stemming the spread of tuberculosis. Chinese and U.S. specialists can also work together to provide preventive and other technical advice to prevent the outbreak of SARS, avian influenza, and similar deadly diseases in Africa. Chinese construction of medical facilities can be married to introduction of U.S. medical and scientific technical assistance and training as the facilities are stood up. Chinese interlocutors urged wider uptake of the traditional Chinese anti-malarial drug Artemisin by U.S. and Western development assistance programs.

Another area of promise for bilateral cooperation involves joint educational programs at the secondary, collegiate, and graduate levels. Governments can team up to focus resources on education and training programs emphasizing business administration, good corporate governance, and intellectual property rights protections.

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<sup>2</sup> As of the end of 2006, China contributed peacekeepers to UN missions in Western Sahara, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Liberia, Sudan, and Cote d'Ivoire.



## Business, Economic, and Trade Activities

- *Expect increased Chinese interest in business partnerships.*

Major Chinese companies are looking to join forces with established firms operating in Africa, including multinationals, to create joint ventures and other business-to-business partnerships. Such arrangements are particularly likely in the extractive industries.

- *Encourage Chinese public-private partnerships in Africa.*

As Chinese companies become more deeply involved in Africa, they will need to explore the establishment of public-private partnerships as a means of giving back to the communities in which they are operating and defusing potential reputational concerns. Chinese businessmen should be encouraged to take part in local business organizations active in Africa cities, and gain a greater understanding of relationships between businesses as well as among business, governments, and citizenry.

- *Seek trade and export promotion cooperation.*

In the area of trade capacity development, special synergies may emerge for U.S.-China cooperation. The United States has massively ramped up its trade capacity development assistance toward Africa. The Bush administration has indicated its commitment to double trade capacity development assistance worldwide to \$2.7 billion dollars over the next three years, and Africa will be a large target of these funds. Along with trade capacity development assistance, the Bush administration has made investment in trade capacity infrastructure a key feature in its Millennium Challenge Corporation grants. As part of U.S.-China discussions regarding Africa, the U.S. side can explain how trade capacity development has established close ties with African regional economic communities—the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the West Africa Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA)—and find trilateral ways to work with African authorities to assure that the massive increases in U.S. and Chinese development and trade assistance complement one another. For example, the technical assistance provided by the United States to foster improved administrative and regulatory practices in African customs authorities could complement Chinese investments in seaport and airport infrastructures or agricultural storage.

## Civil Society and Nongovernmental Organizations

- *Facilitate interaction among Chinese, African, and international civil society organizations.*

China's expansive engagement in Africa thus far has not tapped into Africa's burgeoning civil society organizations. Working with civil society organizations operating in Africa, both domestic and international, will prove an effective means to gain a better understanding of local developments and accurately gauge

local reactions to China's expanding role. Governments, corporations, foundations, and philanthropies should consider ways to bring China's nascent civil society organizations into contact with counterparts in Africa. Such interactions would include delegations of scholars and policy analysts to meet on issues of common research interest, observation of grass-roots elections, cooperative activities to support environmental protection or worker safety, and other civil society activity related to good governance, religious practice, community health, and rights of women and girls.

- *Facilitate interaction between U.S. and Chinese Africanists.*

Much more can be done to deepen the level of Chinese scholarly understanding of contemporary Africa. Philanthropies concerned with international relations should consider support for Chinese scholars and policy analysts to take up studies, fellowships, and other research and training opportunities in the United States, as well as in Europe and in Africa. This would be similar to a Ford Foundation program in the 1990s, which helped ground a handful of Chinese scholars in serious graduate-level Africa studies at leading American university programs. Another option would be to provide modest support to facilitate the participation of Chinese scholars in major academic meetings, such as university-based conferences or the annual meeting of the Association of African Studies, or to support joint research projects involving U.S., Chinese, and African scholars. Given the increased interest of the United States and China in Africa, now would be an opportune moment to recommence this kind of joint educational programming.



# Forum on China-Africa Cooperation

## Beijing Action Plan (2007–2009)

### **I. Preamble**

**1.1** On 3–5 November 2006, the Beijing Summit and the Third Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) were held in Beijing. Heads of state, government and delegation as well as ministers of foreign affairs and ministers in charge of economic cooperation from China and 48 African countries (hereinafter referred to as “the two sides”) attended the Summit and Ministerial Conference respectively.

**1.2** The two sides reviewed with satisfaction the growth of friendship and cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and African countries in the past 50 years since the inauguration of their diplomatic relations. Pleased and encouraged to note the good progress of their mutually beneficial cooperation that has brought benefit to their peoples in the past six years since the founding of FOCAC, and satisfied with the faithful delivery of the commitments in the Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004–2006) adopted at the Second Ministerial Conference, the two sides resolved to make joint efforts to advance the new type of strategic partnership between China and Africa in keeping with the Declaration of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.

**1.3** To build on the success of the Summit and Conference, chart the course for China-Africa cooperation in all areas in the next three years and promote friendship, peace, cooperation and development, the two sides have formulated and adopted this Action Plan.

### **II. Political Cooperation**

#### **2.1 High-level Visits and Dialogue**

Taking note that contacts and exchange of visits between Chinese and African leaders have increased notably since the Second FOCAC Ministerial Conference, the two sides agreed to continue the momentum of high-level visit and dialogue to enhance traditional friendship and mutual trust, conduct regular exchange of views and close coordination and cooperation on bilateral relations and major

international and regional issues and share experience on governance to pursue common development and progress.

## **2.2 Consultation and Cooperation Mechanisms**

**2.2.1** Convinced that FOCAC has become an important platform for collective dialogue and effective mechanism for pragmatic cooperation between China and Africa, the two sides decided to vigorously carry out follow-up actions, actively explore ways to strengthen the building of a follow-up mechanism and enhance communication and cooperation within the framework of FOCAC.

**2.2.2** The two sides agreed to set up a mechanism of regular political dialogue between foreign ministers of the two sides within the FOCAC framework. In the following year of every FOCAC Ministerial Conference, foreign ministers from the two sides will hold political consultation in New York on the sideline of the UN General Assembly to exchange views on major issues of common interest.

**2.2.3** The two sides resolved to strengthen and give full play to existing mechanisms between China and Africa, such as bilateral commissions, foreign ministries' political consultation, mixed commissions on economic and trade cooperation, and joint commissions on science and technology, expand their cooperation in the United Nations, the World Trade Organization and other international and regional organizations, and actively explore ways of pragmatic cooperation with third parties on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and win-win result.

## **2.3 Contacts between Legislatures and Local Governments**

**2.3.1** To promote mutual respect, deepen understanding and enhance cooperation, the two sides will strengthen friendly contacts in various forms between the National People's Congress of China and parliaments of African countries as well as the Pan-African Parliament.

**2.3.2** The two sides will support the establishment of sister-province/state and sister-city relations between the two sides and promote exchanges and cooperation in local development and administration.

## **2.4 Consular and Judicial Cooperation**

**2.4.1** To meet the need of growing economic and trade relations and personnel exchanges between China and Africa, the two sides will strengthen consular cooperation and take effective measures to facilitate mutual visits and protect personal and property safety and lawful rights and interests of their citizens.

**2.4.2** The two sides will promote exchanges and consultation between judiciaries, police and other law enforcement authorities, improve their capability to jointly prevent, investigate and combat crimes, enhance cooperation in legal assistance, extradition and repatriation of criminal suspects and management of emigrants, and work to resolve the issue of illegal migration through consultation.

## **2.5 Cooperation between China and the African Union as well as Sub-regional Organizations in Africa**

**2.5.1** The two sides applauded the positive role played and accomplishments made by the African Union (AU) and African sub-regional organizations and financial institutions in building up Africa's strength through unity, maintaining regional peace and advancing regional cooperation and economic development.

**2.5.2** The Chinese Government will continue to strengthen its cooperation with the AU and sub-regional organizations and institutions in Africa, support the AU's leading role in resolving African issues, and take an active part in UN peace-keeping operations in Africa.

**2.5.3** To support African countries in their efforts to strengthen themselves through unity and speed up integration, the Chinese side will help the AU to build a convention center in Addis Ababa.

**2.5.4** The two sides commended cooperation between FOCAC and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and resolved to strengthen such cooperation and further explore specific ways and areas of cooperation.

## **III. Economic Cooperation**

### **3.1 Agriculture**

**3.1.1** The two sides stressed the importance of agriculture in their respective economies and that enhanced agricultural cooperation will play a positive role in eliminating poverty, promoting development and ensuring food security for both sides.

**3.1.2** The two sides noted with pleasure the major progress made in China-Africa agricultural cooperation and resolved to intensify their exchanges and cooperation in farming, animal husbandry, irrigation, fishery, agricultural machinery, processing of agricultural produce, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, food safety and epidemic control, and actively explore new forms and ways of agricultural cooperation.

**3.1.3** The Chinese side decided to:

- Send 100 senior experts on agricultural technologies to Africa and set up in Africa 10 demonstration centers of agricultural technology with special features;
- Give encouragement and support to Chinese enterprises in expanding their investment in agriculture in Africa and getting more involved in agricultural infrastructure development, production of agricultural machinery and processing of agricultural produce in Africa;
- Step up cooperation with Africa in extending applicable technologies and human resources training in agriculture;

- Strengthen cooperation with African countries within the framework of the Special Program for Food Security of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

### **3.2 Investment and Business Cooperation**

**3.2.1** The two sides noted with satisfaction the steady increase of mutual investment in a growing number of areas since the Second Ministerial Conference of FOCAC in 2003 and concluded that this will enhance bilateral economic ties and contribute to local economic development. They pledged to give continued encouragement and support for mutual investment, explore new areas and forms of expanded cooperation in investment and take concrete steps to ensure the sound growth of investment.

**3.2.2** The two sides decided to facilitate the negotiation, conclusion and implementation of the Agreement on Bilateral Facilitation and Protection of Investment and the Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation to create an enabling environment for investment cooperation and protect the lawful rights and interests of investors from both sides. They pledged facilitation necessary in terms of administrative approval procedures, customs clearance and border entry and exit for company investors of the two sides.

**3.2.3** The two sides noted with satisfaction the successful convocation of the High-Level Dialogue between Chinese and African Leaders and Business Representatives and the Second Conference of Chinese and African Entrepreneurs during the Beijing Summit, expressed congratulations on the establishment of the China-Africa Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry and pledged their support to the Chamber. They hoped that the Chamber will become an effective platform of communication for promoting result-oriented economic, trade and investment cooperation between China and Africa.

**3.2.4** The two sides agreed to strengthen cooperation among their small- and medium-sized enterprises to promote Africa's industrial development and enhance Africa's production and export capacity.

**3.2.5** The Chinese Government, placing importance on facilitating investment expansion in Africa, decided to support related Chinese banks in setting up a China-Africa Development Fund whose total amount will gradually reach US\$5 billion to give encouragement and support to well-established and reputable Chinese companies in making investment in projects in Africa which will contribute to local technological progress, employment opportunities and sustainable socio-economic development.

**3.2.6** China is ready to encourage, in the next three years, well-established Chinese companies to set up three to five overseas economic and trade cooperation zones in African countries where conditions permit.

### **3.3 Trade**

Noting with pleasure the fast growth in two-way trade since the Second Ministerial Conference of the Forum and convinced that further expansion of trade serves the mutual interests of China and Africa, the two sides decided to:

- Continue to work to create favorable conditions to grow China-Africa trade in a more balanced manner. China pledged to further open up its market to Africa, increase from 190 to over 440 the number of export items to China eligible for zero-tariff treatment from the least developed countries in Africa having diplomatic relations with China and launch bilateral negotiations with countries concerned for the early conclusion and implementation of related agreements;
- Strengthen cooperation in customs, taxation, inspection and quarantine to facilitate healthy and orderly growth of China-Africa trade;
- Properly address, in a spirit of mutual understanding and accommodation, trade disputes and frictions through bilateral or multilateral friendly consultations;
- Gradually improve the mechanism of the China-Africa Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry and give full play to its role in communication, coordination and trade facilitation.

### **3.4 Finance**

**3.4.1** Noting with pleasure the fruitful cooperation between the relevant Chinese financial institutions and the African financial institutions such as the African Development Bank, the Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank and the West African Development Bank, the two sides decided to push continuously for relevant cooperation and support business exchanges between commercial banks from both sides to enhance China-Africa economic cooperation.

**3.4.2** China will encourage its financial institutions to set up more branches in Africa, and the African side agreed to provide necessary assistance in this regard. The African side wished China success in hosting the 2007 annual meeting of the African Development Bank.

### **3.5 Infrastructure**

**3.5.1** Bearing in mind the crucial role of infrastructure in Africa's development and the great potential for cooperation between the two sides with China's technology and development expertise applicable to Africa, the two sides agreed to keep infrastructure building, particularly transportation, telecommunications, water conservancy and power generation facilities, as a key area of cooperation.

**3.5.2** The Chinese Government will give continued encouragement and support to Chinese companies in participating in Africa's infrastructure development while focusing on technical and managerial cooperation with African countries to help improve their capacity for self-development.

**3.5.3** The African side pledged to further open the infrastructure sector. It welcomes Chinese enterprises' participation in infrastructure development in Africa and will provide them with necessary support and facilitation in this regard.



### **3.6 Cooperation in Energy and Resources**

**3.6.1** Noting that China and Africa are highly complementary in energy and resources sectors and that better information sharing and pragmatic cooperation in these sectors serves the long-term interests of both sides, the two sides resolved to give encouragement and support to their enterprises in conducting, under the principle of reciprocity, mutual benefit and common development, joint exploration and rational exploitation of energy and other resources through diversified forms of cooperation.

**3.6.2** In the course of cooperation, China gives high priority to helping African countries turn their advantages in energy and resources into development strengths, protecting the local environment and promoting sustainable social and economic development in the local areas.

### **3.7 Cooperation in Science and Technology, Information, Air and Maritime Transport and Quality Inspection**

**3.7.1** The two sides agreed to promote cooperation in the development, application and transfer of technologies in accordance with the principle of mutual respect, mutual learning and mutual benefit. China will continue to provide training courses of practical technologies and carry out demonstration projects of technical assistance for extending China's scientific and technological achievements and applicable technologies in Africa.

**3.7.2** The two sides agreed to step up scientific and technological cooperation in areas of common interest including agricultural bio-technology, solar energy utilization, geological survey, mining and development of new medicine.

**3.7.3** The two sides agreed to strengthen cooperation in information infrastructure building, IT application, general telecommunications services, cyber and information security, and telecommunications human resources development. China supports the African countries in their efforts to narrow the digital divide and accelerate the building of an information society based on the proposals of the World Summit on the Information Society held in Tunisia.

**3.7.4** The two sides agreed to encourage their aviation and shipping companies to establish more direct air and shipping links between China and Africa.

**3.7.5** The two sides agreed to enhance cooperation in certification and accreditation, technology standards, measurement, consumer goods safety, quality inspection of industrial products, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, frontier health and quarantine, safety supervision on special equipment and other related areas.

## **IV. Cooperation in International Affairs**

**4.1** The two sides recognized that in the current international environment which is undergoing complex and profound changes, to strengthen consultation and cooperation between the two sides in international affairs serves the common interests of both sides and other developing countries.

**4.2** The two sides reaffirmed their respect for the Charter of the United Nations, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the principles in the Constitutive Act of the African Union and other universally recognized norms governing international relations. They pledged to work together to uphold the important role of the United Nations in international affairs and promote multilateralism and democracy in international relations. They supported increasing the authority and efficiency of the United Nations through reform, pointing out that such reform should be based on democratic negotiations and conducive to maintaining unity among UN member states and that full consideration should be given to the concerns of developing countries in carrying out such reform. In reforming the UN Security Council, priority should be given to increasing the representation of developing countries, African countries in particular, and consensus should be reached through full and in-depth consultation.

**4.3** The two sides welcomed the establishment of the Human Rights Council by the United Nations and resolved to enhance cooperation in the Council and make concerted efforts to ensure that the Council respects historical, cultural and religious background of all countries and regions and is committed to advancing dialogue among different civilizations, cultures and religions. The Council should place equal emphasis on both civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights, with priority given to the right to development. It should handle human rights issues properly and work to eliminate double standard and the practice of politicizing human rights issues.

**4.4** The two sides pledged to step up coordination and cooperation in working for the early resumption of the Doha Round of negotiations and a balanced and significant package of outcomes that will boost global economic development. They called for full consideration to be given to the development level and capacity of developing members. The special and differential treatment promised to developing members should be delivered to enable them to fully participate in the multilateral trade regime and truly benefit from it. China supported efforts by those African countries that are not yet WTO members to join the Organization.

**4.5** Recognizing the difficulties and challenges Africa faces in achieving the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the two sides called on the international community to work actively to build an international environment conducive to poverty alleviation and common development, effectively implement the agreement reached at the Global Summit marking the 60th anniversary of the United Nations, and further strengthen the role of the United Nations in promoting development. The two sides will promote the establishment of a fair, proper and effective progress evaluation framework of the UN MDGs to oversee and facilitate the delivery of commitments on international cooperation and development. The two sides also called on the World Solidarity Fund for Struggle against Poverty to pay greater attention to the development of Africa and hoped that the international community pay adequate attention to the sustainable development of small island and landlocked countries in Africa.

**4.6** The two sides agreed to strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation. They condemn and oppose terrorism in whatever form, and are opposed to double

standard. They support the United Nations and UN Security Council in playing a leading role in the international campaign against terrorism and in helping African countries improve their counter-terrorism capability. China noted with pleasure the entry into force of the AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and the establishment of the African Center for the Study and Research on Terrorism, and will explore ways of counter-terrorism cooperation with African countries.

**4.7** The two sides called for increased international cooperation in promoting nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. China supports Africa's efforts in realizing the objective of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa on a voluntary basis. China pledged to continue to support and take part in the humanitarian de-mining operations in Africa and the effort to combat illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. It will provide financial and material assistance and related training for African countries within its capacity.

**4.8** Recognizing the new challenge to global peace and security posed by non-traditional security issues such as natural disasters, refugees and displaced persons, illegal migration, transnational crimes, drug smuggling and communicable diseases, the two sides, guided by a new security concept with mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination at its core, agreed to strengthen exchanges and cooperation in the non-traditional security field.

**4.9** The two sides vigorously pushed the international community to focus its attention on regional conflicts in Africa and take effective steps to help defuse these conflicts. The two sides will work to safeguard the fundamental interests of Africa in the UN Security Council. China will enhance cooperation with Africa in the prevention, management and resolution of regional conflicts.

## **V. Cooperation in Social Development**

### **5.1 Development Assistance and Debt Relief**

**5.1.1** The African side recognized that China has provided development assistance to African countries over many years and that it has reduced and canceled part of the government debt owed to China by heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) and least developed countries (LDC) in Africa that has become mature. It reaffirmed that such genuine and selfless assistance has promoted the sustainable economic and social development in Africa.

**5.1.2** The Chinese Government decided to:

- Continue to provide development assistance to African countries to the best of its ability and by 2009 double the size of its assistance to African countries in 2006;
- Provide US\$3 billion of preferential loans and US\$2 billion preferential export buyer's credit to African countries in the next three years on more favorable terms, more so for HIPC and LDC in Africa;

- Cancel government interest free loans that had become due by the end of 2005 contracted by HIPCs and LDCs in Africa with diplomatic ties with China and take an active part in debt relief operations for Africa within the international multilateral framework;
- Actively participate in bilateral and multilateral assistance plans for African countries in post-war reconstruction, humanitarian rescue and relief and poverty reduction.

## **5.2 Human Resources Development**

**5.2.1** The two sides noted with satisfaction that through concerted efforts, the 2004-2006 China-Africa Inter-governmental Human Resources Development Plan adopted at the Second FOCAC Ministerial Conference has been successfully implemented. China has trained over 10,000 African professionals in various fields under the African Human Resources Development Fund (AHRDF).

**5.2.2** The Chinese Government will continue to provide specific training of professionals and management personnel for African countries in response to their needs and will improve the follow-up monitoring mechanism to ensure the effectiveness of training. It pledged to increase input, based on AHRDF, to train 15,000 professionals for African countries in the next three years. The African side undertook to provide necessary support and assistance in terms of selecting trainees and providing logistical services.

## **5.3 Culture**

**5.3.1** The two sides expressed satisfaction with the progress made in their cultural exchanges and cooperation. Both China and Africa have a splendid history and culture. To strengthen exchanges between the Chinese and African civilizations and enhance bilateral cultural interactions will enrich the new type of China-Africa strategic partnership and will also set an example for dialogue and exchanges among different civilizations and thus advance the building of a harmonious world.

**5.3.2** The two sides resolved to actively implement the bilateral government exchange programs and support and promote cultural exchanges as well as art exhibitions and performances at the local level and between the peoples. The African side expressed appreciation of China's decision to set up the African Cultural Visitors Program to enhance cultural exchanges between the two sides.

## **5.4 Education**

**5.4.1** Recognizing the importance of education as the foundation and key for achieving sustainable social and economic development, the two sides decided to expand China-Africa cooperation in education on the basis of existing sound cooperation.

**5.4.2** Taking note of the success of the China-Africa Forum of Ministers of Education last November, the two sides expressed the view that holding this Forum on a regular basis will help promote their cooperation and dialogue in education.

**5.4.3** The two sides resolved to encourage more exchanges and closer cooperation between institutions of higher learning of the two sides, take steps to ensure the effectiveness of the bilateral student exchange programs, and carry out consultation on concluding agreements on mutual accreditation of academic degrees.

**5.4.4** The Chinese Government decided to:

- Help African countries set up 100 rural schools in the next three years;
- Increase the number of Chinese government scholarships to African students from the current 2,000 per year to 4,000 per year by 2009;
- Provide annual training for a number of educational officials as well as heads and leading teachers of universities, primary, secondary and vocational schools in Africa;
- Establish Confucius Institutes in African countries to meet their needs in the teaching of the Chinese language and encourage the teaching of African languages in relevant Chinese universities and colleges.

## **5.5 Medical Care and Public Health**

**5.5.1** The two sides expressed satisfaction at the progress in their cooperation in public health since the Second Ministerial Conference of FOCAC. The African countries concerned are particularly appreciative of the dedicated assistance provided by Chinese medical teams and pledged to provide proper working and living conditions for them.

**5.5.2** The African side noted with pleasure that the Chinese Government has adopted effective measures to provide timely assistance to African countries in the prevention and treatment of malaria, HIV/AIDS and avian influenza. The two sides resolved to increase exchanges and cooperation in the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, Ebola, Chikungunya, avian influenza and other communicable diseases and in the fields of quarantine and public health emergency response mechanism.

**5.5.3** The Chinese Government decided to:

- Assist African countries in building 30 hospitals and provide RMB300 million of grant for providing anti-malaria drugs to African countries and building 30 demonstration centers for prevention and treatment of malaria in the next three years;
- Continue to send and send new and additional medical teams to Africa in the next three years on the basis of China's own capacity and the need of African countries and actively explore with African countries new ways of providing such service;
- Continue to provide medicines and medical supplies needed by African countries and help them establish and improve medical facilities and train medical workers.

## **5.6 Environmental Protection**

**5.6.1** The two sides fully recognized the importance of environmental protection for achieving sustainable development and were glad to note the success of the Conference on China-Africa Cooperation in Environmental Protection in February 2005 and the substantive progress made in their cooperation in environmental protection. The African side expressed appreciation of the fund provided by the Chinese Government for the establishment of the UNEP China-Africa Environment Center.

**5.6.2** The two sides resolved to promote dialogue and exchanges in environmental protection and cooperation in human resources development. In the next three years, China will increase year after year the number of environmental protection administrators and experts from Africa to receive training in China. The two sides will work with the UNEP for multilateral cooperation in environmental protection.

**5.6.3** The two sides agreed to step up cooperation in capacity building, prevention and control of water pollution and desertification, maintenance of bio-diversity and the development of environmental protection industry and demonstration projects.

## **5.7 Tourism**

**5.7.1** The two sides were pleased to note the substantive progress made in bilateral tourism cooperation. They are convinced that such cooperation will help promote understanding and friendship between their peoples.

**5.7.2** The two sides noted that following the Second Ministerial Conference of FOCAC in 2003, Uganda, Madagascar, Botswana, the Kingdom of Lesotho, Namibia and Ghana acquired the Approved Destination Status (ADS) for Chinese tourists. With the new decision of the Chinese Government to extend ADS to nine African countries including Algeria, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Gabon, Rwanda, Mali, Mozambique, Benin and Nigeria, there are now 26 ADS countries in Africa. The Chinese Government will extend ADS to more qualified African countries at their request. The African side welcomes more visits by Chinese tourists and encourages more African tourists to travel to China.

## **5.8 News Media**

**5.8.1** Recognizing that increased contacts between their respective news media contribute to comprehensive and objective news coverage of the other side, the two sides encouraged their respective news media to play a positive role in enhancing mutual understanding and friendship.

**5.8.2** The two sides support multi-level exchanges and cooperation in various forms between their press authorities and media and exchange more visits between media groups.

**5.8.3** The two sides support and encourage more report and coverage by their news media of the other side and will provide mutual assistance and facilitation to

each other's news agencies in sending resident and non-resident correspondents for news reporting.

**5.8.4** The Chinese side will continue to host workshops for African correspondents and invite heads of press authorities and media groups as well as correspondents from Africa to China to exchange views, cover news and explore ways of conducting effective cooperation.

**5.8.5** The two sides agreed to expand cooperation in radio and television broadcasting. China will focus on helping African countries train radio and television staff.

### **5.9 People-to-People, Youth and Women Exchanges**

**5.9.1** Recognizing the important role of people-to-people exchanges in increasing understanding and friendship between Chinese and African peoples, the two sides decided to increase people-to-people contacts and consolidate traditional friendship to ensure that the China-Africa friendship will be passed on from generation to generation.

**5.9.2** The two sides expressed satisfaction at bilateral youth exchanges and recognized the positive role of the China-Africa Youth Festival in enhancing mutual understanding and friendship between Chinese and African young people. To boost cooperation in the development of Chinese and African youth, the two sides agreed to, in the next three years, develop and improve the communications network and the mechanism of collective dialogue between the youth in China and Africa and continue to hold China-Africa Youth Festivals.

**5.9.3** China decided to gradually expand the "Chinese Young Volunteers Serving Africa" program. In the next three years, China will dispatch 300 young volunteers to African countries to work in medical, health, sports, agriculture, education and other fields.

**5.9.4** Recognizing the importance of promoting gender equality and women's empowerment and noting with satisfaction the existing extensive exchanges between Chinese and African women, the two sides decided to continue to promote such exchanges and cooperation through various forms.

**5.9.5** China attaches importance to and will expand sports exchanges and cooperation with African countries. The African countries support China in hosting the 2008 Olympic Games. They will take an active part in this sports event and wish the 2008 Olympic Games a great success.

# Declaration of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation

November 2006

We, the Heads of State, Government and delegation of the People's Republic of China and 48 African countries, met in Beijing from 4 to 5 November 2006 for the Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.

We applaud the Summit held on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the inauguration of diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China and the African countries.

For the purpose of promoting "friendship, peace, cooperation and development," we have reviewed the sincere friendship, solidarity and cooperation between China and Africa over the past half century, and had fruitful discussions on the common goals and direction for growing China-Africa cooperation in the new era.

Conscious of the fact that thanks to the concerted efforts of both sides, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation founded in 2000 has become an important platform for collective dialogue and an effective mechanism for pragmatic cooperation between the two sides, we have decided to enhance the role of the Forum and to this end, reaffirmed our commitment to the purposes and objectives set forth in the documents adopted by the Forum.

We hold that the world today is undergoing complex and profound changes, that human society is becoming increasingly interdependent, and that the pursuit of peace, development and cooperation has become the trend of the times and the priority of all countries.

We declare that the development of our friendly relations and cooperation are in accordance with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as well as all the international principles that promote multilateralism and democracy in international relations. We urge that diversity of the world should be respected and upheld, that all countries in the world, big or small, rich or poor, strong or weak, should respect each other, treat each other as equals and live in peace and amity with each other, and that different civilizations and modes of development



should draw on each other's experience, promote each other and coexist in harmony.

Faced with the growing trend of economic globalization, we call for enhancing South-South cooperation and North-South dialogue and call on the World Trade Organization to resume the Doha Round of negotiations to promote balanced, coordinated and sustainable development of the global economy to enable all countries to share its benefits and realize common development and prosperity.

We call for reform of the United Nations and other multilateral international institutions to make them better meet the need of all members of the international community. Through reform, the United Nations should strengthen its role, give full scope to the function of the UN General Assembly and pay greater attention to the issue of development. Priority should be given to increasing the representation and full participation of African countries in the UN Security Council and other UN agencies.

We hold that the adherence of China, the world's largest developing country, to peaceful development and the commitment of Africa, a continent with the largest number of developing countries, to stability, development and renaissance are in themselves significant contribution to world peace and development.

The African countries are greatly inspired by China's rapid economic development. They extend congratulations to China and wish China even greater achievements in its development endeavors. They reiterate that they adhere to the one China policy and support China's peaceful reunification.

China commends Africa's progress in safeguarding regional peace, promoting regional cooperation and accelerating economic and social development, appreciates the active role played by the African countries, the African Union and other regional and sub-regional organizations in this regard, reaffirms its support for the African countries in their efforts to strengthen themselves through unity and independently resolve African problems, supports the African regional and sub-regional organizations in their efforts to promote economic integration, and supports the African countries in implementing the "New Partnership for Africa's Development" (NEPAD) programs.

We call on the international community to encourage and support Africa's efforts to pursue peace and development and provide greater assistance to African countries in peaceful resolution of conflicts and post-war reconstruction. In particular, we urge the developed countries to increase official development assistance and honor their commitments to opening market and debt relief, and call on the related international organizations to provide more financial and technical assistance to enhance Africa's capacity in poverty and disaster reduction and prevention and control of desertification, and help Africa realize the UN Millennium Development Goals. Greater attention should be paid to the issue of development facing the least developed countries and the heavily indebted poor countries as well as the small island and landlocked countries in Africa.

We point out that China and Africa enjoy traditional solidarity and cooperation and have always treated each other with sincerity and shared weal and woe. Having stood the test of time and changing international environment, China-Africa friendship is flourishing and enjoys immense popular support.

We maintain that in the new era, China and Africa have common development goals and converging interests which offer a broad prospect for cooperation. In the new century, China and the African countries should enhance their traditional friendship and expand mutually beneficial cooperation to achieve common development and prosperity.

We hereby solemnly proclaim the establishment of a new type of strategic partnership between China and Africa featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchanges. For this purpose, we will:

- Increase high-level visits, conduct strategic dialogue, enhance mutual political trust and promote enduring friendship;
- Deepen and broaden mutually beneficial cooperation, encourage and promote two-way trade and investment, explore new modes of cooperation and give top priority to cooperation in agriculture, infrastructure, industry, fishery, IT, public health and personnel training to draw on each other's strengths for the benefit of our peoples;
- Increase exchange of views on governance and development to learn from each other, make common progress and enhance our respective capacity for self-development;
- Increase dialogue between different cultures, promote people-to-people exchanges and interaction, particularly those between the young people, and boost exchanges and cooperation in such areas as culture, science and technology, education, sports, the environment, tourism and women affairs;
- Enhance international cooperation to jointly address global security threats and non-traditional security challenges, and uphold the common interests of the developing world in the spirit of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination;
- Enhance the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, strengthen collective dialogue and increase coordination and cooperation of the Action Plan with NEPAD and the social and economic development plans of African countries; and
- Properly handle issues and challenges that may arise in the course of cooperation through friendly consultation in keeping with China-Africa friendship and the long-term interests of the two sides.

We hold that the establishment of a new type of strategic partnership is both the shared desire and independent choice of China and Africa, serves our common interests, and will help enhance solidarity, mutual support and assistance and

unity of the developing countries and contribute to durable peace and harmonious development in the world.

We have, in the spirit of this Declaration, formulated and adopted the Beijing Action Plan of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (2007–2009).

We commend the Ministers participating in the Third Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation for their dedicated efforts and outstanding work, applaud the outcome of the High-Level Dialogue between Chinese and African Leaders and Business Representatives, and express our congratulations on the full success of the Summit.

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*Vice President  
Manchester Trade Ltd.*

**Lorne Craner**

*President  
International Republican Institute*

**Bates Gill (U.S. delegation  
coleader)**

*Freeman Chair in China Studies  
CSIS*

**Chin-hao Huang**

*Research Assistant, Freeman Chair  
in China Studies  
CSIS*

**Ken Isaacs**

*Vice President of Programs and  
Government Relations  
Samaritan's Purse*

**Peter Lamptey**

*President, Institute for HIV/AIDS  
Family Health International*

**J. Stephen Morrison (U.S.  
delegation coleader)**

*Director, Africa Program  
CSIS*

**Raymond Offenheiser**

*President  
Oxfam America*

**Pearl T. Robinson**

*Professor, Tufts University, and  
President, African Studies  
Association*

# CSIS Delegation to China on China-Africa-U.S. Relations

November 28–December 1, 2006

## Itinerary

### Wednesday, November 29

CIIS/CSIS China-U.S. Forum on Africa

#### *Opening Keynote Remarks*

The Honorable Zhang Yesui, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs

#### *Chinese and U.S. Interests and Views on Africa: Civil Society, Governance, and Humanitarian Relief*

Chair: Ambassador Ma Zhengang

Chinese presentations: Wang Yiying, Yang Lihua, He Wenping, An Yongyu, Wang Nan

U.S. presentations: Lorne Craner, Akwe Amosu, Pearl Robinson, Peter Lamptey, Ken Isaacs

#### *Chinese and U.S. Interests and Views on Africa: Energy, Natural Resources, Investment, and Trade*

Chair: J. Stephen Morrison

Chinese presentations: Victor Gao Zhikai

U.S. presentations: Anthony Carroll, Stuart Brooks

#### *Chinese and U.S. Interests and Views on Africa: Conflict Resolution and Security*

Chair: J. Stephen Morrison

Chinese presentations: Wang Hongyi, Xu Weizhong, Huang Zequan

U.S. presentations: Ray Offenheiser, Mark Bellamy

Reception and Dinner Hosted by CIIS

**Thursday, November 30**

*Summation of Key Points from the Previous Day's Discussion*

Chinese presentation: Wang Yingying

U.S. presentation: J. Stephen Morrison

*Possibilities for China-U.S. Collaboration in Africa*

Chair: Cui Yongqian

Chinese presentations: Xing Hua, Huang Guifang, Rong Ying

U.S. presentation: Bates Gill

*Concluding Remarks and Next Steps*

Chinese presentation: Yuan Jian

U.S. presentation: J. Stephen Morrison

*Luncheon hosted by China Foundation for International Studies (CFIS)*

*Meeting with the Honorable Zhai Jun, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs*

Depart for Shanghai

**Friday, December 1**

BHP Billiton/CSIS Shanghai Roundtable on China-Africa Relations

*Opening Remarks*

Clinton Dines, President BHP Billiton China

*Overview of Beijing Discussions*

Bates Gill

J. Stephen Morrison

*Roundtable Discussion*

*Concluding Remarks*

Reception and Dinner Hosted by BHP Billiton China



# 中国在非洲的扩展角色

## 对美国的意义

国际战略研究中心中国-非洲-美国关系事务访华代表团报告  
2006年11月28日至12月1日

作者  
季北慈  
黄劲豪  
史蒂文·莫利森

2007年1月





## 关于国际战略研究中心

国际战略研究中心（CSIS）通过为决策者提供对战略的洞察以及实用的政策解决方案，在经济与政治变革领域中寻求推进全球安全和繁荣。做为政府的战略计划伙伴，CSIS 进行研究与分析，并制定着眼未来和预测变革的政策动议。我们围绕三个主题组织25项以上的规划：

- *国防与安全政策*—CSIS 具有在美国国防政策和国际安全方面最为全面的规划之一，它针对美国国防机构，国防政策以及国防工业与技术基地提供改革建议。CSIS 其它规划为核扩散带来的挑战，跨国恐怖主义、国土安全和冲突后重建提供解决方案。
- *全球挑战*—基于对人口统计与人口、能源安全、全球健康、技术、以及国际金融和经济体系的研究项目，CSIS 着力应对世界舞台上风险与机会的新生驱动力。
- *地区变革*—CSIS 是同业中唯一一家具有长驻专家对世界所有主要地理区域变革进行研究的机构。CSIS 的专家着眼预测关键国家的地区的变化—从非洲到亚洲，从欧洲到拉丁美洲，从中东到北美。

由 David M. Abshire 与 Arleigh Burke 上将始建于1962年，CSIS 为代表两党和非盈利机构，总部设在首都华盛顿，机构拥有220多位正式职员以及庞大的从属专家网络。前美国参议员，Sam Nunn，于1999年成为 CSIS 理事会主席，John Hamre 自2000年以来任 CSIS 总裁及首席执行官。

CSIS 对具体政策立场无倾向性；因而，应该理解的是，在此表达的观点均为各作者个人之观点。

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# 鸣谢

国际战略研究中心（CSIS）启动中非关系研究项目以来，一直有幸与我们卓越的同仁和支持者共事。我们特别感谢中国国际问题研究所（CIIS）所长马振岗大使和他的工作人员，尤其是吕品柔女士，对我们在2006年11月28日至12月1日访华期间给予的盛情接待、协作和组织方面的支持。我们衷心希望将这一关系保持下去，CSIS期待着在2007年以东道主身份在华盛顿接待CIIS和中国其他的专家，进行继续交流。我们在华盛顿为此次访华做准备过程中，以及在12月份结束访华归来后，都得到了中国驻美大使周文重阁下和公使郑泽光先生以及中国大使馆非洲事务高级专家孙保红女士的大力协助。

CSIS代表团的九位成员都是独立专家，非同寻常地来自多个领域和高层次。除一名成员以外，均驻美国，包括来自非洲的两位人士。每位成员都慷慨贡献出他（她）的时间，都展现了其在各自领域中研究非洲和中国事务的深度和热忱。CSIS总裁和首席执行官John Hamre大力鼓励我们去落实CIIS所长马振岗大使于2006年初首次提议的合作机会。非洲事务部联合主任Jennifer Cooke在项目开发的全过程中给予了大量智慧向导，Savina Rupani和Elizabeth Sullivan为项目提供了不懈的专业支持。

默克公司和必和必拓中国分公司为我们在2006年底访华提供了慷慨赞助，

必和必拓中国分公司总裁 Clinton Dines 倾注了他个人的关注。必和必拓公司中国经济学家卜北风女士在代表团运筹访华之初就给予了大量实质性的协助，并对支持和通报我们的工作提供了巨大的帮助。我们非常感谢这些优秀人士和机构所做的贡献，但我们对本报告中表达的观点和结论全面负责。

# 综述

为了探求与非洲更紧密的战略伙伴关系，中国在非洲大陆经济、政治和外交活动中愈加活跃。正如2006年11月举行的第三届中非合作论坛（FOCAC）所示，这一高调峰会代表了中非关系的历史性时刻。中国最高领导层积极支持峰会上达成的远大前景，并为大批非洲领导人热情接纳。非洲48个国家，包括43位国家元首出席了峰会。由于中国将认真开始将注意力投放到诸如发展基础设施这样长期被忽视的领域，其战略做法将拓展非洲在未来以建设性方式大量受益的前景，提高非洲在全球的地位、加剧政治和市场竞争、为建立各种外部伙伴关系提供富有前景的各种新选择、增强非洲抗击疟疾和爱滋病的能力并驱动非洲大陆的经济增长，使非洲国家能更好地融入全球经济。

本报告指出大力影响中国做法的六个关键因素：

1. 中国寻求与非洲建立战略伙伴关系与北京的全球外交政策战略及其关于不断演变的国际体系的远见全面相吻合。
2. 中国领导人和战略专家认为，中国的历史经历和发展模式与非洲国家具有异曲同工之处，因此较之西方享有比较优势。
3. 中国相信，与非洲友好、相互尊重和有助益的政治联系的历史，为今后的战略伙伴关系奠定了可持续的根基。
4. 中国认为非洲实现发展的腾飞已指日可待。
5. 中国决策者深信，采用以国家为主导的挺进非洲的做法，将在战略上增强北京的核心力量并与非洲国家所阐明的意愿相一致。
6. 决策者认为，在非洲事务上与第三方接触符合中国的利益，但应慎重、缓慢并充分保留意见。

近几年来，中国本着以上六大因素保持势头并汲取信心，在非洲政治、经济和文化领域扩大树立其存在。这些活动显然证实了中国在非洲日益增长的利益；也清晰表明非洲大陆对于蓬勃发展的中国经济和上升的政治地位正在形成的重要性。

虽然中国目前更雄心勃勃和复杂的非洲政策可能在一定时间内带来金融和政治方面的回报，改变非洲的竞技场并给美国调整其政治做法带来压力，但

中国的战略也面临多种风险。特别是，北京在将其与非洲建立战略伙伴关系的远景转化为可持续的现实中面临九大核心挑战：

1. 中国将需要不懈的努力来克服与语言、文化、宗教和种族偏见相关联的各种障碍。
2. 虽然 FOCAC 北京行动计划呼吁增进非洲与中国媒体之间的交流，促进彼此之间派驻常驻记者，但迄今为止，中国媒体和大众文化只是非常有限地进入非洲市场。中国政策咨询和智囊界对非洲的知识和专长有限，并且缺乏最新和实地的经验。
3. 目前，北京的思维中没有系统地考虑非洲不断变化的大众观点——“非洲街头巷尾”。
4. 中国的做法既不熟悉也不能完备地与非洲正在出现并愈加活跃和具有影响力的非政府团体打交道。
5. 随着时间的推移，将难以坚持不干涉内政的既定政策和首尾一致地加以贯彻，并且可能与中国在非洲利益的深化相冲突。
6. 中国日益受到的压力是如何对正在出台的对非政策以及对非长期策略进行内部协调和策略落实指导。
7. 中国在海外的企业界尤其面临与行贿和生产假冒产品，及其它有争议的做法相关的“名誉风险”。
8. 中国在正在进行的国际援助与其在非洲的赠款活动之间，尤其是债务方面，更好地进行协调的压力将增大。
9. 北京将面临更多压力，主要应对如何更好地在非洲问题上处理与其最重要的双边合作伙伴美国的关系。

中国扩大在非洲的活动，必然对美国在非洲和全球的利益以及美中关系带来深刻的影响。如同中国，美国正处于比以往任何时候规模都大的在非洲活动时期。在布什政府执政期间，美国对非洲提供的海外援助增加了三倍以上。白宫启动了多项侧重于非洲的标致性动议：为期五年，耗资150亿美元的总统紧急爱滋病援助计划（PEPFAR）、美国消除疟疾动议和千年挑战合作，该动议为治理良好和经济表现佳的国家提供大量新的援助方案，用以加快经济增长。私营部门在非洲的活动稳步上升，主要集中在能源领域，年度双向贸易在2005年达到606亿美元，比2004年增长36.7%。目前，人们普遍认为，美国在非洲的利益范围已扩展到包括庞大的全球能源利益、反恐、公共卫生，并且与大幅扩张在非洲活动的中国、印度、韩国和亚洲其它国家之间加剧进行竞争。

截止目前，美国和中国专注于各自的领域，扩大各自在非洲的存在和投资，几乎没有系统或实质性地考虑对方。美国一些智囊机构的初步研究以及媒体

的多篇报道，引发了对中非关系的关注，这些研究和报道常局限于令人忧虑和苛薄之言。2005年，美国和中国确实在原则上认可在范围更大的美中战略对话框架内进行美中非洲次地区对话，但此后，在将实质内容列入该承诺方面，几乎没有取得进展。

中国扩大在非洲的活动是一个复杂的新现实，对此我们只是部分掌握，这一新现实变化迅速，呈多面性并在长期内产生各种影响，它要求华盛顿予以更多关注和行动。因此，要想避免美中在非洲发生代价高昂的冲突，需要投入至关重要的研究，以产生新的和更长远的思维 and 更丰富的智慧内涵，来帮助制定美国在非洲与中国展开富有成效接触的有效政策。广泛而言，美国和中国在寻求更具体协作和建设性双边关系中有着一系列共同的利益，因此可在这一现实基础上建立战略性的做法。两国关系正处于一个相对稳定和建设性对话时期，从而为在扩大两国共同基础方面取得进一步进展提供了机遇。显然，双方在经济上已经是你中有我，并且在以能确保双边经济利益得以继续的方式，来运作两国的政治和安全关系方面，有着共同的利益。

然而，对任何做法不可或缺的预期是，抛开美中关系如何不谈，非洲的发展将不断地检验美国和中国的做法和双方展开协作的决心。这是因为非洲大多数国家机构疲弱，冲突频发，经济相对脆弱。重要性不相上下的是预期双方间持续存在的哲学观、意识形态和程序的不同、彼此间的猜疑和误解以及竞争，这些将导致紧张，使美国-中国在非洲利益之间发生冲突的风险持续存在。因此，特别需要预期针对非洲各种做法中的出现的摩擦点并预先加以管理：目前而言，最重要的是如达富尔地区这样的危机案例、敏感的援助问题，如债务和协调赠款国各项做法和能源资源的准入。

由于美国在全球其它地区有着急迫的外交和安全政策的考虑，并且已经在非洲实施几项重大和正在增加的外交、人道、开发和安全方面的动议，因此存在的风险是，美国决策者不愿意或无法就中国扩大在非洲活动给予所需的优先关注和投入政策精力。这将是一个错误。各种机会和利益现在都表明，应该更加准确地评估中国针对非洲的做法、更加有效地接触中国和努力形成对非洲人、中国人和美国人有益的结果。

更具体地说，本报告为美国-中国-非洲在多边、政府间、商业和公民社会这几个层面展开协作提供了多项富有前景的选择方案。

### 多边层次

- 高度重视多边机构—如联合国安理会、联合国各作业机构、非盟和非洲次地区机构—做为重要机制来就美-中-非在政治和安全领域展开协作而获得中国的支持。
- 鼓励中国、美国和其它国际赠款方之间就开发援助、扶贫计划、

## VIII 中国在非洲的扩展角色

多边开发银行贷款和非洲债务可继续进行更深入的接触。

- 鼓励八国集团在2007年德国峰会上让中国参与到与八国集团利益切身相关的非洲开发议题中。
- 鼓励中国加入采矿业提高透明度动议（EITI）。
- 在 FOCAC 框架之下，中国及其伙伴应建立常设秘书处或其它高层协调机构来指导和实施其正在深化的伙伴关系。

### 双边政府间关系

- 加快形成关于美中在非洲进行合作的更有实质性的议程，并认知固有的局限性。
- 增进目前进行中的双边磋商，解决迫在眉睫和正在出现的各项挑战，尤其涉及尼日尔三角洲和从非洲之角海岸至内陆弧型圈内的索马里、埃塞俄比亚、苏丹和乍得的开发。
- 中国增加与其它关键角色，包括非盟、欧洲国家和美国之间就对非洲增加军队以及军队间合作的磋商。
- 就非洲的医疗和教育相关的问题加强协作。

### 商业、经济和贸易活动

- 预期中国将与非洲和美国建立三边商业伙伴关系。
- 鼓励中国在非洲建立公共-私人伙伴关系。
- 寻求三边方式，与非洲各国当局共同确保美国和中国大幅提高开发和贸易援助形成彼此互补。

### 公民社会和非政府组织

- 促进中国、非洲和国际公民社会组织之间的互动，就共同感兴趣的研究课题，包括观摩基层选举、通过合作性的活动来支持保护环境或提高工人的安全，以及与良好治理、宗教活动、社区卫生和妇女及女童权益相关的其它活动进行交流。
- 促进美国和中国的非洲学者之间进行互动，加深中国学术界对当代非洲的了解。

# 前言

## 背景

CSIS 非洲事务部和 CSIS 费和中国研究讲座率领的高级代表团，于2006年11月28日至12月1日对中国进行了访问。访问恰逢于2006年11月3-5日在北京举行的具有重大意义的中非合作论坛（FOCAC）之后。此行可追溯至2005年年中，源于 CSIS 的一项广泛和跨年度的动议。该动议认识的事实是，中国正处于其扩展在非洲活动的历史最高点，而与此同时，美国政府已将其对非洲的承诺扩大了三倍，并启动了数项白宫针对非洲的重大动议。对于中国和美国的国家利益而言，非洲都以崭新和显著的方式日益重要，从而在本质上要求中美各方寻求长期与战略性的做法。随着中国和美国对其做法进行精准化，在此历史关头，加深理解美中双方关于针对非洲的关键政策问题而演变

的看法，更好地识别出对紧张的管理点，以及为今后美-中在非洲的合作制定具体途径，都具有重大意义。

具体而言，CSIS 的中-非项目包含以下三大目标：

1. 在美国政策做法正在成型的脉络下，阐明驱动中国对非政策的动机与决策过程；
2. 进行深入，实地的工作，评估在关键问题领域方面中国在非洲的利益和活动的程度及影响，特别集中于能源和其它原材料准入、金融市场、商品价格、人权、良好治理、公共卫生、地区稳定和维和行动，以及环保。
3. 举办各种活动，大会和研讨会，为推进美中关于非洲的对话提供实质性内容。

为有助于实现这些目标，在与中国国际问题研究所（CIIS）共同努力之下，CSIS 访华代表团于11月29日—30日，举办了由中国关键非洲事务专家参与的两天研讨会，目的在于获得对于驱动中国对非政策动机和官僚机制的更深入了解，解释美国在非洲的做法的形成因素，并且探索美中有望在非洲进行合作的领域。CIIS 总部设在北京，为隶属于外交部的智囊。代表团于12月1日对上海进行了为期一天的访问与讨论，由必和必拓中国分公司主持并汇集



## 2 中国在非洲的扩展角色

了上海各企业、外交和学术界的代表，考查中国在非洲扩大活动的经济与地缘政治影响。

在北京和上海期间，代表团得以与来自中国政府、外交、企业和学术界等广泛领域的人士进行沟通。这些人士包括外交部副部长张业遂、外交部部长助理翟隽、现任或前任驻非洲的中国使节、中国非洲研究会会长、中海油（CNOOC）高级副总裁高志凯、来自10个不同智囊机构与政府其它部门的政策专家，还有十多位居住在中国并密切关注中非关系的领先政府与非政府专门人士。代表团成员名单及访问日程附在本报告附件中。

CSIS 代表团的构成非同寻常，汇集了独立的高层次专家，对非洲和中国有着深度经验和多领域之专长：领域包括能源市场和紧缺高值商品、公共卫生、企业公平做法、人权与良好治理、以及安全和维和行动。代表团的组合提供了一幅构成美国社会针对非洲政策做法的醒目画卷。代表团成员包括 Mark Bellamy 大使，美国国防大学资深副院长；Peter Lamptey，一位领导家庭健康及公共卫生国际组织爱滋病防控中心的加纳籍医生；Ray Offenheiser，美国乐施会总裁；Pearl Robinson，塔夫斯大学教授和非洲研究学会会长；Lorne Craner，布什政府前高级官员和现任国际共和研究所总裁；Akwe Amosu，开放社会学会的一位尼日利亚裔英国籍高级官员；Ken Issaacs，基督教人道救援组织，撒玛利亚福音援助国际组织副总裁；Stuart Brooks，雪佛莱公司的一位英籍资深政策分析员；以及 Anthony Carroll，曼彻斯特贸易公司贸易与投资专家。

### 核心结论

在2006年11月的 FOCAC 上崭新亮相的中国与非洲战略伙伴关系，标致着中-非关系一个新的和历史性时刻。中国最高领导层积极支持 FOCAC 雄心勃勃的远见，也为广泛的非洲领导人热情地接纳。非洲48个国家与会，包括43位政府首脑。中国在非洲向前推进，为让非洲今后以显著、富有建设性的方式获益增强了保证。希望的提高在于，中国将在整个非洲严肃地将注意力放在长期被忽视的领域，如基础设施建设和其提高非洲在全球地位的战略方针，强化政治与市场竞争，为外部伙伴关系创造有望成功的选择，加强非洲抵御疟疾和爱滋病的能力，以及促进经济增长。它也增加中国在未来日益面临的多种棘手问题和复杂的实施挑战，需要尽早而不宜迟地进行周密考虑。

中国在非洲扩大的活动，对于美国在非洲和世界的利益有着显著的固然联系，也关系到美中关系。这些活动正值美国在非洲进行并行的扩大承诺时期，其推动力是美国在非洲日益上升的国家利益，关系到全球传染性疾病预防，能源安全，反恐和全球安全，以及对良好治理的倡导。布什政府执政期间增加了三倍的外国援助包括总统的爱滋病紧急援助计划（PEPFAR），为一项五年，150亿美元的规划，以及千年挑战合作，一项重大动议旨在加强许多

位于非洲的，有着良好治理的国家之经济实绩。美国在非洲的军事介入已大幅扩大，尤其在非洲之角，撒哈拉/萨赫勒地区，以及几内亚湾海域区。2007年，美国首次宣布其建立分立的美国非洲作战司令部的意图。继埃塞俄比亚军队推翻伊斯兰运动对摩加迪沙的统治之后，美军在2007年初大幅增强其在南部索马里的反恐活动，目标是可疑的基地组织成员。美国在非洲能源领域的投资，及其为满足上升的能源需求而对非洲的依赖，都已稳步扩大。与此并行的是中国日益依赖于非洲石油的同样强烈之格局。在今后十年内，美国20%到25%的石油进口将依赖非洲。

中国在非洲雄心勃勃与崭新高调的作用对美国提出挑战，促其更加全面和战略地思考未来将如何与中国在非洲问题上打交道。对于美国和中国，该挑战的一部分将是尽量避免在非洲落入进行破坏性和不必要战略竞争的陷阱。为此，中美双方需要创新地，孜孜不倦地，并且仔细地将更多的紧要性放在合作上，并扩大美中在非洲问题上开放和高层次的交流。将需要对紧张领域更好地管理，并就双方特殊的敏感性找出回旋余地，而不牺牲原则性。将需要在制定共同推进方式以强化非洲融入全球进程方面，赋予来自非洲的意见以更为显要的地位。将需要在现有多边渠道中更为系统地运作，尤其对于那些驻非洲人员，从而协调在减债方面的赠款国做法，在公共卫生领域的投资以及相关问题。也将需要认真寻求对具体美-中-非合作具有显著前景的选择，尤其在解决冲突，爱滋病，疟疾和其它传染病，非洲维和能力和良好治理等领域中的选择。

深化美中相互依赖和共享利益，至少从表面上看，支持更加紧密的合作方略。然而，其它强有力的因素构成反向牵制力，并带来美中在非洲发生冲突的风险。加强经济与政治的竞争必然增加关系的紧张。对于双方的动机和镜鉴倾向（即强调对方的虚伪和强硬），一直存在着相互怀疑。并且，存在显著而持续的意识形态，哲学观以及机构之不同。如果的确避免了冲突，那也只能是在各方政府领袖有意识做出政治选择，并行使其政治意志的情况下成为可能。

本报告余下部分详细论述 CSIS 代表团以及正在进行的研究项目所得出的结论和建议。它包含对于中国在非洲做法和新兴挑战的审视，继而是针对中国在非洲做法对于美国外交政策利益的含意所做的简要评论。报告以对美-中-非在官方，商业和公民社会领域提出扼要并富有前景的选择做为结束。

# 中国演变中的非洲政策 做法

## 形成中国目前对非洲政策做法的关键因素

虽然中国自50年代以来一直与非洲国家保持良好的双边外交关系，并向非洲大陆的伙伴们提供大量开发和基础设施援助，但直到2000年，北京才对非洲做为一个整体发起更全面和雄心勃勃的接近攻势。中非合作多边论坛（FOCAC）进程和各项宗旨就最好地反映了这一崭新和更加积极主动的做法。CSIS代表团访华后确信，以下六个关键因素在很大程度上影响着中国的做法。

*1. 中国寻求与非洲建立战略伙伴关系与北京的全球外交政策战略及其关于不断演变的国际体系的远见全面相吻合。*

非洲被视为北京促进形成“新的安全理念”之战略雄心的不可或缺的组成部分，该理念可确保中国和平崛起为全球强国，并加强与关键邻国和各地之间的关系。通过其扩展性的全球做法，中国领导人寻求持续保持内部发展和国内政治稳定、在国际社会内部使中国崛起带来的历史性益处合法化，并实现其更加多极化、公平和“民主”的国际体系的更长期目标。

中国的硬国家利益和战略需求使其愈加与非洲分不开。在前几十年中，政治团结和利他主义主导着中国对非洲的讨论。这些论调在今天仍然相关，但已退位给国家硬利益。按照中国外交部一位高级官员的话说，目前“中国需要非洲”。中国需要非洲的资源来给其发展目标提供燃料，需要其市场来保持经济增长，需要其政治联盟来支持实现影响全球的抱负。

*2. 中国领导人和战略学家认为，中国的历史经历和发展模式与非洲国家具有异曲同工之处，因此较之西方享有比较优势。*

中国领导人和外交官们有意识地向其非洲同行介绍中国的过去、现在和将来，以吸引非洲的注意力。中国从被殖民者侵犯、内部动乱和经济绝望中走出，实现了辉煌的经济增长和基础设施开发。过去20年，中国发展的成就已使两亿中国民众脱离贫困。同时，中国可以宣称它已取得扎实的政治稳定和日益上升的国际威望。这样的描绘对非洲有着强大的吸引力。

此外，构成此番描绘之基础的中国发展道路被称为是优越的，远比西方模式要有活力。在北京看来，非洲和中国均认同这样的观点，即西方实现发展的

历史经验与非洲的经历相去甚远,可借鉴的太少,而且西方经济模式并未给非洲带来多少巨大成功的范例。照北京看来,西方的发展做法过于伦理化、官僚、有附加条件而且沉湎于腐蚀性和短视的怀疑论中。相反,北京毫不羞涩地宣称“不附带任何政治条件”地提供发展援助,并且首先强调的是政治稳定和经济发展。

*3. 中国相信,与非洲友好、相互尊重和有助益的政治联系的历史,为今后的战略伙伴关系奠定了可持续的根基。*

让中国尤为感到自豪的是,过去50年,中国在被国际上孤立,一贫如洗并被各种内部挑战所困扰之际,谱写了与非洲建立政治团结,向其提供发展援助的篇章。做为对可追溯到1955年发展中国家万隆会议上的原则之体现,中国坚定的立场是,非洲国家主权不可侵犯,不干涉内部事务,和脱离殖民统治后的国家要抗争外部“欺凌”和“霸权主义”。此外,北京认为,这一段历史与美苏超级大国冷战时期的争夺而给非洲留下的政治和安全状况非常相似,它煽起安哥拉、莫桑比克和埃塞俄比亚的战火,并导致了与扎伊尔总统蒙伯托和索马里总统巴里这样的腐败强人结成联盟。

中国领导人也认识到,其与非洲的关系已给中国带来了丰厚的外交回报。北京没有忘却,非洲在70年代初提供的支持,对于北京恢复在联合国席位起到了至关重要作用。如今,北京极力靠近那些仍正式承认台湾的非洲国家,以进一步在国际舞台上孤立台湾。<sup>1</sup>

*4. 中国认为非洲实现发展的腾飞已指日可待。*

中国分析人士颇有信心地认为,非洲已跨过一个历史的门坎,总体上朝着一个要光明的多的未来迈进—中国可在其中发挥正面和积极的作用。根据这一看法,与90年代十多个国家长期陷入冲突的黑暗时期相比,非洲已出现了一段较稳定和平静的时期。中国相关人士认识到,还持续存在局部的冲突,需要国际社会密切介入:如苏丹/达富尔、索马里、刚果民主共和国(DRC)和象牙海岸。然而,中国更普遍的对非洲的看法是和平与稳定日益上升,非洲大陆已有条件去获取重大的开发益处。因此,中国加大介入和扩展作用的时机已成熟。

*5. 中国决策者深信,采用以国家为主导的挺进非洲的做法,将在战略上增强北京的核心力量并与非洲国家所阐明的意愿相一致。*

通过官方政府与政府间关系行事,是北京接触非洲主要和高度倾向的的方

<sup>1</sup> 截止2006年底,非洲5个国家保持与台湾的正式外交关系:布基纳法索、冈比亚、马拉维、圣多美和普林西比和斯威士兰。此外,台湾政府在非洲设有四个准官方的联络处:一个设在尼日利亚(在阿布加),另外三个设在南非(分别在普里特利亚、开普敦和约翰内斯堡)。

## 6 中国在非洲的扩展角色

式。对于北京高级官员而言，中非关系的下一个三年期，将几乎完全由围绕峰会宣言中阐明的八项核心政策动议而制定的综合行动计划来指导。行动计划是中国和非洲同行之间经过多年官方对话、数次政府计划代表团互访和外交报告的结晶。同样，中国就其非洲政策与第三方的接触一如美中高级领导人对话及其关于非洲的主题对话——严格局限于官方渠道，并且将保持下去。

对北京而言，这样的做法能发挥其强势。由于其非洲政策不因国内选民和利益集团而变得复杂，因此可更快更果断地采取行动。国有或受国家影响的企业主导着中国在非洲最大的经济和商业活动，从而使北京官方在非洲的政治和经济竞争中又胜出一筹。中国缺乏发育良好，独立的商业和公民社会部门，致使目前完全由国家领导人和外交官全面负责推进其远见。

*6. 决策者认为，在非洲事务上与第三方接触符合中国的利益，但应慎重、缓慢并充分保留意见。*

从原则上说，中国对与美国和其它发达国家在非洲进行合作持开放态度。外交部副部长张业遂在对 CSIS 代表团的开场致辞中，重申了就与美国进行合作持开放态度，与其致力于保持美中就非洲进行战略对话相一致。中方与会者认知吸取美国和西方其它国家关于非洲的知识和专长的价值，其中包括与非洲公民社会、企业伙伴和地区组织的接触。

然而，中国依然对美国讨论其在非洲的做法，包括所建议的协作，感到谨慎并高度敏感。这反映了北京继续对它所认为的美国霸权感到忧虑，和担忧华盛顿的长期意图在于挫败或遏制中国全面成为全球强国的雄心。它根植于中国民族主义的自豪，对无所不在的美国力量、影响力和在非洲（及世界其它地方）的说教表示不屑。最近与此情绪最直接相关的是2005年中海油（CNOOC）竞购美国尤尼科能源公司遭遇失败。中国分析人士一再指出，这证明了美国决意要阻止中国一家全球能源企业的崛起，这件事的后果直接促使中国当局加大在非洲建立战略伙伴关系的力度。

## 中国在非洲扩展的角色和2006年11月中非合作论坛（FOCAC）高峰会

近几年来，中国本着以上六大因素保持势头并汲取信心，在非洲政治、经济和文化领域扩大树立其存在。这些活动显然证实了中国在非洲日益增长的利益；也清晰表明非洲大陆对于蓬勃发展的中国经济，和上升的政治地位正在形成的重要性。

中国高级官员为了确立高层次访问的频率，目前已建立了在每年新年伊始，先对非洲做一次重大官方访问的外交惯例。2007年，外长李肇星于1月1日开始访问非洲七国，这些国家是：贝宁、赤道几内亚、几内亚-比绍、乍得、

中非共和国、厄立特利亚和博茨瓦那。中国在2006年1月首次发表了官方关于中非关系的白皮书，随后，在中国与非洲建立外交关系50周年之际，国家主席胡锦涛、总理温家宝和外长李肇星在当年上半年访问了非洲十多个国家。在每次高调访问中，中国官员不断强调与非洲的共同立场和表达中国在维和、立法部门交流、人力资源开发、医药与卫生、司法合作和农经等领域加强对话的愿望。

过去几年，中国也保证对非洲商品给予免征关税待遇，促进非洲对中国出口市场的多样化。北京已探索增加在非洲投资的途径。据由世行在2007年出版的*非洲的丝绸之路：中国和印度的新经济边境*，截止2005年，中国进出口银行为非洲近24个国家的55个项目累计承诺提供八亿美元的优惠贷款。此外，2000年，中国同意减免非洲31个国家12亿美元的债务。在2003年举行的第二届FOCAC峰会上，北京承诺再为非洲国家注销7.5亿美元的债务。这项世行研究进而估计，截止2006年年中，中国进出口银行光是就基础设施开发一项，就向非洲提供了总计为125亿美元的贷款。这些项目主要集中在安哥拉、莫桑比克、尼日利亚、苏丹和津巴布韦。

在能源领域，中国从非洲（主要是安哥拉、苏丹、尼日利亚和赤道几内亚）进口的石油继续增加，目前占从外部进口石油总额的30%，占中国能源需求总量的4%至5%。2006年1月，中国首次发表了其非洲政策白皮书，其中要求中资企业与非洲国家合作“理性地开发和利用他们的天然资源”。非洲占世界上被证实的石油储备的8%，其中近四分之三位于西非。在今后十年中，近海石油新发现将集中在西非的几内亚湾，每四桶进入世界市场的新石油中，就有一桶来自那里。与其西方同行一样，中国石油公司尤其对这批含硫量低的原油感兴趣，并正在大力着手兴建输油管道，炼油厂，并取得勘探权。自2003年以来，安哥拉一直是非洲向中国售油的主要供应商。2006年，安哥拉占中国从非洲石油进口的50%，超过沙特成为中国主要外部石油供应商。

最近几年中，北京大幅扩大了文化教育交流。预计到2020年有1亿中国游客，使中国成为世界最大的外向型旅游市场之一。2003年以来，中国一直将非洲宣传为旅游去处，并批准了非洲二十多个国家为官方认可的旅游目的地。2005年，有11万中国游客访问了非洲，比2004年人数翻了一番。此外，为促进教育交流，最近在肯尼亚、卢旺达和南非建立了三所儒家学院。这些学院在中国政府的支持下，并与非洲的大学结为伙伴，为非洲学生提供中文和文化课程。中国教育部估算，有八千名以上的非洲学生正在学习中文。随着感兴趣的学生人数增加，在不远的将来，预计再启动五家儒家学院。

中国在FOCAC框架下更加扩展其在非洲的活动。2006年11月在北京举行的第三届FOCAC峰会，以其热度、规模和雄心都超过了头两届——2002年在北京，2003年在亚的斯亚贝巴。

中国领导层动用了大量努力和特权确保11月峰会的成功。从各界报道来看，非洲领导人热情接纳了北京提出的前景和机会。峰会出台的主要文件，北京FOCAC行动计划（2007-2009年），展示出在几大领域的合作（政治合作，经济合作，国际事务合作和社会发展合作），以及中国扩大在非洲活动规模的宏伟目标。<sup>2</sup>

在行动计划提出的诸多保证中，中国承诺：

- 派遣100位高级农业专家到非洲，建立10个农业示范场地；
- 建立中-非发展基金，逐渐达到50亿美元，以支持“成功和声誉佳”的中国公司在非洲投资；
- 将从最不发达并与中国有外交关系的非洲国家出口到中国，享受零关税待遇的商品从190种增加到440种；
- 到2009年将发展援助翻一番；
- 在今后三年中向非洲国家提供30亿美元的优惠贷款和20亿美元的出口买方信贷；
- 取消与中国有外交关系的非洲重债穷国（HIPC）和最不发达国家（LDCs）2005年底到期的无息政府贷款；
- 在今后三年内，为非洲国家培训15,000名专业人员；
- 成立100所农村学校，将非洲领奖学金的学生人数翻番至4000名；
- 建立10家医院和30家抗疟疾诊所，并提供三亿元人民币（约3750万美元），用来购买抗疟疾药品；
- 在今后三年中，派遣300位中国青年到非洲，以中国青年志愿者援助非洲规划的名义，支持教育、农业、体育和与卫生相关的项目。

## 中国在非洲紧迫的挑战

在将其与非洲建立战略伙伴的远见转化为可持续现实方面，北京面临一些难以对付的挑战。CSIS代表团辨别出九大核心挑战。

### 1. 中国将需要不间断地克服语言、文化、宗教和种族偏见的障碍。

中文不为非洲所广为使用，为了最为有效率地工作，中国的外交官、商人、技术人员、医生、维和人员，以及其他“文化大使”，必须掌握在非洲普遍使用的语言，如英语和法语。同样，未来在非洲的活动将需要更多考虑到非

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<sup>2</sup> 北京FOCAC行动计划（2007-2009年）全文，附在报告附件中。

洲社会特有的宗教信仰，并建立起目前尚为缺乏的官方做法，与宗教领袖进行接触。宗教组织，不管是穆斯林还是基督教，都提供广泛和正在扩大的社会服务，尤其在教育和卫生领域。他们有与非洲以外同事的庞大联络网，并在公众辩论的课题方面代表民意。在全球基督教社会中，从成员和参与率角度出发，非洲的新教和天主教发展最快。非洲的三亿穆斯林教徒形成高度复杂，充满活力和多样的社会。

2. 尽管 *FOCAC* 行动计划呼吁加强非洲和中国媒体间交流，并为双方在对方国安置常驻记者做出安排，但迄今中国媒体和大众文化只有限地进入非洲市场。中国的政策咨询和智囊界对非洲的知识与专长甚少，并缺乏最新和实地经验。

随着与非洲关系的深化和更复杂化，中国将需要比现在更加细微地理解其关键非洲伙伴国家的新情况。中国院校学者和智囊专家们不能定期或有充分机会访问非洲和进行实地研究。

3. 演变中的非洲大众观点，即“非洲街头巷尾”，目前未被系统地纳入北京的思维。

相反，能看到的只是几处对局部挑战有针对和策略性的片面反应（例如，迫于南非政府，贸易联盟和媒体的强大压力，2006年在南非实施自愿纺织品配额）。

4. 中国的做法，既不熟悉也不具能力与非洲非政府团体打交道，这些团体正在兴起，且愈加畅所欲言并具影响力。

冷战结束之后，随着非洲政治环境的自由化，雨后春笋般的草根团体突然束缚减少，开始遍地开花。随着90年代的向前推进，人们开始注意到它们在多个领域中的专长：如选举准备与监督；独立媒体；倡导经济改革，人权，保护弱势人口，支持女权等等。到90年代末，做为任何国家决策民意调查的重要伙伴，非政府部类已经在许多国家中立稳脚跟。的确，非政府部类开始培育明智的改革人士，为政府的改革举措服务，并在加纳和肯尼亚这样的国家中，成为非洲发展新伙伴（NEPAD）同伴考核之核心。

5. 坚持不干涉内政的政策，并不断将其付诸实施将是困难的，并且，随时间推移，将可能与中国不断加深的利益相冲突。

随其国家和企业利益在非洲的深化，北京将日益面临的压力是，要与不动摇的“不附带任何政治条件”和绝对尊重主权的政策背道而驰，而支持实用的调整和采取有针对性的行动。已有证据表明，针对非洲政策的目标和实施，以及关于中国政府如何更好地管理其与非洲愈加复杂化的关系问题，在中国政府圈内已存在政策争议。

中国在像尼日利亚这样的国家环境中，将日益面临严重的结构腐败，缺乏法



律和秩序，暴力，挟持人质，以及对私有能源和其它部类利益进行有目标的打击。同时，中国将面对来自非洲和外部的指责，要求其在对安哥拉，赞比亚和埃塞俄比亚这样的国家进行的援助和企业做法更加负责任与透明。对于像苏丹达富尔地区的骇人的人道危机，中国将不断受到压力，要其对人道主义干预进行支持。

*6. 中国日益受到的压力是如何对正在出台的对非政策以及对非长期策略进行内部协调和策略落实指导。*

究竟谁在负责调解商务部、外交部、半自主能源和采矿企业，大型基建公司和其它重要的国内角色的利益，目前还不甚明朗。不同的政府角色在非洲政策问题上将不同的关注和优势，以及确保利益在中国国内实现的能力，带入辩论。例如，那些日趋市场化的中国企业——以及他们在中国的国有股东——主要关心的是他们国际业务的盈利情况。虽然这是可以理解的，但当追逐利益与更广义的中国政府对非政策变得复杂化或相矛盾时，这些企业如何行事，还是不清楚的。与其相关的是，中国将面临压力来调和非洲国家的需求和更好地处理非洲政府的期望值。现阶段尚不清晰的是如何将来自非洲上升的需求和预期分出轻重缓急。非洲的显赫人物正施压为 FOCAC 成立真正的中非联合实施委员会，但2006年底尚未达成任何协议。

*7. 在诸多有争议的做法中，中国海外企业界构成与行贿和生产假冒产品相关的特殊“声誉风险”。*

外交部目前不具备足够的管理能力管理这一问题。国家发改委和商务部只能在一定程度内，对大型国企施加影响并对其做法进行指导。对于今天活跃在非洲的成千上万的中国企业家，它们的影响微乎其微。

*8. 中国在正在进行的国际援助与其在非洲的赠款活动之间，尤其是债务方面，更好地进行协调的压力将增大。*

目前，尚没有中国各部委与在非洲进行深度投资的国际和双边赠款人，或参与北京发起的新兴战略伙伴关系的非洲国家之间进行系统的数据分享。也尚未为融和援助以及避免重复劳动而在广泛的国际一级或国家一级的层面上建立有效的双边和多边机制。中国的做法不考虑它的努力如何与国际货币基金组织，世界银行和采矿业增加透明度动议（EITI）之间的关联。日益上升的忧虑是，中国的贷款做法损害到在过去十年中与非洲国家和地区机构合作共同制定的减债战略，这些战略已大幅减少了非洲的债务负担。所担心的是，中国的贷款做法可能会助长非洲不可维继的债务负担迅速东山再起。

中国官员一再坚持，它给非洲国家的贷款将不附带任何具体前提条件。2006年，中国为尼日利亚、安哥拉和莫桑比克承诺了81亿美元。世界上最大的出口信贷机构之一的国有中国进出口银行——其年贷款额为150亿美元——争论说，它的贷款和信贷已帮助非洲国家“建设一系列带来积极社会和经济回报

的关键项目”。

2006年10月，对于非洲许多最贫穷国家可能会因中国的银行无条件贷款而面临大批新债务，世界银行行长沃尔福威茨表达了他的焦虑。华盛顿尤其担忧的是，非洲的借贷格局，及其可能给重债穷国减债动议，和与此相关的尼日利亚310亿美元减债方案所带来的影响。该方案由八国集团2005年在苏格兰 Gleneagles 峰会上形成。最激烈的指责是2006年9月美国财政部称中国为“无赖债权人”，正在实行“机会主义贷款”。

9. *北京将面临更多压力，主要应对如何更好地在非洲问题上处理与其最重要的双边合作伙伴美国的关系。*

于2005年底启动的美-中地区非洲主题对话，达成了制定协作项目的初步性协议。然而，自那以后，进展停滞不前。同时，美国遭受愈强压力来就中国在非洲的一些所作所为与中国对质，最主要问题有达富尔，债务，能源竞争，商业做法，以及与像津巴布维这样的声名狼藉的国家之关系。随着最近美国国会控制权的转移，对中美关系性质进行批判性审议的兴趣大幅提高。一些倡导运动，如“拯救达富尔联盟”，继续力推对中国进行新的制裁，作为一种手段来获得更多合作，促使形成在达富尔的联合国—非盟联合性维和行动。

# 对美国的意义

如同中国，美国正处于比以往任何时候规模都大的扩大在非洲活动的时期。在布什政府执政期间，美国对非洲提供的海外援助增加了三倍以上。白宫启动了多项侧重于非洲的标致性动议：为期五年，耗资150亿美元的总统救助爱滋病紧急计划（PEPFAR）、美国消除疟疾计划和千年挑战合作动议，该动议为治理良好和经济表现佳的国家提供大量新的援助方案，用以加快经济增长。私营部门在非洲的活动稳步上升，主要集中在能源领域，年度双向贸易在2005年达到606亿美元，比2004年增长36.7%。

自9/11以来，美国已大幅扩大了军事介入：启动了泛撒哈拉反恐动议；目前正在制定几内亚湾海运动议，还有雄心勃勃的非洲之角反恐规划。预计未来15年将在吉布提设立非洲之角-联合特遣部队（CJTF-HOA）。继埃塞俄比亚在2006年12月底对索马里实施军事干预，推翻伊斯兰法院政府后，美国于2007年1月初直接进行介入，对在逃涉嫌运载“硬目标”的恐怖分子护卫队实施了打击，这些恐怖分子与1998年8月基地组织袭击美国驻肯尼亚和坦桑尼亚大使馆，及2002年11月袭击在肯尼亚蒙巴萨的以色列游客有关。

截止目前，美国和中国都专注于各自的领域，扩大各自在非洲的存在和投资，几乎没有系统或实质性地考虑对方。美国一些智囊机构的初步研究以及媒体的多篇报道，引发了对中非关系的关注，这些研究和报道经常局限于令人忧虑和苛薄之言。2005年，美国和中国确实在原则上认可在美中战略对话框架内举行美中非洲次地区对话，但此后在将实质内容列入此项承诺方面几乎没有取得进展。

那么，对于不断演变的美中关系性质，以及美国和中国并行在非洲大幅扩大活动对美国的意义可做何进一步解读呢？

首先，也是最重要的，如果要避免美中在非洲发生代价高昂的冲突，和有效地追寻富有成效协作的各个机会，美国需要采纳更有战略性的做法。广义而言，美国和中国在寻求更具协作和建设性双边关系中有着一系列共同的利益，因此可在这一现实基础上建立战略性的方略。两国关系处于相对稳定和建设性对话时期，从而为在扩大两国共同基础方面取得进一步进展提供了机遇。显而易见，双方在经济上已经是你中有我，并且在以能确保双边经济利

益得以继续的方式来运作两国的政治和安全关系中有着共同的利益。此外，最近的经历已证实，两国通过合作和健康的竞争，而非通过对立，来应对面临的诸多安全挑战，胜数要大得多。这些挑战包括从阻止伊朗和北韓的核野心到确保能源供给，到解决全球气候变暖。

这种正在深化的相互依存也突出表明美国需要以战略远见处理中-非关系，认识到美国在一个领域采取的行动，可能对另一领域产生不经意和潜在负面的影响。中海油收购尤尼科公司遭遇失败，就戏剧性地说明了这一点，中国决策圈广泛相信这是美国执意要阻止一家中国全球能源企业崛起，因而促使他们加快与非洲建立战略关系。中国在其非洲做法中越来越能够部署资源并做出决定，对美国在其它地方的行动触及其既定全球利益时做出反应。美国应假定今后还会有更多这类无法预见的意外，但应努力尽可能加以避免。

“我们和中国[在达富尔/苏丹]的政策，比我们预想的要接近，我相信中国在帮助我们解决这一问题方面将起到日益重要的作用。我认为，这是一次非常成功的访问，原因是，在实现这些目标方面，无论是我们的目标和战略方面，我们更多领域中找到了共识”。美国总统特使，Andrew Natsios，2007年1月12日，星期五，在离京前的记者会上说。

Natsios在为期四天的访问中，与，中国主要官员，国务委员唐家璇，以及外交部副部长杨洁篪举行了闭门会议。(资料来源：法新社，北京。)

然而，对任何做法不可或缺的预期是，抛开美中关系如何不谈，非洲的发展将不断地检验美国和中国的做法和双方展开协作的决心。这是因为非洲大多数国家机构疲弱，冲突频发，经济相对脆弱。重要性不相上下的是预期双方间持续存在的哲学观、意识形态和程序的不同、彼此间的猜疑和误解以及竞争，这些将导致紧张，使美国-中国在非洲利益之间发生冲突的风险持续存在。因此，特别需要预期针对非洲各种做法中的出现的摩擦点并预先加以管理：目前而言，最重要的是如达富尔地区这样的危机案例、敏感的援助问题，如债务和协调赠款国各项做法和能源资源的准入。

对美国而言，针对中-非关系采用这一战略性和预期性的做法，将要求通过加大开放性，在多边渠道中接触中国，如联合国、国际主要经济和金融机构以及像非盟这样基于非洲的多边机构。建立共识的缓慢，加上为此投入艰苦的外交努力一定会使人烦恼有加，但通过增进了解中国的各项政策和倾向，并促进中国做出更有建设性和合作性的回应，将带来长期内的回报。

更具体地说，可通过有意识地侧重于在非洲的强有力和共同的利益来增强战略做法。在非洲的公共卫生和传染病领域，美国和中国已就爱滋病、疟疾和禽流感各自发挥全球领导作用，双方都从政策层面上来更好地解决基础设施

能力疲弱，以及医疗卫生人员短缺的问题。

“在安理会制裁问题和武器禁运问题上，中国的参与对索马里起很大的作用，我们将继续与中国合作。事实上，我们已经在安理会与中国进行了很多建设性互动”。*主管非洲事务的国务卿助理 Jendayi Frazer 大使，在2007年1月17日在 CSIS 举行的大会 - “为索马里未来的安全：外交、援助及安全活动的选择” - 发表演讲。*

Frazer 大使赞扬了中国为联合国安理会第1725决议案和 IGAD 支持和平赴索马里使团 (IGASOM) 提供的关键支持。(资料来源：CSIS [文字由联邦新闻社提供])。

在解决冲突、维和能力和非洲反恐问题上，双方的理念和做法呈现很大的趋同。虽然双方在达富尔问题上依然存在分歧，但最近双方在联合国安理会悄悄调合关于苏丹问题的外交做法，已取得进展。同为联合国安理会常任理事国，中国和美国在制定非洲维和作业中分享决策权，该维和作业占全球范围维和作业的65%。双方都对为非洲维和能力投资表现出愈加浓厚的兴趣。在涉及基地组织对非洲构成威胁问题上，双方在观点和做法上不存在严重的分歧。例如，今后几内亚湾海事安全的改善，将的确使中国和美国的能源安全都同样获益。同时，美国大张旗鼓要中国发挥更大作用的主张，将需要因北京一贯坚持国家主权和不干涉内政的政策而降温。

在确保非洲长期内实现可预测和稳定的治理、使非洲更好地融入全球经济、建立贸易能力和减轻贫困方面，也存在同样固然相同的经济和政治利益。衡量今后岁月是否取得成功的标准是，美国和中国能否在非洲展开一系列具体的协作，这些协作将产生新的现实、展示共同利益的范围、促进非洲福祉和防范加剧紧张和导致损害性冲突的冲动之举。

最后，由于美国在全球其它地区有着急迫的外交和安全政策的考虑，并且已经在非洲实施几项重大和正在增加的外交、人道、开发和安全方面的动议，因此存在的风险是，美国决策者不愿意或无法就中国扩大在非洲活动给予所需的优先关注和投入政策精力。这将是一个错误。各种机会和利益现在都表明，应该更加准确地评估中国针对非洲的做法、更加有效地接触中国和努力形成对非洲人、中国人和美国人有益的结果。

# 展望未来

## 今后的政策选择

以下篇幅就美国-中国-非洲在官方、商业和公民社会领域展开协作提供了几项扼要和富有前景的选择。这些建议涵盖四个部分的做法，多边、政府间、商业和公民社会层次。

### 多边层次

- *高度重视多边机构—如联合国安理会、联合国各作业机构、非盟和非洲次地区机构—做为重要机制来就美-中-非洲在政治和安全领域展开协作而获得中国的支持。*

鉴于北京坚持“不干涉”和主权不可侵犯的原则，它将仍然不愿意在地区或国际共识达成的使命以外，采取行动解决各国内部发生的人道或政治危机。然而，如果形成由联合国或非盟通过的国际共识，北京将会更加支持潜在的干预，同时仍保持较低的姿态。

就良好治理和人权问题而言，中国和美国都认同已由非盟通过的原则，这将是富有前景的一个做法。这些原则包括于1986年10月生效的非盟人类和人权宪章和非盟的创立法规。

华盛顿应进一步鼓励中国参与多边赠款人在国际和受援国一级举行的关于非洲的讨论，以更好地在赠款人现有活动与中国扩大的活动之间进行协调。不应当仅仅由美国来呼吁中国参与这些活动，还应由联合国赠款机构、赠款国和通过非洲与北京的多边和双边渠道提出呼吁。

- *鼓励中国、美国和其它国际赠款人之间更深入接触。*

例如，债务可持续问题可能是这些伙伴可在非洲朝更紧密协作迈进的一个领域。

尽管仍存在差距，但让中国的援助与国际赠款人的贷款做法相融合的必要性的已经呈现。北京似乎意识到其贷款做法的长期后果。在最近公布的 FOCAC 行动计划中，中国同意“积极参与用于非洲国家战后重建、人道救助和扶贫的双边和多边援助计划”。2006年底，世界银行与中国官员举行了直接会谈。2006年12月，美国商务部长鲍尔森率领由内阁部长和美国其他高级决策者组成的代表团访问北京，参加首次经济战略对话会议，债务可持续也被列

入讨论议程。对话主要目标之一，是在现有各机制之下就开发援助和多边开发银行的贷款增进双边的合作。

华盛顿通过双边和诸如经合发组织与世界银行这样的多边机构努力接触中国，这是一个促进负责任地贷款的首要步骤，并帮助确保非洲国家从有协调的援助和减债进程中获益，同时避免积累无法维继的新债。

中国和其它国际赠款人就各扶贫规划展开协调，也有助于避免重复劳动，并确保更有效地分配资源。

- *鼓励八国集团在2007年德国峰会上让中国参与到与八国集团利益切身相关的非洲开发议题中。*

中国高级官员定期被邀出席八国集团峰会，2007年，他们将得以扩展正在进行中的各种动议，这些动议旨在提高医疗能力，来抗击爱滋病、疟疾和结核病，改革全球贸易机制、促进更高透明度和建立非洲维和能力。

- *鼓励中国加入采矿行业提高透明度动议 (EITI)。*

EITI 是非政府组织，成立于2003年，常设国际秘书处位于挪威奥斯陆，据其网站介绍，该组织“旨在确保采矿业的营收为可持续发展和扶贫做出贡献”。全球资源丰盛的20多个国家—包括非洲的14个国家<sup>1</sup>—支持或积极实施 EITI 的原则和指南，EITI 得到另外几十个国家的政府、从事采矿业的跨国企业、行业协会、国际组织、非政府组织和主要机构投资者的支持。迄今为止，无论是中国政府还是中国企业，都没有参与 EITI。随着中国能源和其它天然资源开采企业日益扩展在非洲的存在，促使他们参与 EITI 将是至关重要的。如果中国能做为支持国的身份参与，它将与美国、欧洲、墨西哥和其它投资国一起努力，确保产能国提高能源投资创造的收入透明度的提高。中国的参与将为讨论提高能源行业收入的透明度问题提供一个平台，使中国了解非洲许多产能国打击能源领域腐败的愿望，促使中国支持国际上为增强全球能源安全和中国自身利益所做的努力。

- *在 FOCAC 框架之下，中国及其伙伴应建立常设秘书处或其它高层协调机构来指导和实施其正在深化的伙伴关系。*

非洲几位有影响力的政治领导人，有强烈意愿对 FOCAC 的前进方向和中国为满足非洲的需求日益增加提供援助的水平和性质，发表更多的看法。北京将从这样一种安排中获益，尤其是它帮助确立其在非洲雄心勃勃的援助目标的轻重缓急和侧重点，通过更规律地与非洲同行们的磋商，帮助使中国的政策合法化。正式设立秘书处或类似的机构也将使诸如国际贷款机构或双边赠

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<sup>1</sup> 这些非洲国家为安哥拉、喀麦隆、乍得、刚果民主共和国、刚果共和国、赤道几内亚、加蓬、加纳、几内亚、毛里塔尼亚、尼日尔、尼日利亚、圣多美和普林西比、塞拉利昂。

款人这样的第三方发挥适宜的参与作用，来提议或协调非洲的各项协作性活动。

## 双边政府关系

- *加快形成关于美中在非洲进行合作的更有实质性的议程，并认知固有的局限性。*

在美中高级领导人对话框架内，进行非洲主题对话意味着原则上同意就非洲及在非洲的协作性活动举行更规律的磋商。对2006年11月公布的 FOCAC 三年行动计划的讨论和澄清，可构成主题对话讨论的中心出发点。有关非洲的问题和讨论也可融入由美国财长鲍尔森新近主导发起的经济战略对话进程。

然而，即便提出更具实质性的议程，北京和华盛顿也会感到难以在非洲实施严格的双边规划。需要在非洲启动具体和实地的合作性动议与在多边框架中此举益处之间进行权衡，尤其是那些已经投入运行的多边框架。

- *增进目前进行中的双边磋商，解决迫在眉睫和正在出现的各项挑战。*

需要立即关注非洲之角日趋不稳定的局势，尤其是涉及横跨非洲之角海岸线岛国的情况：索马里、埃塞俄比亚、苏丹和乍得。也应促进磋商和形成联合解决方案，以应对尼日尔三角洲、安哥拉、津巴布维、尼日利亚正在出现的安全和政治挑战，以及沿非洲东海岸能源和原材料海上运输的安全问题。

- *中国增加与其它关键角色，包括非盟、欧洲国家和美国之间就对非洲增加军队以及军队间合作的磋商。*

中国和其它关键角色正考虑扩大他们的军队在协助应对非洲许多地方的安全挑战中的作用。自2000年以来，中国已大幅度增加其维和力量，目前是为联合国维和部队贡献人数最多的国家之一，共有1600名以上的军人、警察和军事观察员执行11项使命。目前，在联合国的非洲7项维和使命中，中国维和部队参与了其中的六项。<sup>2</sup> 随着国际社会考虑扩大在诸如苏丹达富尔这些地区的存在，和其它地区可能需要联合国增加维和力量，美国，中国和非盟及其它相关各方将需要为此相应加强磋商。做为美国日益担忧非洲的稳定、国家崩溃和恐怖主义的体现，美军即将成立新的非洲司令部这一考虑的原委，将构成美国和中国讨论非洲大陆安全问题的一个起始点。

- *就非洲的医疗和教育相关的问题加强协作。*

美国和中国已就解决全球卫生领域的一系列首要问题展开双边合作。也许可在美中高级领导人对话或美中经济战略对话框架内扩展这一双边合作，进行

<sup>2</sup> 截止2006年底，中国维和部队参加了联合国在西撒哈拉、刚果民主共和国、埃塞俄比亚和厄立特里亚、利比里亚、苏丹和科特迪瓦的维和使命。



更全面的磋商并就与全球卫生，尤其有关非洲的相关问题协调活动。双方共同关注的非洲卫生问题包括抗击爱滋病、为抵御疟疾做出更大贡献和阻止结核病的传播。中美专家还可以携手为非洲避免暴发 SARS、禽流感 and 类似致命疾病提供防控和其它技术咨询。中国建造的医疗设施完工后，可与美国提供医学和科学技术援助和培训联手。中国有关部门敦促美国和西方开发援助规划加大使用中国传统抗疟疾药品，青蒿素。

双边合作的另一有前景领域在于联合制定中学、大学和研究生教育规划。两国政府可携手将资源重点投放到教育和培训规划上，着重于商业管理、良好的企业治理和知识产权保护。

## 商业、经济和贸易活动

- *预期中国将与非洲和美国建立三边商业伙伴关系。*

中国一些大企业正寻求与已在非洲运作的公司合作，包括跨国公司，建立合资企业和其它类型的企业间伙伴关系。采矿业特别有可能建立这样的安排。

- *鼓励中国在非洲建立公共-私人伙伴关系。*

随着中国企业更深地介入到非洲，他们将需要探索建立公共-私人企业伙伴关系，做为回馈社区和消除潜在名誉受损的手段。应鼓励中国商人参与活跃在非洲各个城市的地方商业组织，更好地了解商业之间以及商业、政府和公众之间的关系。

- *寻求促进贸易和出口的合作。*

在贸易能力开发领域，美中合作可产生特殊的整合效应。美国已大幅度增加对非洲的贸易能力开发援助。布什政府已承诺在今后三年将全球范围的贸易能力开发援助金额增加一倍，达到27亿美元，其中很大一部分资金将投放到非洲。联同贸易能力开发援助，布什政府已将投资于贸易能力基础设施做为其千年挑战合作赠款规划的一个关键特征。做为美中就非洲展开讨论的一个部分，美方可说明贸易能力开发如何与非洲地区经济共同体—东部和南部非洲共同市场（COMESA）、南部非洲开发共同体（SADC）、西非国家经济共同体（ECOWAS）和西非经济和货币联盟（UEMOA）—建立了紧密的联系，并寻找三边途径与非洲国家当局一起，确保美国和中国大幅增加的开发和贸易援助是互补性的。例如，美国为提高非洲国家海关当局行政和管理实践所提供的技术援助，可对中国投资建设海港和机场基础设施或农产品存储设施构成补充。

## 公民社会和非政府组织

- *促进中国、非洲和国际公民社会组织之间的互动。*

迄今为止，中国扩展在非洲活动尚未接触非洲蓬勃兴起的公民社会组织。与在非洲运作的当地和国际公民社会组织一同工作，将被证明是获得当地政府更好地理解并准确判断当地社区对中国扩展活动的反应的有效手段。政府、企业、基金会和慈善机构应考虑如何使中国正在出现的公民社会组织与其非洲同行建立联系。这样的互动将包括由学者和政策分析人士组成的代表团，就共同感兴趣的研究问题进行交流，观摩基层选举，通过合作性活动来支持保护环境或提高工人的安全以及与良好治理、宗教活动、社区卫生、妇女和女童权益相关的其它公民社会活动。

▪ *促进美国和中国的非洲学者之间进行互动。*

在加深中国学术界对当代非洲的了解方面，可做的事情很多。关注国际关系的慈善机构应考虑资助中国学者和政策分析人士到美国和欧洲以及非洲从事研究、讲学和其它研究和培训活动。这将类似于福特基金会在90年代实施的项目，该项目资助一批中国学者到著名的美国大学里认真从事研究生水平的非洲问题研究。另一选择是通过提供少量的资助，来促进中国学者参加主要的学术会议，如大学兴办的各种大会或非洲研究学会年会，或为由美国、中国和非洲学者参与的联合研究项目提供支持。考虑到美国和中国在非洲利益的上升，现在将是建议实施这种联合教育规划的时机。





